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ABSTRACT 
A Best Estimate Method for the Diagnosis and Mitigation of Multiple-Failure 
Transients in Nuclear Power Plants. (May 1989) 
Roben P. Martin, B. S. , Texas A &. M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Bahram Nassersharif 
This software was designed to diagnose major nuclear power plant transients 
in real-time by analyzing simulated sensor and plant thermal hydraulic information, 
typical of that available in a nuclear power plant contxol room and is able to provide 
emergency response operating pmcedures for mitigating transient scenarios. The 
purpose of this code is to analyze incoming data froin a nuclear power plant (or from a 
power plant simulation), interpret the control system data over consecutive time 
increments, determine the transient sequence, allow the operator to add relevant 
information, return diagnosis and suggested remedy responses (taken from nuclear- 
plant emergency operating guidelines). This expert system specifically addresses 
issues of uncertainty management, multiple failure, real-time, best estimate diagnosis, 
information management, and mitigation procedures. 
The "best-estimate" strategy presented here involves using a modification of 
assumption-based truth maintenance system (ATMS) theory to improve diagnosis. 
This method extends the ATMS technique by incorporating a means for ignoring minor 
conflicts in the knowledge base, known as confidence level assessment. This allows 
for a simpler, more efficient knowledge base, making real time diagnosis possible. 
This modification requires that as part of the assumption set (i. e. , heuristic rules and 
procedures), weighing factors are assigned to each assumption, these weighing factors 
are manipulated by an inference engine in such a way as to accommodate for this 
problem. A few expert systems have been developed that apply a deviation of this idea, 
concentrating on applying a themy of probability, However, the work presented herein 
is based on a different method involving "confidence levels". 
For this project a qualitative model of a nuclear power plant and the ATMS 
knowledge base of transient facts were developed as part of a software experiment 
demonstrating the software and the methods on which it is based. Four case studies were 
performed and evaluated. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this work was to develop an expert system (ES) using 
assumption-based truth maintenance theory capable of monitoring a "simulated" nuclear 
reactor facility. The ES would detect deviations from normal operation, diagnose the 
event, and propose possible mitigation pmcedures to resolve the problem. Such an 
expert system must address many issues that will affect performance. 
Normal operation of a nuclear power plant is controlled by the plant trip and 
control system. When an emergency occurs, an accurate and thorough understanding 
of the state of the reactor is necessary to diagnose and mitigate the transient because 
consequences could be severe. For example, during the first few minutes of an event, 
as many as 100 annunciators can alarm in the control room. Reaction to this 
information overload and the mechanical failure of certain sensors can lead to a 
misinterpretation of the situation; consequendy, a plant can be permanently damaged 
and safety of the public may be at risk 
For a pmper evaluation of a potential accident, it is necessary to closely monitor 
the many components of a nuclear reactor system. Ideally, an operator would want to 
know the exact state of the reactor at all times. In cases of multiple-failure transients, 
diagnosis is more difficult because the existing operating guidelines do not sufficiendy 
cover such cases. Often the failure of one component causes the failure of another or 
interferes with mitigation of the transient. An alternative to the current operating 
environment would be to introduce intelligent software to perform analysis on 
occurring plant conditions. A computer could be interfaced with the existing plant 
computer which collects plant information and could analyze many transients in real 
time. Analysis of plant control system data could then be correlated against operator 
emergency response guidelines and a corresponding mitigating response could be 
determined. In complex systems such as nuclear power plants allowances must also be 
made for lost or invalid sensor data 
This thesis follows the journal style recommended by Nuclear Technology. 
For complex systems such as nuclear power plants, operators are trained to deal 
with diagnosis and mitigation of a wide variety of event scenarios. During emergency 
situations, plant conditions can present a challenge to an operator's training experience. 
Information overload, multiple failure, and uncertainty can contribute additional 
problems in diagnosing and mitigating system faults. 
During the operation of nuclear power plants (or their numerical simulation), 
much data is produced describing current conditions of every subsystem and 
components inherent to the plant. Information is generated in the form of thermal- 
hydraulic data, annunciator status, sensor data, and other data which would be available 
in a nuclear power plant control room. When a transient occurs, an operator 
experiences an abundance of information which can be difficult to assess. An 
experienced operator or analyst can diagnose a transient effectively by examining the 
proper gauges and annunciators that will give him the information essential for 
diagnosis and mitigation of the transient. Likewise, for an expert system designed to 
diagnose reactor transients, it must know what essential data to reference. The quantity 
of this information load is great even for the computer, therefore, this expert system is 
designed for sequential deduction, similar to the operator. t 
Another strategy for maximizing the information fmm a minimum number of 
data sources is to concentrate on data that is unique to a transient and is most often 
available. By analyzing transient calculation data, such as that pnxluced by TRAC, z an 
understanding of the essential data needed for diagnosis can be established. Since the 
expert system is designed to be real-time, it can increase the amount of information that 
can be learned from plant data by analyzing change over a length of time. Once the 
essential data sources are determined, the method of sequential deduction can be 
folio wetL 
During multiple-failtNe reactor transients, the occurrence of a second transient 
can override the signatures that identify a first transient that may have been present for 
some time. Such cases pose a difficult problem for correctly identifying both 
transients. Strict appliance of the symptom oriented diagnostic methods currently used 
at nuclear power plants cannot be performed. An operator may have to rely only his 
intuition and experience to derive his best-estimate diagnosis of the event. 
Sometimes failures can occur with instrumentation, resulting in lost or invalid 
information required by the operator. An operator must then make his decision based 
on a subset of the total information he needs for a thorough analysis. If the uncertainty 
is great, he faces a similar problem as with multiple failure, strict application of 
established diagnostic method cannot be used. 
Due to the likelihood of invalid or unavailable data, multiple failure, infotmation 
overload, and the need for quick response to system failures, a significant amount of 
uncertainty exists for a nuclear power plant operator during a transient situation. The 
expert reactor operator can respond to this information from experience, research, 
learning, or intuition; however, these concepts are not pro~le into a mechanistic 
strategy. By using expert system techniques, those concepts can be captured to a 
degree. An expert system, as defined in n x s is a 
computer system capable of simuhuing that element of a human specialist's knowledge 
and reasoning that can be formulated into knowledge chunks characterized by a set of 
facts and heuristic rules. Heuristic rules are rules of thumb accumulated by a human 
expert through intensive problem solving in the domain of a particular task. The main 
body of an expert system usually consists of an inference engine. The inference engine 
is that part of the code that evaluates rules that define the expert knowledge. For the 
uncertainty that exists in nuclear power plants, system evaluation requires a "best- 
estimate" reasoning fmm known as well as heuristic conditions. Because mechanistic 
algorithms are incapable of this fry of reasoning, the application of expert system 
methods capable of performing this kind of analysis is necessary. 
From a user standpoint, the main difference between "intelligent" and "number 
crunching" computer systems is in the datum that can be manipulated. Traditional 
"number crunching" oriented computers manipulate numbers by mechanistic 
algorithms. "Intelligent" computers have that added capability of being able to 
manipulate symbols (i. e. , wotds, phrases, etc. ). This ability has created new strategies 
for problem solving. With symbol manipulation integrated with traditional "number 
crunching", knowledge can be captured in words and phrases compiled into a 
qualitative model or heuristic rules, Predictions of state, as well as other information, 
can be inferred from these rules which describe action and function of specific 
components integrated in a system 
Emulation of the diagnostic strategies of an expert nuclear reactor operator 
requires an evaluation of methods that can be provided by reactor operator guidelines or 
plant final safety analysis reports, and to compile them into a qualitative model or 
statements of procedure that an operator would follow during a reactor transient 
situation. A model would include instruments and gauges found in the reactor contml 
room that the operator would monitor and basic knowledge of the system as a whole. 
Statements of procedure would be based on intuitive analysis of trends occurring 
during a particular transient. 
All of this information is used by the operator in order to answer questions about 
the reactor's condition. Likewise to emulate such a process, the computer must 
transform such infortnation into a symbolic form and match it against heuristic rules 
and a qualitative knowledge base describing the system. This would include a 
compilation of all the knowledge a reactor operator would rely on during abnormal 
conditions. For example, an expert reactor operator knows that if there is a loss-of- 
coolant-accident (LOCA), the primary pressure will decrease. The computer can 
emulate this by comparing the pressure at two different times, if there is a drop in 
pressure, it can label this condition as DECREASING PRESSURE on the PRIMARY 
COOLANT LINE. A rule can be developed as IF THE PRESSURE on the PRIMARY 
COOLANT LINE is DECREASING, then CHECK FOR LOCA. 
The state-of-the-art in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Expert System technology 
has matured to a degree that the potential development of a computer aided/automated 
diagnostic and transient mitigation system can be considered. Since traditional methods 
cannot handle complex systems efficiently, AI techniques provide a ineans to emulate 
an expert reactor operator rather than following mechanistic methods. 
Assumption-based truth maintenance systems (ATMS) represent an aspect of 
this state-of-the-art technology directly applied to problem-solving. The ATMS is 
based on the manipulation of assumption sets. As a consequence it is possible to work 
effectively and efficiently with inconsistent information and to examine more than one 
point in the search space at one time, thus, ATMS is a pmblem-solving architecture in 
which all potential solutions are explored simultaneously. 
The software has been entitled CATALisp for Computer Aided Transient 
Analysis encoded in Lisp. 
A. Literature Review 
The application of AI techniques in the form of expert systems to nuclear 
engineering problems has been examined by numerous other organizations and 
individuals; however, this research has been limited by the state-of-the-art in expert 
system technology at the time of the research. Since the AI state-of-the-art is rapidly 
changing year-to-year, such research becomes outdated as new methods and better 
facilities become available; yet, the research is still significant to current projects, since 
they can provide the heuristic and qualitative knowledge that is inherent to expert 
system development as applied to nuclear engineering. 
One of the first significant applications of expert system technology was 
REACTOR4. This program can be described as a rule-based expert system designed 
for simple analysis of nuclear reactors. This expert system queried the user for 
symptoms of failure in a nuclear power plant and provided a final diagnosis. A similar 
expert system for improving operator diagnostic ability has been developed by Wells 
and Underwood. & & The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)7 has under 
development an expert system called The Reactor Safety Assessment System. This 
system generates conclusions for assessed situations given only parametric values, 
known operator actions, and transient information in the data. At the University of 
Michigan a methodology for combining model- and rule-based algorithms has been 
developed specifically for the purpose of diagnosing off-normal events in nuclear 
power plants fmm thermal-hydraulic conditions in the plant in real-time. s Also, much 
research in developing a sensor validation systetn is being conducted at Ohio State 
University. 9 te More recently, an expert system ICS-EXPERTt t used pmbabilistic risk 
assessment and abnormal transient operating guidelines for real-time diagnosis as 
opposed to "snapshot" diagnosis at some arbitrary time. 
At the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II (EBR-III at Idaho National Engineering 
Laboratory two programs have been developed for analysis and diagnosis of that 
reactor. The System State Analyzer&& and DISYSts are expert systems that receive real- 
time plant data and perform rule-base inference to discover potential problems in the 
cooling system of the EBR-II. 
A number of other applications of expert systems to plant operations have been 
described. These include a program for probabilistic risk assessment, '4 operauons 
analysis of the Savannah River reactors, ts automated monitoring of plant performance 
for the Oak Ridge National Laboratory High Flux Intensity Reactor, && and refuelling 
assistance on the Fast Flux Test Facility. t t 
B. Methodology and Results 
Development of this work requires investigation into issues of qualitative 
modelling and simulation, transient diagnosis and mitigation, and information 
management. Chapter II details qualitative modelling and simulation methods as they 
pertain to expert systems. Development of the strategies and issues relevant for 
transient diagnosis are explained in Chapter HI and methods for transient mitigation are 
address in Chapter IV. Chapter V presents the software experiment performed for 
evaluating the expert system. A full description of the software and results from 
codifying expertise and f'mm four simulation case studies are present in this chapter. 
Evaluation of the methods used and results obtained, along with general conclusions 
and discussion is pmvided in Chapter VI, 
CHAPTER II 
QUALITATIVE MODELLING AND SIMULATION 
A. Qualitative Modelling 
A model is an intellectual construct used for studying the behavior of a physical 
system. » Two types of models exist for describing the physical world, quantitative 
and qualitative. While the goal of both modelling schemes is to make predictions or to 
explain properties of systems with equally precise statements of fact, the methods are 
quite different. Quantitative models describe methodologies that incorporate the 
capabilities of precise measurements. Conversely, a qualitative model is not concerned 
with precision and quantification is not of prime importance. 
A goal of qualitative physics is to develop systematic models that capture the 
breath and depth of human reasoning about the physical world, However, the main 
obstacles inhibiting such models are availability of the expert knowledge and computer 
limitations in speed and memory. These models must be capable of capturing several 
levels of detail, and a variety of different perspectives. Most qualitative models can be 
described as scenario models because they describe a specific system or situation. In 
most cases, a model must be carefully designed so that rules used by an inference 
engine may reference model infcxmation effectively. 
There are both advantages and disadvantages to having a very large or very small 
qualitative model. A very large tnodel can be designed to be very generalized; allowing 
for greater flexibility in analyzing events for different types of systems and greater 
ability to derive precise predictions about the model. However, these models require 
more effort to construct and more effort by the expert system to reuieve information. 
Small models, although they must sacrifice precision, are more easily handled by the 
expert system. However, every model deviates from the physical system in order to 
simplify it. Simplification is both legitimate and necessary, but such assumptions must 
be accounted for when interpreting the model's predictions. 
A qualitative model of a nuclear power plant must adequately describe all relevant 
components; however, it may not be necessary to model every component. Groups of 
components working as a system can be modelled as a system, such as the High 
Pressure Injection System (HPIS), The purpose of the HPIS is to supply coolant at 
high pressure to the core during unexpected depressurization of the primary coolant 
system. The HPIS can consist of a water holding tank, a pump, water lines, and a 
sparger, however it is not necessary to model each component. By isolating what 
component sets can be classified as subsystems, the size of the qualitative model is 
minmnzed. This system subset can be minimized further to account for only those 
components that supply necessary information for performing diagnosis of the system. 
This restricts any redundant information fiom the model. 
To meet a requirement for near real time execution, the qualitative model used in 
this work has been structured to include only the most relevant and necessary 
information, required by CATALisp to identify the specific set of transients in its 
knowledge base, in an attempt to optimize the use of the model. The qualitative model 
used in this work can be found in Appendix C. A detailed description of this model is 
pmvided in Chapter VI. 
B. Qualitative Simulation 
Human reasoning is able to perform extremely well with vague, context- 
sensitive concepts, such as high, low, big, small, etc. This is intimately related to our 
ability to make decisions based on common sense knowledge. Computers, however, 
deal most effectively with specific numerical values for comparison and judgement. 
Although AI research has resulted in inexact or fuzzy logic theory, expert system 
technologies are currently limited in their ability to perform the kinds of qualitative 
simulations that humans spontaneously employ when reasoning and making decisions. 
While the exact emulation of human reasoning is a topic of current research, 
good results have been acquired fmm attempts at approximating it. Simple nuclear 
power plant analysis concepts can be derived from simulation data to be used by rules 
and an inference engine. Knowledge of normal operational conditions included in the 
qualitative model can be compared to the "current" conditions to establish qualitative 
measures such as high, low, normal, on or off. For a real time system additional 
qualitative knowledge can be captured by using a first order approximation to parameter 
derivatives over a transient time step, such as decreasing, increasing, or stable. These 
concepts are used to update the status of the model, specifically the conditions in a 
component or system (i. e. , operational status, pressure, temperature, etc. ). In this 
way all numerical data from a simulation is converted into a symbolic form. As an 
example, if pressure in the reactor coolant system drops from 2250 psia to 2235 psia in 
one second, the program can convett this data to a pressure that is "low" (with respect 
to the normal pressure of 2250 psia), a pressure derivative that is "decreasing", and a 
pressure rate that is "quickly. " Concepts such as "quickly" are more abstract than 
"low" or "decreasing, " therefore they are usually defined for specific purposes, such as 
distinguishing between two different results (e. g. , a pressure rate of "quickly" might 
suggest a transient condition that is more severe than the condition of a pressure rate of 
"moderate"). 
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CHAPTER HI 
MODIFIED ASSUMPTION BASED TRUTH MAINTENANCE 
A. Truth Maintenance Systems 
When a transient occurs, it can be identified by an "expert" from the pattern 
made by the component states of nuclear power systems. In other words, in a given 
nuclear power plant similar general transient trends will be evident every time a 
parricular transient occurs; thus, the problem of transient analysis is one of pattern 
recognition. As presented in Chapter II, rules describing these transient patterns can be 
derived so that an inference engine is able to perform diagnostic reasoning. 
Truth maintenance systeinsi9 (TMS) extend traditional rule-based reasoning 
strategies to perform more efficient search and reasoning with inconsistent or 
incomplete information. The TMS manages truth through a nodal network of contexts 
representing a conclusion about the system. Dependencies of these contexts provide 
pathways through the search space. An inference engine interacts with a TMS to 
evaluate assumptions or rules that describe context nodes in the TMS search space. If a 
TMS node is "believed" then the TMS provides the inference engine with assumptions 
of contexts dependent on the original context, 
A truth maintenance system associates a special data structure, called a node, 
with each problem-solver datum (which includes database entries, inference rules, and 
procedures). The basic nodal data stmctute of every truth maintenance system contains 
the datum with which it is associated (a descriptive node name), the justifications (all 
rules and procedures derivable for the given datum), and a label (a list including the 
datum and all antecedent datum). The datum is supplied by the problem solver 
(inference engine in most cases), and is never examined by the TMS. The justifications 
are supplied by the problem solver and are examined but never modified by the TMS. 
Justifications represent inference steps from combinations of nodes to another node 
(e. g. , all rules and pmcedures derivable for the given datum). A node is believed if the 
justification is valid, in which case that node and all antecedent nodes contain 
noncontradictory assumptions (e. g. , rules). The label identifies the node. The problem 
solver can add nodes, justifications and mark nodes as contradictory at any time. 
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The TMS provides two services: truth maintenance and dependency-directed 
backtracking. The TMS responds to the state of knowledge given in a knowledge base 
or qualitative model. This state of knowledge supports a set of premises which the 
TMS can process. Truth maintenance finds an assignment of belief statuses for every 
node such that every justification is satisfied. Although a node may have many 
justifications, only a few may hold, and one of these is chosen as the current 
supporting justification. A contradiction is encountered when a node, marked as 
conmdictory, is assigned belief. Dependency-directed backtracking searches for the 
assumptions contributing to the contradiction. Contradictions found are removed from 
the TMS. A final solution derived fmm the TMS is found when no contradictions 
exist. 
Reasoning using a TMS allows for a very flexible knowledge base. Concepts 
do not have to be specifically defined under a general context. Given a set of premises, 
the TMS will provide a best estimate solution. With increasing number of defined 
premises, the final solution becomes more specific. 
While the TMS has the advantage of being able to find a solution for any given 
set of premises, other limitations make the TMS inadequate for system diagnosis. 
Multiple fault diagnosis and teal time analysis are two goals of this expert system the 
TMS reasoning methodology cannot provide. The TMS is designed to converge to 
only one solution at a time (although modifying the state of knowledge can result in a 
new solution); however, many solutions may exist in a real system. The execution time 
of an expert system using TMS reasoning is directly related to the size of the TMS 
knowledge base; thus, a large TMS knowledge base requires longer computational 
time. 
Although the TMS concept was not specifically designed for diagnosis 
purposes, it provides the foundation for an extension of the TMS that is capable of 
dealing with diagnosis, the assumption-based truth maintenance system. 
B. Assumption Based Truth Maintenance System 
The assumption based truth maintenance systemzc (ATMS), like the traditional 
TMS, is structured by a network of nodes describing a systetn. The major difference 
between the ATMS and a traditional TMS, is that ATMS context membership is a 
12 
subset of a general context; therefore dependency-directed backtracking is not 
necessary. The ATMS also allow multiple solutions because, unlike the basic TMS, 
nodes are contingent in a structured hierarchy. 
Like a traditional TMS, processing knowledge about a system using an ATMS 
initially assumes that all possible solutions exist unless contradictions occur. In such a 
case that a node is declared contradictory, it is removed from the justification and 
knowledge processing continues until the justification is shown to be noncontradictory, 
Figure 1 displays the knowledge structure used by CATALisp (described in Chapter 
V). The node NOT. NORMAL represents all possible assumptions (i. e. , all possible 
transient conditions) about the given system (i. e. , the nuclear power plant). Figure 2 
gives an example of the anatomy of a node used in this code. After the 
NOT. NORMAL node is processed, the nodes RCS failure, steam generator failure, 
SCS (secondary coolant system} failure, reactor trip, and LOSP (loss of offsite power) 
are examinetL The environments for which these nodes hold are evaluated and if they 
are determined to be contradictory with the state of the system, they are removed from 
the justifications. For example, in the event that only the node RCS FAILURE is not 
contradictory, the justification is the nodal set (NOT. NORMAL, RCS FAILURE), 
Figure 3 presents a portion of the ATMS nodal network, used in the software, in 
standard ATMS graphical notation (rectangles represent assumptions, ellipses represent 
premises or datum, and armwheads represent justifications). This figure also displays 
the label for the Small LOCA node. Processing a node without contradictions results in 
the creation of an assumption or a set of assumptions. For example, when the RCS 
FAILURE node is pmcessed, it creates the ATMS nodes LOCA and ATWS. This 
procedure is analogous to forward-chaining, however, it differs fmm forward chaining 
in its ability to reason with inconsistency and uncertainty. The assumptions (part of the 
environment processed by the inference engine) underlying these nodes are created as 
part of the nodes. For more complicated knowledge structutus in which nodes might 
be cross referenced by superior nodes, the tasks are nontrivial and require more 
computation to process. The advantage of a more complicated knowledge structure is 
that instances of environments with the same consequence can be used. This is 
necessary because often one set of assumptions cannot adequately describe a 
consequence. For example, if a LOCA is occumng in the reactor coolant system, the 
pressure in the RCS usually decreases; however, because of the High Pressure 
Injection System (HPIS) safety system, the pressure can be rising when the HPIS is 
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on. Given these two instances have similar consequents, a knowledge structure might 
be created with both of these instances being represented as nodes. However, in 
complex systems such as nuclear power plants, many permutations of possible events 
can occur. A full knowledge base including all possible events would be very large 
and, hence, might require extensive computational attention. Therefore, one goal of 
this work was to simplify the knowledge structure without significant performance 
degradation, thus, extending this method to effectively handle real world problems such 
as real-time nuclear power plant diagnosis. 
The efficiency of the ATMS is directly proportional to the number of 
environments it is forced to consider. Ultimately, the observed efficiency of the ATMS 
is a result of the fact that it is not that easy to create a problem which would force it to 
consider all possible solutions, rather it can only consider the assumptions which hold 
true. 
The primary diagnostic module of CATALisp coordinates the activities of the 
inference engine which pmcesses information from the ATMS knowledge base and the 
qualitative model (which receives simulation information directly). Figure 4 presents a 
graphical representation of this module, The inference engine receives the assumption 
sets fiom the ATMS knowledge base, matches the assumptions with knowledge from 
the qualitative model, information that is not available is communicated back to the 
ATMS knowledge base and the knowledge base is modified (physically, the 
assumptions that cannot be processed are removed from the knowledge base and 
confidence level values are tenormalized, this is discussed in section III. F), and when 
an assumption set correctly describes the conditions presented in the qualitative model, 
the result is reported. 
C. Real Time Diagnosis and Information Reduction 
While some expert systems have addressed the issue of nuclear power plant 
transient diagnosis from the standpoint of "after-the-fact4-s, " this work focuses on 
analyzing data as it would be presented during an actual unknown reactor transient. 
The difference between these two strategies is this: in "after-the-fact" diagnosis all 
diagnostic considerations are analyzed at one time after an event has occurred; and in 
real-time diagnosis, diagnostic considerations are analyzed upon repeatedly during an 
event. For true real-time analysis one would want to reduce the time between 
Primary Diagnostic Module 
Qualitative 
Model 
Figure 4. Primary Diagnostic Module 
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diagnostic iteration to be as smail as possible; however, for transients that are not 
highly unstable, this iteration time step maybe larger. During highly unstable 
transients, a large time step might give meaningless results because many events could 
have occurred between iteration steps. Therefore, an iteration time of under 3 seconds 
would be considered good for most applications. Of the programs that have been 
reviewed that address diagnostics of real-time data, none have achieved the ideal of 
being able to obtain results instantaneously; rather, the authors have admiued that large 
improvement needs to be made in this atua. 
A major bottleneck in designing a real-time transient diagnosis and mitigation 
code is the abundance of information that is available for analysis. Much of this 
information is useful only for diagnosing specific transient cases; therefore, managing 
only that information that must be processed to obtain accurate results is a prime goal 
for efficient information handling. 
In the nuclear power plant information is received in the control mom from 
hundreds of locations in the plant. Information in the form of thermal-hydraulic data, 
annunciator status, and sensor data are available to an operator for consultation during 
operation. However, during transient scenarios only a small subset of this information 
is actually considered when the operator makes his final diagnosis. Therefore, to 
emulate an operator's actions during a transient, a study must first be made of 
procedures and thought processes an operator performs during these situations. Some 
studies have been performed in the this area. ' One conclusion of these studies is that an 
operator reduces the information that must be examined in two ways, One way he does 
this is by performing sequential deductive reasoning for isolating a transient cause. 
This sequential deduction can be performed by using the ATMS. sc As mentioned 
before, in an ATMS each datum or concept label is described with the sets of 
assumptions (rules or procedures representing the context of the datum) under which it 
holds. If the underlying assumptions hold true, the datum is assumed true. When this 
derivation is made, the ATMS records it in the most general way so that it covers as 
large a region of potential events as possible. For example, the RCS Failure node in 
Figure 1 represents a class of system failures found in the reactor coolant system. The 
idea is that the original assumptions are the primitive data from which all other data are 
derived. This method allows for a reduction in the number of assumptions that might 
have to be checked since only if a general context is verified will the ATMS check more 
specific problems. Such a database is said to be tree-structured since from general 
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context more specific contexts are derived. Diffeient results are derived from different 
paths/branches taken in the database. By using this method, the objective of 
diagnosing both transient and failure location is accomplished systematically, similar to 
the method a human expert operator might follow to diagnose a transient. 
The second way the operator reduces the amount of information he must 
pmcess is to only consider information that define unique characteristics of the 
system's condition. For example, if the operator wants to know if the RCS is 
depressurizing, he only monitors one source, such as the pressurizer pressure 
indicator, rather than examining other instruments that can supply the same 
information, such as reactor vessel pressure or the pump outlet pressure. This 
procedure of monitoring on only one signal for indications of system condition allows 
for possible misdiagnosis if there has been an instrument failure. The method 
developed here presumes that all sensors have been previously validated. If sensor 
validation becomes a necessity, the assumptions defining the knowledge structure of 
the system can be expanded so that sensor validation can be performed to some degree. 
Redundant information useful for improving diagnosis should be included if it does not 
degrade performance significantly. 
D. Diagnosis with Multiple Failure 
Diagnostic reasoning requires the identification of deficiencies of a system on 
the basis of observed behavior discrepancies. In troubleshooting system failures, any 
differences in the presumed state of the system and the actual state of the system 
indicate that a problem could be present. However, the evidence does not always 
support a unique failure. Usually, additional signatures should be infened to isolate the 
failure. It is important, for the sake of efficiency, to try to minimize the number of 
additional signatures that would have to be analyzed. 
A significant problem that differentiates diagnosis of multiple failure from 
diagnosis of single failure is that simultaneously occumng failures can influence the 
system behavior patterns of events that would normally identify that individual event. 
Therefore, if one considers all permutations of possible events, the space of potential 
candidates gmws exponentially with the number of faults involved. In this instance 
intense study must be performed to derive a set of assumptions that describe every 
possible event. This is not a reasonable consideration when dealing with complex 
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systems such as nuclear power plants. Therefore, an alternative method for dealing 
with multiple faults must be derived. 
One possible method incorporates probabiTities of failure in the diagnostic system 
analysis, so that results derive a set of most probable events. This methodology for 
getting multiple potential solutions has been demonstrated in the area of circuit 
diagnosis by applying probability of failure algorithm to an ATMS. » These 
probabilities are manipulated in such a way as to create a statistical distribution of 
possible causes of failure and their entmpy, which is a value derived from the failure 
probabilities. Such methods assume that failure probabilities are known and are 
accurate. This is not the case in most real world problems. 
Another problem that inhibits diagnosis is the possibility that information 
required for diagnosis is not available. However, it may be important that regardless 
on the amount of available information, a best-estimate evaluation be performed. To 
what degree is a best-estimate result valid is a very important issue in developing a best- 
estimate system. In considering this issue, advantages and disadvantages exist. The 
main advantage of such a system is that a solution is always available and independent 
of the amount of uncertainty present. However, in situations where much uncertainty 
exists, many solutions are generated, some of which may not actually be present. 
Although the ATMS can derive multiple best-estimate solutions, the procedure 
cannot be applied efficiently to nuclear power plant diagnosis because it requires a 
complex ATMS knowledge base structure. However, to perform efficient, best- 
estimate reasoning, a modification to the ATMS knowledge processing has been made 
to simplify the ATMS knowledge base structure. This modification is based on 
"confidence levels", which ate not to be confused with probabilities. 
E. Confidence Level Assessment 
A problem that occurs with simplifying the ATMS knowledge base is that a 
node can only be fired if the exact conditions described for that node aie occurring. As 
mentioned before, for most real world cases exceptions can make up most of the 
knowledge base. Simplifying the knowledge base limits these possibilities greatly. 
However, if these nodes were capable of ignoring minor conflicts in the assumption 
sets, it would be possible to address these exceptions without actually describing them 
individually. 
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The focus of this modification is on how to pmcess conflict resolution in the 
evaluation of assumption sets. Normally, an inference mechanism is used to evaluate 
the truth of the assumptions. If the set of assumptions are not valid, the context that 
they support is not valid. The basis of this modification is that under certain 
circumstances, minor conflicts should be ignored and the context should remain valid. 
Confidence level assessment allows this. 
A confidence-level is the normalized confidence (0-1) that an "expert" expresses 
in a specific signature to describe a known transient. The confidence-level value for 
each transient is determined by examining the states of every relevant system in a 
nuclear reactor. The procedure for ignoring minor conflicts of assumption sets 
concerns how the assumptions are processed. Assigned to each assumption in the 
assumption set is a number that represems a weighing factor or confidence level. 
Confidence levels associated with each assumption in an assumption set are added 
together to arrive at an overall confidence-level for diagnosis of a particular transient. 
When a single event occurs, the sum of all the confidence levels is equal to 1009o. 
However, should exceptions arise, any confidence level of 70% or greater validates the 
node. This cutoff value has been derived from an iterative pmcess of evaluation of 
simulation results using different values. Accurately determining individual confidence 
levels is, therefore, the most imcontant part in developing a successful transient analysis 
program by this method. The physical meaning of the confidence level is the 
percentage that the given assumption represents a particular transient relative to the 
other assumptions in the environment. In estimating the confidence level value, a 
thorough understanding of the transient is necessary. Given the list of conditions that 
apply to a particular transient, a valued judgement is made on the importance of 
individual conditional assumptions in the diagnosis of the transient. For the 
assumptions that apply to a diagnosis of the failure described by the context, the relative 
importance of each assumption is determined by extensively analyzing actual plant and 
code-calculated data (e. g. , TRAC calculations). By comparing detailed transient 
simulations against heuristic results, estimates of the confidence-levels can be obtained. 
Interviewing experts in reactor safety could result in improved values for the 
confidence-levels and provide additional heuristics. ~z 
Support for this method is as follows: Consider an event Q that can be 
described by the assumptions A, B, C, D, E, and F, an assumption (or fact) can be 
classified as either 1) absolute, one that holds for all circumstances of Q, or 2) 
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conditional, one that holds for most circumstances of Q; but may not hold under 
unusual conditions. For tntample, fact 7 in Table 1 is a conditional assumption because 
a LOCA could have resulted from high RCS Pressure; fact 9 is an absolute assumption 
because a LOCA event always conmbutes to containment radiation. When normalized 
weighing factors (confidence levels), a-f, are assigned to assumptions A-F, statements 
of fact can be derived about the truth of Q. If we consider that assumptions A-F 
represent absolute assumptions only, then the addition of all weighing factta. s with true 
assumptions, H, is equal to the maximum possible sum, H . If we select an arbitrary 
value, h, that represents the minimum value for which the summation of weighing 
factors of true assumptions provides a confirmation of event Q, we can extend this idea 
to include conditional rules. For the set of all absolute assumptions, H is always 
greater than or equal to h. In the set of assumptions that includes conditional 
assumptions, this rule does not hold for all possible cases. To confirm Q in this 
situation, all absolute assumptions should be true; however, the truth of all absolute 
assumptions may not alone verify Q. This assumptions implies that 
H~„- g Absolute Premises & h Eqn. l. 
This assumption also implies that if an absolute assumption is not true and H is greater 
than h, Q is true. This implication is debatable, but this situation should not occur. A 
corollary to insure that this does not occur is that any absolute assumption weighing 
factor should be greater than all conditional assumption weighing factors. For the 
CATALisp program H ~ = 100% and h = 70%. An appropriate weighing factor or 
confidence level can be obtained from following these rules and by ranking the 
importance of the assumption against others in an assumption set. 
To illustrate the pmcedures for deriving confidence levels for a LOCA transient, 
knowledge of the relevant system conditions that identify a LOCA must be known. 
These can be the following: RCS pressme, RCS pressure iputhent, RCS pressure rate 
of change, RCS temperature, RCS temperature gradient, and containment vessel 
pressure and radiation. Absolute rules that relate how these quantities behave during a 
LOCA should be identified, then a corresponding confidence level value should be 
coupled with those rules. In this case RCS pressure gradient and containment radiation 
data are the most valuable to the identification of a LOCA because the occuttence of a 
LOCA immediately affects these two quantities. For the conditional rules confidence 
level values can be derived relative to each other once the "rank of usefulness" is 
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Table 1. LOCA Facts with Confidence Levels 
RCS Failure 
1) RCS Pressure is Not Normal 
2) RCS Pressure Gradient is Not Normal 
3) Level of the Pressurizer is Not Normal 
4) RCS Temlxeratuxe is Not Normal 
5) RCS Temperature Gradient is Not Normal 
6) RCP Mass Flow is Not Normal 
20 
15 
10 
20 
15 
20 
7) RCS Pressure is Low 
8) RCS Pxessuxe Gradient is Decreasing 
as long as the HPIS is off 
9) Radiation in Containment is High 
10) Pxessme is Containment is High 
11) Sump Pump Status is On 
12) RCP Mass Flow is Low 
10 
20 
25 
15 
10 
10 
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determined. Factors that determine the usefulness of system data are: response time to 
a transient, availability, and uniqueness to a transient. 
Table 1 displays facts with corresponding confidences levels, as used by 
CATALisp, that define a LOCA event. Rules 1-6 are fired to determine whether the 
failure source is in the RCS, while rules 7-12 are fired to determine whether the 
problem is a LOCA. When a LOCA event occurs, all of these rules should fire 
affirmatively, pmvided that no other abnormal event is occurrhtg simultaneously. The 
individual confidence levels are added together for a total confidence level of 100% for 
both the RCS Failure and LOCA. 
F. Confidence Level Assessment and Uncertainty 
For circumstances in which infortnation is unavailable, the assumptions that 
represent this information are removed from the assumption set and the confidence- 
levels are recalculated so that confidence levels are renormalized to 100%. This 
pmcedure renormalizes the confidence level value evenly among the remaining 
assumptions. Equation 2 defines this renormalization procedure. Whem a; is the new 
confidence level, a; is the old confidence level and g ai is the sum of confidence level 
value of known assumptions. 
n 
at = a; ~ g a. * 100% Eqn. 2. j=l 
In this way, unknowns are not completely ignored, they are just removed from the list 
describing a transient. For this reason and because assumptions can appear in many 
assumption sets, greater information on conditions of other parameters may be 
necessary to identify the transient. In certain cases all assumptions may be unknown. 
A best-estimate solution should provide such solutions as long as the nodes that 
precede that node are evaluated affirmatively. As menuoned before, in a highly 
uncenain environment many solutions can be possible. For this reason an "Uncertainty 
Screen" was created for diagnosis. This function is capable of screening out all results 
having uncertainty that is classified as "very high". The advantage of this function is 
that an operator can first examine diagnosis from known quantities in the plant; then, 
with the uncertainty screen off, he can get information of all possible events present, 
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provide the additional information to remove some uncertainty, and get an improved 
diagnosis. 
Uncertainty is assigned to diagnostic results from the summation of the 
confidence levels of those assumptions in an assumption set that cannot be evaluated 
because of insufficient information. When this value is 0%, "very low" uncertainty is 
assigned; less than 30% and greater than 0% corresponds to "low" uncertainty; less 
than 70% and greater than 30% corresponds to "moderate" uncertainty; greater than 
70% and less than 100% corresponds to "high" uncertainty; and 100% corresponds to 
"very high" uncertainty. Table 2 displays this uncertainty scale. 
The uncertainty value does not modify the confidence level, since the 
confidence level is based strictly on what is known. Therefore, it is not unusual to 
have a diagnostic result with 100% confidence level and "high" uncenainty. 
Table 2. Uncertainty Scale 
Summation of Confidence Levels 
f n 
0% 
1- 30% 
31-69% 
70- 99% 
100% 
Associated 
Very Low 
Low 
Moderate 
High 
Very High 
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CHAPTER IV 
MITIGATION STRATEGY 
A. Current Methods 
At commercial power plants operators are trained to follow emergency response 
operator guidelines specifically developed for the given plant. These guidelines pmvide 
transient mitigation procedures for a variety of transient situations. They are step by 
step instructions of actions and expected responses to problems including procedures to 
follow in case the expected result cannot be obtained. If the operator cannot trust that 
certain equipment will respond to his control, these guidelines are meaningless. To 
insure operator reliability in the system, the system is constantly examined for possible 
failure and fuuue maintenance needs, 
System design plays a major role in defining emergency response guidelines to 
mitigate a transient. Certainly, there are basic differences between plant types such as 
Pressurized Water Reactors, Boiling Water Reactors, and Liquid Metal Reactors; but, 
beyond the basic system design many other components are included to improve the 
safety factor of the system as a whole, while increasing the complexity. Many safety 
systems are incorporated into the final design to insure the integrity of the system. 
These designs are also built with redundant coolant flow pathways so that some failures 
can be isolated and bypassed. These added features, while contributing to the total 
safety of the system, contribute greatly to its complexity. Therefore, the function of the 
safety features represent an important consideration when developing transient 
mitigation strategies. 
B. Operator Obstacles 
Efficient response to a nuclear power plant transient is of utmost importance. 
Quick identification of a problem fmm observed symptoms can prevent further 
propagation of failure in the plant, possibly preventing a more severe problem. 
However, many factors, such as stress, invalid instrument readings, and information 
overload, can prevent the operator fmm performing efficiently. 
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Human factors considerations must be included into a system design to aid the 
operator in performing his job. The incident at Three Mile Island in 1979 demonstrated 
this need and has since prompted modification of the control room. Signals received in 
the control room are now presented to rhe operator in a more orderly fashion to prevent 
information overload and redundant signals. Another lesson learned from TMI is the 
importance of valid instrument readings. Instrument verification must be perform 
during transient conditions to insure that the operator xeceives the correct information so 
that he can provide the proper mitigation pmcedures that the condition calls for. 
It is possible that an event can occur that is not specificall defined by operator 
guidelines or it is possible that a secondary failure can prevent the continuation of 
mitigation procedures. In these situations the operator must deduce similarities between 
the transient and the transients defined by the mitigation pmcedures. Incidents of 
multiple failure or severe accidents complicate this task and prevent the strict use of 
mitigation procedures because the guidelines are typically defined for non-sevexe single 
transient events. The operator must rely on his own experience and intuition. The 
priorities the operator has first is to protect the safety of the public. This can be in~ as to ptevent the relearn of significant amounts of xadioactivity. The greatest 
source of radioactivity is in the reactor core, therefore, insuring the reactor core 
integrity is of greatest importance. 
C. Automation of Mitigation Procedures 
Automation of transient mitigation procedures can offer much improvement 
over the present emergency operator response process performed at nuclear power 
facilities. In light of the additional processing capability and speed by use of 
computers, such an innovation can create a working environment capable of drastically 
improving operator efficiency. The computerization of operator response guidelines 
create the opportunity for a direct link between the nuclear power plant contxol system 
and the expert system. In this way, inquixies made by the response guidelines about 
the system can be pxovided by the contml system rather than by the operator, reducing 
operator exror and time wasted on data gathering. This ability could also preclude 
operator selection of a particular recovery strategy that depended directly upon the 
availability or adequate performance of a downed or degraded piece of equipment or 
suggest alternative procedures to follow. Together with a program specifically for best- 
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estimate transient diagnosis, an improved diagnosis could be gained by first using the 
diagnosis program to determine probable failure and then following the operator 
response guidelines with additional diagnostic rules included; assurance of correct first 
estimate diagnosis could be confirmed or alternate procedures provided for the correct 
result. Other areas of potential improvements include the development of interactive 
plant simulations based on emergency response guidelines. This could provide better 
information on plant response to potential upset conditions and increased understanding 
of the impacts of operator actions on the response of the plant. Such a system would 
be very specific with respect to the actions required of the plant operator for any 
specified plant condition, it could be used to better assess the likelihood of operator 
error in recovery scenarios, while ~g training for personnel. 
Some pmgress has evolved from work performed in the area of computerization 
of mitigation pmeAures for nuclear reactor transients or related subjects. 9~ However, 
the fact that knowledge of how to fix or correct something that needs attention is much 
more esoteric than actually understanding what is wrong with it presents a major 
problem. One result of this work is an investigation of the applicability of the 
Westinghouse Emergency Response Operator Guidelines (WEROG) as an expert 
systemzs The WEROG resulted fmm a systematic development process supported by 
all major elements of the commercial nuclear indusuy and tepresents a comprehensive 
body of knowledge available to guide nuclear operation under transient and accident 
conditions. The basic format of these guidelines are IF/IHEN/ELSE statements. A 
conclusion of this work was that although these guidelines were not intentionally 
developed for expert system implementation, they provide over 2500 rules that could 
easily be codified to some degree in an expert system, A simple extension of this 
concept has been implemented for this project. 
Mitigation procedures for a set of "typically occurring events" have been 
transferred to a database. The structure of this database is very similar to the format of 
the WEROG, including instructions of actions and expected responses to problems and 
procedures to follow in case the expected result fails. Mitigation procedures are 
presented to a user as they appear in the WEROG, the user is prompted to confirm the 
condition presented, and the procedure continues, jumping to different procedure 
guidelines as necessary. If the guidelines request information that is available from the 
instruments and gauges used when diagnosing a transient, the code processes that 
procedure for the user. 
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CHAPTER V 
SOFTWARE EXPERIMENT 
A. Introduction 
Software experiments are often performed to evaluate a physical system without 
actually having to build one. For example, transient analysis using thermal-hydraulic 
codes, such as TRAC, are used to evaluate safety and design of nuclear power plants. 
The purpose of this software experiment is to demonstrate the reasoning ability of 
CATALisp and evaluate the methods on which CATALisp is basaL The intent of this 
project was the development of an aid to a reactor operator that could in an ideal sense, 
reside in a nuclear power plant contml room and be hardwued to the instrument panel. 
However, for this experiment, a "real world" nuclear plant control panel, providing 
nuclear plant data, must be simulated by software. 
CATALisp, a qualitative model, the ATMS knowledge base, and an interface 
between the simulated nuclear plant contml panel and the qualitative model are 
requirements for this software experiment. Given the CATALisp software, the 
qualitative model and the ATMS knowledge base must be developed (CATALisp 
provides a mechanism for establishing a link between the simulated control panel and 
the qualitative model). Section V, E. and V. I. discuss in detail the ATMS knowledge 
base and the qualitative model, respectively, used in this software experiment. 
B. Development History 
The number of choices available to a code developer for hardware and software 
tools and programming methodologies are large. The selection of a complete set of 
development tools is dependent upon the requirements of the code being developed. 
Every tool has strengths and weaknesses. Code requirements must be weighed against 
the abilities of a tool; however, even the "best" set of tools may not be able to function 
well together or even be usable. 
For these reasons development of the CATALisp software has been 
evolutionary. Due to limitations, availability pmblems, and incompatibilities for certain 
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hardware and software, changes in code design had to be made. Early attempts at 
developing an expert system for the purpose of diagnosing nuclear reactor transients 
began on an Apple Macintosh' using the production rule language OPSS integrated 
with LISP. This initial code version was capable of processing rules to recognize a 
loss of coolant accident (LOCA), steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), loss of 
feedwatm (LOFW), and reactor trip transients, yet it required one minute to diagnose 
one transient time step. These results were quite inadequate due in part to the 
inflexibility of GPSS and the incompatibility of the language compiler with the 
computer. As hardware availability allowed, the project was moved to a XEROX 
1108™. On the XEROX execution time was improved to five seconds for every 
transient time step (a factor of 12). The expert system building tool KEE~ ~4 
(Knowledge Engineering Environment) was used as the inference engine under the 
control of an ~isp program. With the expansion of the nutnber of transients 
evaluated and the number of components in the reactor system, iteration time increased 
to ten seconds. At that time, implementation of a diagnostic strategy for handling 
uncertainty was being developed. It was assumed that a component in an unknown 
state was in the worst possible condition. This assumption worked fine for some 
simulations, but was not strictly accurate. The combination of these two problems 
made it necessary to devise another method that would be faster and perform diagnosis 
better. After an evaluation of the code objectives and the results up to that rime, it was 
determined that not only was a more powerful machine necessary; but also that the 
ptogram had to be created from scratch, rather than with a expert system building tool. 
This flnal version has been developed on a Symbolics 3640 and is written entirely in 
Common Lisp. 
C. Rule-Eased Reasoning Strategies 
Rule-based reasoning is by far the most widely used knowledge representation 
scheme. Rules take the form of IF/IHEN or IF/IHEN/ELSE statements and combine 
factual and heuristic domain knowledge, Individual IF/IHEN rules are linked together 
to form rule chains, which can then be used to deduce information about a domain. 
Inference engine mechanisms used with rule base structures can take many 
forms. Simple rule-based methods are search, forward-chaining, and backward- 
chaining. Truth maintenance systems are an example of a more advanced rule-based 
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reasoning strategy. Search methods are employed when rule-chains cannot be 
structured. In these cases rules are fired, often in a predefined sequence, in order to 
establish facts about a domain by querying the user. An inference engine evaluates to 
firing any and all rules that satisfy the given premises. Forward-chaining infers 
conclusions I'ram facts in a database, typically staidng with an initial set of inftmnation 
pmvided by the user, Using this inethod of inference, conditions of rules (the IF patt) 
are examined, and if a rule's conditions are satisfied, the action (the THEN part) is 
performed. Backward-chaining attempts to find probable causes for a conclusion or 
goal sometimes supplied by the user, other times taken from a small caudog. If a rule 
conclusion is known to be true, the conditions that could have given rise to the rule 
conclusion become subgoals, and the inference engine tries to establish the validity of 
these subgoals recursively. 
The rule-based expert system's inference engine has two parts: the rule 
mterpreter and the scheduler. The role of the rule interpreter is to continually evaluate 
all rules in the system to locate those whose conditions are satisfied. The scheduler 
then orders the execution of all such rules. 
Nuclear power plant diagnosis using rule-based reasoning has been performed 
to some degree. 4-&&& REACTOR and ICS-EXPERT, as mentioned in the Literature 
Search, are two simple rule-based expert systems for this purpose. As mentioned in 
Development History for this project, a simple rule-based methodology was originally 
used. However, this methodology proved inferior for handling uncertainty and 
conflicts of fact. This occurs with simply rule-based methods because they assume that 
all information is available and accurate. A pmblem with this method is that if an event 
not specifically defined by the given rule set that exists, the inference engine will not be 
able to infer diagnosis. For this reason the more advance ATMS method was necessary 
for this project. 
. 
D. Codifying Expertise 
Experts frequently perform their jobs intuitively, sometimes with linle 
awareness of the logical thought sequence in their thinking and decision making 
processes. This apparent lack of strategy greatly inhibits solution explanations, 
justification, and the training of others. Computers do not comprehend such subtleties 
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as intuition and hunches, so the expertise must be delineated in terms of logically linked 
facts, rules, and heuristics to be used in an expert system. 
In most circumstances an exptnt system developer is not an expett in the field he 
wants to describe with the expert system. For the novice capturing expert knowledge 
into heuristics requires extensive investigation into relevant books or manuals, analysis 
of test case studies, and interviews with experts. Strategies have been devised to 
identify knowledge that can be codified. The main objective of these strategies is to 
weigh the lmowledge on the basis of its relevance to a particular task. Expert systems 
have been developed capable of analyiing data and generating rules from trends that are 
evident in the analysis. ss ss 
Extensive study has been dhected for deriving general heuristics about nuclear 
power systems. Basic sources such as final safety analysis reports (FSAR) and 
emergency response operator guidelines for specific nuclear power plants contain a 
significant amount of this information. Test case results of nuclear power plant 
transients have been the tpvatest source of knowledge for this project. Extensive 
analysis has been performed on a wide range of transient scenarios and general trends 
have been identified to derive qualitative patterns of various failmes that might occur in 
a nuclear power plant 
For complex systems, such as nuclear power plants, most of this knowledge 
codification deals with only a small number of the all the possible situations. This is 
because of exceptions that arise in the system. For example, during a LOCA transient 
occurring in the reactor coolant system, the pressure in the RCS will usually be 
decreasing; however, safety systems, such as the High Pressure Injection System 
(HPIS), have been put in place to prevent adverse conditions. At a certain check point 
(ke. , when the pressure drops to a predefined level) the HPIS turns on. One side effect 
of the HPIS being on is that the RCS pressure may no longer be decreasing, but rather 
increasing. This fact requires a more complicated heuristic rule to describe RCS 
pressure during a LOCA transient. This rule may resemble IF ((The PRESSURE of 
RCS is DECREASING) or (The STATUS of HPIS is ON)) THEN (Transient may be 
a LOCA). The presence of these exceptions represent the largest contribution of 
heuristics to an expert system. 
Codifying expertise is not considered to be an exact science, therefore, it 
requires extensive iteration of eliciting knowledge from "expert" sources, documenting 
(or implementing) the knowledge, testing the knowledge by comparing the expert' s 
analysis against simulations, modifying the implemented knowledge as necessary and 
retesting. In developing rules for this expert system, this method was followed strictly 
to derive the present set of rules. 
E. Codification Methods and Results 
For this work many of the rules used for diagnosis were compiled from the 
results of other research endeavors;4-~ ii however, some rules were derived from the 
South Texas Pmject final safety analysis report 27 Westinghouse Emergency Operator 
Response Guidelines, ss and analysis of plant conditions provided by best-estimate 
thermal-hydraulic codes such as TRAC2s-ss Rules were vetified by incorporating them 
into the CATALisp software, performing simulation, and assessing the accuracy of the 
results. If certain rules did not contribute to or detracted Rom the validity of the results, 
they were modified or removed. Ttris iteration was repeated many times under different 
conditions to confirm that rules that worked for one simulation, also worked for other 
simulations. 
The rules used in the CATALisp software were compiled into assumption sets 
describing both general and specific events. Table 3 presents these assumption sets 
with the understanding that the infetence engine that evaluates the facts weighs each 
assumption with respect to its "rank of importance" relative to other assumptions in the 
set (Appendix B contains a detailed listing of this knowledge base, as used by 
CATALisp). This concept was explained in Chapter III. This knowledge base is a 
compilation of only abnormal transients. Normal transients such as power ramp and 
reduction are not classified here; however, because some assumption sets have similar 
conditions to this events, more specific assumptions describing these conditions are 
included. 
Table 3. Codification Result 
Fault: REACIOR COOLANT SYSTEM FAILURE 
Description: The symptoms describe conditions which might exist if a failure has 
occurred in the RCS. 
Assumptions: 
1) RCS Pressure is Not Normal 
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Table 3 - continued 
2) RCS Pressure Gradient is Not Normal 
3) Level of the Pressurizer is Not Normal 
4) RCS Temperature is Not Normal 
5) RCS Temperature Gradient is Not Normal 
6) RCP Mass Flow is Not Normal 
Fault: REACI'OR TRIP 
Description: These symptoms describe the conditions which might exist during a 
reactor trip. Typically, only rule 6 should be necessary; however, additional rules are 
included to demonstrate aspects behind the theory for rule processing. 
Assumptions: 
1) RCS Pressure is Low 
2) RCS Pressure Gradient is Decreasing 
3) Control Rod Level is Very Low 
4) Neutron Density is Decreasing 
5) RCS Temperature Gradient is Decreasing 
6) Reacex Trip Annunciator On 
Fauln STEAM GENERATOR FAULT 
Description: These symptoms identify conditions that might be present for problems 
with the steam generators. 
Assumptions: 
1) Steam Generatca Level is Not Normal 
2) Steam Generator Pressure is Not Normal 
3) RCS Pressure is Low 
4) RCP Mass Flow is Low 
Fault: SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM FAILURE 
Description: The symptoms describe conditions which might exist if a failure has 
occurred in the Secondary Coolant System (SCS). 
Assumptions: 
I) RCS Pressure is Not Normal 
2) RCS Temperature is Not Normal 
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Table 3 - continued 
3) SCS Pressure is Not Normal 
4) Generator Power is Not Normal 
5) Turbine Pressure is Not Normal 
6) Feedwater Heater Temperatuxe is Not Normal 
7) Condenser Temperature is Not Normal 
Fault: LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER 
Description: Confirms the lack of available offsite power. 
Assumptions: 
I) Generator Power is Very Low 
2) Turbine Tripped 
3) Diesel Generator Power is Very Low 
Fault: LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT fLOCA) 
Description: Symptoms descxibe plant conditions during a coolant line break in the 
RCS. 
Assumptions: 
I) RCS Pressure is Low 
2) RCS Pressure Gradient is Decreasing as long as the HPIS is off 
3) Radiation in Containment is High 
4) Pxessuxe in Containment is High 
5) Sump Pump Status is On 
6) RCP Mass Flow is Low 
Fault: ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS) 
Description: Symptoms describe plant conditions during an ATWS. 
Assumptions: 
I) No Reactor Trip 
2) Pressurizer Level is High 
3) RCS Pressure is High 
4) Generator Power is High 
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Table 3 - continued 
Fault: STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPIURE 
Description: These symptoms describe typical plant conditions after a tube rupture in a 
steatn gellelatof. 
Assumptions: 
1) RCS Pressure is Low 
2) Pressurizer Level is Low 
3) Condenser Radiation is High 
4) Containment Radiation is Normal 
5) Feedwater Pump Mass Flow is Low 
6) Steam Generator Level is High 
Fault: STEAM GENERATOR STEAMLINE BREAK 
Description: These symptoms describe typical plant conditions after a break has 
occurred in the steam line exiting the steam generator in the secondary coolant system. 
Assumptions: 
1) RCS Pressure is Low 
2) Pressurizer Level is Low 
3) Condenser Radiation is Normal 
4) Containment Radiation is Normal 
5) Feedwater Pump Mass Flow is High 
6) Steam Generator Level is High 
Fault: LOSS OF FEEDWATER 
Description: These symptoms identify plant conditions when the feedwater supply has 
been lost. 
Assumptions: 
1) Mass Flow of the Feedwater Pump is Low 
2) Steam Generator Level is Low 
3) Emergency Feedwater Pump is On 
4) RCS Temperature is High and Increasing unless Reactor has Tripped 
5) Generator Power is Low 
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Table 3 - continued 
Fault; OUT OF CONT~IT LOCA 
Description: These symptoms define plant conditions foHowing a break in the SCS. 
Assumptions: 
I) Turbine Pressure is Low 
2) Mass Flow of Feedwater Pump is High 
3) Steam Generator Level is Low 
Fault: CONDENSATE PUMP TRIP 
Description: Confirms condensate pump has nippetL 
Assumption: 
I) Condensate Pump Status is Off 
Fault: TURBINE TRIP 
Description: Confirms turbine trip 
Assumptions: 
1) Turbine Status is Off 
2) Generator Power is Low 
3) Turbine Pressure is Low 
Fault SUNBREAK LOCA 
Description: Identifies size of RCS LOCA 
Assumptions: 
I) RCS Pressure is Decreasing "Slowly" 
Fault: MEDIUM-BREAK LOCA 
Description: Identifies size of RCS LOCA 
Assumptions: 
I) RCS Pressure is Decreasing "Moderately" 
Fault: LARGE-BREAK LOCA 
Description: Identifies size of RCS LOCA 
Assumptions: 
1) RCS Pressure is Decreasing "Quickly" 
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F. Real-Time Simulation 
The goal associated with real time simulation of a nuclear power plant is to 
create an environment for the expert system that is as close to reality as possible. 
Assumptions made to this affect are the following: I) not all information is readily 
available, due to component failures, some instruments may no longer function or may 
no longer give accurate results; 2) not all of this information needs to be received as 
time dependent data, certain relevant information that does not change over a period or 
is less critical can be included directly into the model; and 3) that a simulation can 
consist of either a large or small amount of both relevant and irrelevant information. 
While real time simulation might imply an analog method of handling 
information, this is not possible for a standalone, single processor machine to perform. 
The desired envimnment for this situation is to simulate the process by which an expert 
system would handle information if it was directly connected to a plant control panel. 
Conceptually, this means that information would be received directly from the plant by 
a "signal control processor, " which would store plant information directly into specific 
memory locadons of the computer, so that this information could be directly retrieved 
from memory (see Figurc 4). To simulate this process on the computer, simulation 
data is ex~ in "snapshots. " Information on plant conditions are called upon by the 
expert system as often as possible. Ideally, the time delay between iteradons should be 
infinitesimal; however, for analyzing a nuclear power plant system this time delay can 
be as much as 3 seconds for most transients, with exception to highly unstable 
transients conditions, in which a 3 second delay may make a diagnosis meaningless. 
While the time delay factor is a function of how fast the inference engine can process 
the rules, knowledge of this fact is necessary for cteating a transient simulation. 
So that CATALisp can use this information, an assumption that the values from 
the first time step represent "normal" plant conditions is made. This assumption gives 
CATALisp flexibility for handling many different transient scenarios, because 
CATALisp can analyze data independent of the attribute value units. While this 
eliminates rules that contain quantitative constraints, this does not eliminate rules that 
contain quantitative constraints disguised as percentages of an arbitrary normal (i. e. , If 
NEUTRON DENSITY is 596 of NO~ Then Reactor has been Tripped). 
Sources for comprehensive sets of nuclear reactor transient simulation data are 
few. One candidate has been to use the code output from large thermal-hydraulic codes 
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such as TRAC, RELAP5/MOD2s4, etc. Another source of simulation data has come 
from reports of "test cases" using these codes. Many such studies have been 
performed at Los Alamos National Laboratory and Idaho National Engineering 
Laboratory using TRAC and ~5 and are readily available in journal paper form. 
Since this expert system is not directly coupled to a nuclear plant simulator computer, 
when using "test case" reports, the presented material must be first converted f'rom the 
graphs and charts to data set as would be required by the expert system. By hand this 
is a strenuous task; however, as part of the expert system package developed, a code 
capable of allowing a user to reproduce these graphs and save transient simulation data 
as interpolated from given points on the graph was developed. 
G. CATALisp Environment 
CATALisp is a highly interactive and asynchronous program. The CATALisp 
package includes the main transient diagnosis and mitigation mutines as well as a 
program for recreating transient data from graphs and a program for creating mouse- 
sensitive graphics of the modified ATMS knowledge base. Rgure 5 presents the basic 
anatomy of the CATALisp program. 
The initial stage of using CATALisp requires the user to establish the link 
between the qualitative model and the simulation data and to supply any other 
information required for the model. This is done from a mouse-sensitive window 
containing all of the components. Inciting any of the components creates a menu of 
attributes of that component. Selecting any of these items queries the user to supply the 
value (in symbolic form, i. e. , high, low, increasing, etc. ) for this attribute or the name 
of the simulation file containing this information. When all the available information is 
supplied to CATALisp, CATALisp is ready to begin analyzing it. Simply selecting the 
RUN THE SIMULATION option in the main menu begins this operation. 
During the simulation run sequence, various information is available to the user. 
A gauge report supplies the relevant conditions of all components, that is, it displays all 
the information it has examined to make a diagnosis. Transient plots are available for 
those conditions which have been defined as transient data. A transient report is 
constantly updated to display the nodal labels of the modified ATMS that have been 
fired successfully, A more detailed transient report is available to explain what is 
happening. Diagnosis pmvides identification of specific problems in a given area and 
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the corresponding uncertainty of that event. The actual confidence level values 
associated with each node can also be retrieved from the options menu. During any 
simulation, additional information may be given to CATALisp by a process similar to 
that performed initially to start the simulation. When this is perform, a list of 
information that CATALisp believes to be relevant and not known is pmvided as a 
prompt for the user. The completion of his procedure requixes that CATALisp evaluate 
a new set of confidence-levels for the newly learned information and repeats the 
analysis for an "improved" diagnosis. CATALisp has two modes of operation - normal 
and uncertainty screen. Uncertainty screen will not process nodes that contain 
assumptions that cannot produce a true or false result. Figure 7 display a typical screen 
dump of CATALisp during a simulation. Included in this figure are the gauge report, 
transient report, the diagnostic report, a transient plot, the lisp listener (provided for 
user responses to queries from CATALisp), and the options menu. 
Once a final diagnosis has been derived, mitigation procedures can be called 
up as a separate process. In the operator response envimnment, the user selects, from 
a menu of transient events and operating procedures, the guidelines that address the 
transient previously diagnosed. Immediately, questions and instructions are addressed 
to the operator or, when appropriate, to the knowledge base on the state of the system 
and how to gain control of it. For multiple failures extra windows can be created to 
present different guidelines. Figure 8 presents a screen dump of the operator response 
plogfalll. 
A useful tool available to the user at any time is the mouse-sensitive "tree" of 
ATMS nodes. Selecting any item in the tree creates a menu list of the 
assumptions/rules defined for that given node. The user can select any item in the list 
to see if the rule is true or false. Figure 9 provides an example of this feature. The 
menu shown in this figure displays assumptions under which a LOCA event is 
confirmetL Any of these assumptions can be selected for processing the uuth of that 
assumption. The result is displayed in the top left corner of the window under the 
word 'Examine". If the assumption is unknown, the displayed result is "Not. known", 
rather than "True" or "False". 
The other feature available in CATALisp is the simulation development tool. 
Figure 10 shows a sample screen dump of this feature. A mouse-sensitive graph is 
created from constraints provided by the user, such as time length of transient and 
maximum property value. The graph can be easily recreated by depressing a mouse 
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button at a point on the graph. A second mouse button provides information on current 
coordinate location on the graph. At completion of the graph, a paired data set is 
cxeated by linearly interpolating benveen points on the graph. 
H. Physical Model 
The original intent of this work was to specifically analyze Pressurized Water 
Reactors (PWR); thus, the qualitative model and heuristic rules are designed for this 
type of system. To test CATALisp a qualitative model (See Appendix C) of a simple 
one loop PWR was developed. It consists of 27 components and their relevant 
properties. Figure 10 displays this model. Of the 25 components, 14 components 
define "main" system components, 4 components define control or safety system 
components, 7 components define water and steam lines, and 2 components xepresent 
the containment vessel and the sump. Slots are attached to these components to store 
information that the control xoom might have on these components. 
I. Case Studies 
Four simulations have been developed and tested to demonstrate CATALisp's 
abilities. These simulations axe driven by data sets defining the conditions on important 
nuclear plant components as a function of time. Global knowledge of a particular 
transient is put into the model to describe non-transient states in the system. Appendix 
A contains graphs of the transient data used in these four simulations. 
The first simulation ~ a simple single-failure transient tripping a second 
at a certain time during the simulation. The data for this simulation was taken from 
output of a TRAC calculation for a primary side cold leg loss of coolant accident 
(LOCA) combined with a loss of feedwater (LOFW) at the South Texas Project Nuclear 
Plant. && Only RCS pressuxe, RCS temperature, HPIS mass flow, and core neutron 
density are supplied to CATALisp. Given this minimum set of information during a 
normal run, all possible results were displayed, While all results are viable, more 
information must be pxovided by the user to gain a more specific response of the events 
occurring. Specifically, information necessary to confirm or deny the presence of a 
SGTR is required, such as steam generator water level or condenser radiation. Table 4 
presents the transient sequence and CATALisp results for this simulation. 
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Table 4. Transient Sequence and CATALisp Results for Simulation 1 
Tlm Ev n ATALis Result 
0. 00 s main and auxiliary 
feedwater supplies cut 
5. 82 s 1 inch small break in 
primary side hot leg 
10. 6 s LOFW (high, 100%) 
15. 9 s Small LOCA 
(moderate, 100%) 
18. 6 s SGTR (high, 100%) 
62. 0 s 
180 s End of Transient 
Reactor Trip 
gow, 100%) 
0. 0 s Condensate Pump 
Trip 
0. 0 s Out of containment 
0, 0 s Turbine Trip 
0. 0 s LOSP 
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The second simulation described a loss of offsite power combined with loss of 
feedwater transient. However, for this simulation only core average pressure and 
temperature data (reproduced from TRAC outputzs) were usetL Under these conditions 
many results, depending on the state of the reactor, were possible. As in the first 
simulation, due to the large amount of uncenainty present, additional information is 
necessary for CATALisp to make the correct diagnosis, specifically that a LOFW has 
occurred. Extensive use of the ADD INFORMATION feature was performed to 
demonstrate how CATALisp can perform best-estimate analysis. Information from the 
reactor trip annunciator and steam generator level were later provided, proving that the 
ATWS was not present and providing greater certainty to the LOFW. Table 5 presents 
the u ansient sequence and CATALisp results for this simulation. 
The third simulation was a recreation of conditions similar to that which 
occurred at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) Reactor for the simple one loop 
~ model. The TMI-2 facility is a Babcock and Wilcox, two loop reactor rated at 
2772 MW thermal power. The sequence of events is extensive and spanned over many 
hours; but for this simulation, an abridged analysis was performed on only the first 
hour's events. ss Because this model has only one loop, individual events occurring in 
the two loops of TMI-2 were compiled into one. Basically, the expected resulting 
transient was an initial loss of feedwater due to condensate pump trip, followed by a 
loss of coolant in the RCS due to the stuck open electmmagnetic relief valve. The 
information used in this simulation was the following: RCS pressure, RCS 
temperature, neutron density, pressurizer water level, steam generator water level, 
condensate pump status, sump pump status and containment vessel radiation. Table 6 
presents the transient sequence and CATALisp results for this simulation. 
The last simulation examined the conditions from a single event, SGTR (from 
TRAC outputs&). RCS pressure, RCS temperature, steam generator water level, 
neutron density, containment radiation, condenser radiation, and pressurizer water level 
were provide for this simulation. Table 7 presents the transient sequence and 
CATALisp results for this simulation. 
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Table 5. Transient Sequence and CATALisp Results for Simulation 2 
Ev n CATALi R t 
0. 00 s LOSP, LOFW 
0. 50 s 
120 s LOFW (high, 100%) 
ATWS (low, 100%) 
494 s PORV valve opens 
3000 s End of Transient 
0. 0 s 
Uncertainty Screen 
Off 
Condensate Pump 
Trip 
0. 0 s Out of containment 
LOCA 
0, 0 s Turbine Trip 
0. 0 s LOSP 
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Table 6. Transient Sequence and CATALisp Results for Simulation 3 
Ev TALi R 1 
0. 0 s Condensate pump trip 
main feed pump and 
turbine tri 
Condensate Pump 
Trip (very low, 100%) 
6. 0 s Pressurizer relief 
value opens 
8. 0 s Reactor scram 
10. 0 s Reactor Tritp 
gow, 100%) 
13. 0 s Pressurizer relief 
valve does not 
respond to closure 
15. 0 s Pressurizer water 
level peaks 
38-40 s Auxiliary feed valves 
fail to respond to 
30 inch SG water level 
setpoint, due closed 
block valves 
1 - 4 min. Voids appear in core 
80. 0 s Small LOCA 
(moderate, 80%) 
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Table 6 (continued) 
2:02 min. HPI low pressure 
setpoint reached 
7:29 min. Sump pump turns on Small LOCA 
(moderate, 100%) 
Emergency feedwater 
restored 
1 hour End of Transient 
Uncertainty Scteen 
Off 
0. 0 s Turbine Trip 
0. 0 s LOSP 
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Table 7. Transient Sequence and CATALisp Results for Simulation 4 
R ul 
0. 00 s SGTG 
15. 0 s SGTR (low, 100%) 
838 s reactor, turbine, and 
condensor trip 
Reactor Trip 
(moderate, 82%) 
858 s Main feedwater trips 
864 s HPI begins 
1 hour End of Transient 
0. 0 s 
Uncertainty Snmn 
Off 
Condensate Pump 
Trip 
0. 0 s Turbine Trip 
0. 0 s LOSP 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
A. Theoretical Methods Evaluation 
The strength of the methodology developed here is the integration of the best 
estimate capabilities, especially in reference to multiple failure. For the degree of 
uncertainty presented from the simulations, this method for diagnosis has been 
demonstrated to be able to generate intelligent results based on known quantities. One 
possible disadvantage is that with high uncertainty, many results are possible; however, 
a reactor operator may have similar difficulties. From the case studies, the expected 
results are presented to the best degree of certainty. This ability is especially important 
when an operator is confronted with an event that is not specifically defined in 
emergency response guidelines (i. e. , multiple failure, severe accidents, etc. ). Provided 
with a best estimate evaluation of the situation, the operator can respond to the 
conditions presented in the evaluation or at least rule out certain event possibilities. 
Lessons learned fittm accidents, such as the TMI-2 incident, support the importance of 
being able to predict all possible events with the greatest degree of certainty. Future 
work in this area should stress this ability. 
Confidence level assessment, as a modification to assumption based truth 
maintenance, has demonstrated an ability to ignore minor conflicts in assumption sets to 
validate contexts. For example, any result with a confidence level of less than 100% 
would not be validated in a uadiational assumption based truth maintenance system. If 
this was the case, simulation 3 and 4 results would be less accurate. The most dramatic 
result of confidence level assessment is that the ATMS knowledge base can be 
simplified, since exceptions to assumption sets describing a context do not have to be 
specifically defined. All rules describing a context can be contained under one context. 
This reduces the amount of tracing the ATMS has to perform, thus greatly improving 
performance efficiency and making real-time diagnosis possible. However, it is 
important that accurate confidence level values be assigned to individual premises in an 
assumption set. The rules governing this procedure (discussed in Chapter III) worked 
56 
well to a degree; however, iteration between creating rules and confidence levels, 
performing diagnosis through many simulations, and evaluating results was necessary 
to "fine tune" these values. A strict method for dexiving these values has not been 
perfected; however, this study shows that even "close" values for the confidence-levels 
generate good xesults. Therefore, adding additional transients to the knowledge base 
requires that this iterative Ixocedure be followed. 
B. Software Experiment Results Evaluation 
From the results of the four test cases performed using CATALisp, an 
assessment of CATALisp's performance can be made. The issues of focus in the 
evaluation are multiple failure identification, accuracy of results, uncertainty, and 
performance (including xeal-time and best-estimate diagnosis issues). 
The LOFW combined with LOCA (simulation I) and the LOSP combined with 
LOFW (simulation 2) simulations demonstrated CATALisp's ability to recognize 
multiple overlapping transients fmm a minimum set of information. CATALisp 
correctly diagnosed that the events expected where indeed present. It also showed that 
the information sets used in both simulations were inadequate to completely evaluate the 
transients. However, the fact that nearly accurate results were found suggest that the 
information that was supplied was very useful to the diagnosis. Additionally, 
simulation 2 showed how (when not enough information is provided) an incorrect 
result can have a greater cenainty than the actual event. This leads to the conclusion 
that there is a limit were a minimum amount of information is absolutely necessary to 
make an accurate assessment of the situation. This has been shown to be the case with 
human operators. sx For these two simulations uncertainty was high for all results, this 
was expected considering the amount of information provided. 
The TMI transient (simulation 3) and the SGTR (simulation 4) simulations 
perform efficiently and accurately when provided with much more information. Given 
the extensive data supplied to CATALisp, CATALisp gives very good results under 
both uncertainty screen modes, considering that the transient signatures are defined in 
the ATMS knowledge base. With more information provided to CATALisp the 
possibility of conflicts in the assumption set increases due to certain uniqueness among 
similar transients. For this reason some results had lower confidence level values, 
however, still high enough to validate its context. Simulation 4 was included to 
demonstrate that for a single event with a sufficient amount of information supplied, 
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only that event is the result as expected (the conditions of a SGTR are often similar to a 
small LOCA). 
General observation are evident in assessment of these simulations. With 
greater uncertainty and unknown information, confidence level values tend to be 
skewed to the extremes. These would be expected considering that only a subset of the 
total number of rules in an assumption set are fired. With less uncertainty there is a 
more even distribution of confidence level values. Also, with greater uncertainty 
accurate results were not confirmed immediately following the occurrence of a fault. 
For example, in simulation 1 the LOCA event was not reported until 10 s after it had 
occurred. This was because the rule "RCS PRESSURE is LOW" was false until 15. 6 
s. The uncertainty screen should probably be on at all times, except when the operator 
is confused about the conditions, With the uncertainty screen off CATALisp can 
provide a list of information that is necessary to perform a better analysis (from the 
ADD INFORMATION option). The openuor could then supply this information for an 
Improved diagnosis. For simulations 3 and 4 CATALisp was made to handle more 
information, yet, no significant difference was notice in CATALisp's performance. 
Under "real plant" conditions much information would be available to the computer and 
this simuladon demonstrates the performance of this situation. One diagnositic iteration 
took about I s to perform. 
Finally, a "necessary set" of information has been derived from these 
simulations that CATALisp should have during a simulation to pmvide accurate results 
with low uncertainty for the simple one-loop model. This set would likely be larger for 
a more detailed and complex model; however, this set would be the "backbone" to any 
"necessary set" of information. These are RCS pressure, RCS temperature, neutron 
density, reactor trip annuicator status, pressurizer water level, containment radiation, 
condenser radiation, steam generator level, turbine trip annuicator status, and HPI 
status. As this necessary set of information is pmcessed, additionai can be supplied to 
CATALisp when using the ADD INFORMATION option. 
C. General Conclusions 
Using knowledge-based systems in the nuclear power industry could offer 
improved safety, operation, inaintenance, and efficiency of a nuclear power plant. 
Real-time analysis along with the integration of symptom-oriented diagnostic strategies 
and mitigating procedures provides a powerful combination for analyzing and 
mitigating transients in nuclear power systems. Best estimate diagnostic methods 
pmvide a means for handling uncertainty and multiple failure occurrences. 
The goal of any potential operator aid should address the issues of correct 
diagnosis, correct selection of required actions, or the transmittal of the necessary 
information to the operator. The results of this project 'ndirectly present some evidence 
that "intelligent" computer aids can provide this invaluable service to an operator during 
transient scenarios. Extending this prototype and the qualitative model to analyze an 
actual plant coukl pmvide more valuable information. This requhes modification of the 
ATMS knowledge base and the qualitative model only (see Appendix A and B). In this 
scenario CATALisp's response could be directly compared to an operator's response. 
CATALisp is a software experiment that addresses most major issues involved 
in computer operator aids. These are: real time diagnosis, multiple failure transient, 
best estimate analysis, uncertainty management, information overload problems, and 
presentation of mitigation procedures. The results have demonstrated that symptoms in 
a plant can be accurately associated with transient events during complex transient 
conditions similar to a human operator's own reasoning in a reasonable time period 
Even with a significant amount of uncertainty present, this pmgram has shown a best 
estimate abiTity capable of resolving minor symptom conflicts of reasoning. It is not the 
intention of this expert system to do the job of the operator, this code still requires that 
the operator to provide it with the necessary information to assure an accurate analysis, 
to confirm its reasoning and to make a valued judgement from the diagnosis of the 
correct response. 
D. Potential Areas of Application and Enhancements 
The results from this code also imply new means for addressing transient 
analysis, personnel training, and severe accident situations. This tool could also be 
apphed to similar systems such as that in the chemical industry. 
D. l. Transient Analysis 
Transient analysis of a nuclear power plant embodies study of predicting the 
behavior of a system I'rom initiating events over time. This study is not limited to just 
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thermal hydraulic properties; but includes any condition that might be relevant to 
assuring the integrity of the plant (i. e. , radioactive releases, availability of equipment, 
etc. ). Extensive computations can be performed using system codes such as 
RETRAN, ~, and TRAC. The goal of transient analysis is to insure the integrity 
of a nuclear power plant by giving attention to prevention, mitigation, and response 
preparation of accident situations. Information pmvided in the study of transient 
behavior can identify potential breaches in safety so that design modifications or 
mitigation procedure can be made. 
While traditional transient analysis deals with the prediction of state, intelligent 
computer-aided diagnosis presents another branch of transient analysis for prediction of 
transient cause. Results from computational transient analysis are used in the 
assessment of design and safety margins. Likewise, an unknown transient scenario 
could be run on a code similar to CATALisp to identify possible causes of undesirable 
phenomena; possibly leading to discoveries of inadequacies of design or equipment. 
D. 2. Training 
The codification of expert knowledge of diagnosis and mitigation schemes in 
terms of logically linked facts, rules, and heuristics greatly enhances understanding of 
solution explanations. Expertise captured in this ordered form is vital for educating 
others of strategies and methods used by experts. An automated diagnosis system 
could serve in operator training courses demonstrating diagnostic reasoning, mitigation 
strategies, plant-operator interactions, and the qualitative behavior of nuclear systems 
under transient conditions. This system could be interfaced with an interactive plant 
simulator and respond to simulation input for an evaluation of the information. An 
operator trainee could then use this system to support or re-assess his own evaluation. 
An assessment of the likelihood of operator ermr during uansient scenarios could also 
be made. During operator response and mitigation, this code could also provide 
qualitative information on plant response to potential abnormal conditions and increased 
understanding of the impacts of operator actions on the response of the plant. 
Considering that such a system would be interfaced with a simulator and based on 
emergency response guidelines, it could gather certain knowledge directly from the 
plant to determine whether the correct procedures were being followed by the operator; 
thus, it could be used to better assess the likelihood of operator ermr in recovery 
scenarios, while pmviding training for personnel. 
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D. 3. Severe Accident Insights 
Severe accident analysis and prevention is cuxrently an issue of great concern in 
the nuclear industry. While nuclear power plants are designed with the safety principle 
of 'Y)efense in Depth", these systems have a non-zexo probability of failure. Severe 
accidents represent a class of low frequency events having high consequence to the 
plant and envixonment. Severe accidents are classified as accidents that pxesent risk to 
containment integrity, thus, presenting a risk to the envixonment from core degradation 
or melting &om inadequate core cooling. Inadequate core cooling can be due to a bxcak 
in the xeactor coolant system causing loss of water and/or steam, or a gradual escape of 
steam fmm the reactor coolant system causing heat to generate in the reactor core if the 
decay heat removal system is intexxuptexL 
Many barriers already exist to prevent a severe accident situation. "Defense in 
Depth" barrier implies system redundancy exist, so that for certain failures, problems 
can be bypassed or isolated. Mitigation safety systems represent another design barrier 
for assurance of adequate cooling for the reactor. Emergency operator response 
procedures provide symptom-based diagnosis and response for cooling down a reactor. 
The containment pxesents a physical barrier for release of radioactivity resulting from a 
severe accident. Finally, response preparedness provides for attention to public 
concerns and cleanup. If the precursors of such events that cause inadequate core 
cooling are identified early in an initiating event, an accident capable of breaching these 
barrier might possibly be avoided. Studies have been performed to do just that by 
examining licensee event reports supplied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) by commexcial power plants. ss Precursors were identified on the basis of I) If 
the event involved the failure of at least one system required to mitigate a loss of main 
feedwater, loss of offsite power, small-break LOCA, or steam-line break; 2) If the 
event involved the degradation of more than one system required to mitigate one of the 
above initiating events; or 3) If the event involved an anual initiating event that required 
safety system response. Codifying the symptoms to recognize these precursors is 
conceivable using CATALisp, thus allowing CATALisp the capability to serve as early 
warning for potential severe accidents. 
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D. 4. Potential Enhancements 
The current state of CATALisp is dependent on the qualitative model and 
heuristics describing the simple one loop PWR. New models can be created describing 
different plants or systems. Ideally, a general qualitative and heuristics model might be 
created so that new models would not have to be created from scratch. Alternatively, a 
preprocessor could be designed to ease the creation of new models. Diagnosis could 
possibly be improved by using component connectivity information in a model to 
define a physical location of a failure. Mass and energy balance equations could also be 
used to gain additional infcsmation about a plant. Communication between the machine 
and the user could be improved to provide more information, such as explanations of 
diagnosis, providing the importance of unknown information to diagnosis, and other 
useful plant information. Greater understanding of uncertainty could be gained by 
applying failure probabilities to events from Probablistic Risk Assessments. Mitigation 
procedures could be improved to provide intelligent conflict resolution when the 
establish operator guidelines do not adequately address a transient event. 
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APPENDIX A 
SIMULATION TRANSIENT DATA 
Figure A-1 to Figure A-19 represent the transient data used in the four case 
studies presented in the Chapter V. It should be noted that not all the data used for 
these cases is presented in transient form, some data was also included representing 
"global" knowledge about the system during the transient. For example, for simulation 
3 the reactor trip annunciator was on during the entire transient, therefore this 
knowledge was provided directly to the qualitative model, rather than in transient data 
form. 
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APPENDIX B 
ATMS NODAL NETWORK 
' 
& (start) (not. normal ((pattern ((nil))) 
(daughter ((cool. sys) (reactor. trip) (secondary. sys) (steam. gen. sys) (loss. of. offsite. power))))) (cool. sys ((pattern ((pressure reactor. vessel not. normal 20) (pressure. gradient reactor. vessel not. normal 15) (level pressurizer not. normal 10) 
(temperature hot. legl not. normal 20) 
(temperature. gradient hot. legl not. normal 15) 
(mass. flow rcp not. normal 20) ) ) 
(daughter ((loca) (atws))))) (reactor. trip ((pattern ((status reactor. trip. ann on 50) (pressure reactor. vessel low 10) (pressure. gradient reactor. vessel decreasing 8) (cr. level reactor. vessel low 10) 
(neutron. density reactor. vessel deczeasing 15) 
(temperature. gradient hot. legl decreasing 7))) 
(daughter ((nil))))) 
(steam. gen. sys ((pattern ((level steam. genl not. normal 20) (pressure steam. genl not. normal 20) 
(mass. flow rcp not. normal 30) (pressure reactor. vessel low 30))) 
(daughter ( (sgtr) (sg. slb) ) ) ) ) (secondary. sys ((pattern ((pressure reactor. vessel not. normal 15) 
(temperature hot. legl not. normal 15) 
(pressure turbine not. normal 15) 
(power generator not. normal 15) 
(temperature condenser not. normal 15) 
(pressure cold. leg2 not. normal 15) 
(temperature heater2 not. normal 10))) 
&daughter ((loss. of. feedwater) &cond. pump. trip) 
&turbine. trip))))) (loss. of. offsite. power 
(&pattern ((power generator very. low 50) ((rule (probability turbine. trip & numbez 70. 0)) 35) 
(power diesel very. low 15))) 
(daughter ((nil))))) (loca ((pattern ((pzessure zeactor. vessel low 10) ((or (pressure. gradient reactor. vessel decreasing) (rule (mass. flow hpis & number 0. 0))) 25) (radiation containment. vessel high 25) 
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40) 
(pressure containment. vessel high 10) (status sump. pump on 10) 
(mass. flow rcp low 20))) 
(daughter ((small. loca& (medium. loca) (large. loca))))) (small. loca ((pattern (&pressure. rate reactor. vessel slowly 100) ) ) 
(daughter ((nil))))) 
(medium. loca 
( (pattern ((pressure. rate reactor. vessel moderately 100) ) ) 
&daughter ((nil))))) 
( large. loca ((pattern ((pressure. rate reactor. vessel quickly 100) ) ) 
(daughter ( (nil) ) ) ) ) 
(atws 
( (pattern ( ( (rule (probability reactor. trip ( number 70. 0) ) 
reasing)) 
number 
70. 0)))) 20) 
(power generator low 30))) 
(daughter ((out. of. con. loca) (feed. pump. trip))))) (out. of. con. loca ((pattern &(pressure turbine low 34) 
(mass. flow feed. pump low 33) (level steam. genl low 33))) 
(daughter ((nil))))) (feed. pump. trip ((pattern ((mass. flow feed. pump very. low 35) (status em. feed. pump on 15) 
(level pressurizer high 15) 
(pressure reactor. vessel high 30) 
(power generator high 15))) 
(daughter ( (nil) ) ) & ) (sgt r 
( (pattern ( (pressure reactor. vessel low 15) (level pressurizer low 15) (radiation condenser high 20) (zadiation containment. vessel nozmal 15) 
(mass. flow feed. pump low 20) (level steam. genl high 15))) 
(daughter ( (nil) ) & ) ) (sg. slb ((pattern ((pressure reactor. vessel low 15& (level pressurizer low 15& (radiation condenser normal 20) (radiation containment normal 15) 
(mass. flow feed. pump high 20) (level steam. genl is high 15))) 
(daughter &(nil))))1 (loss. of. feedwater ((pattern ((mass. flow feed. pump low 30) (level steam. genl low 10) (status em. feed. pump on 10) ((or (and (temperature hot. legl high) (tempezature. gradi. ent hot. legl inc 
(and (temperature hot. legl high) (rule (probability reactor. trip 
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(pressure feed. pump low 40))) 
(daughter &(nil))))) 
(cond. pump. t«p 
&(pattern ((status cond. pump off 100))) 
(daughter ((nil))&)) (turbine. trip ((pattern ((status turbine off 60) 
(power generator very. low 20) 
&pressure turbine low 20)&) 
(daughter ((nil))))) (end))) 
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APPENDIX C 
PWR QUALITATIVE MODEL 
steam. genl)))) 
eg2 cold. leg2 
' ( (start) (reactor. vessel ((pressure (not. known 2250)) (pressure. gradient (not. known 0)) (pressure. rate (not. known 0)) 
(neutron. density (not. known 80}) 
(c r . level (not . known 8 01 ) 
(ad j. sys &hot. legl cold. legl) & ) ) (hot . legl ((pressure (not, known 2250)) (pressure. gradient (not. known 0&) (pressure. rate (not. known 0)) 
(temperature. gradient (not. known 0)) 
&temperature (not. known 650&) 
(mass. flow (not. known 20)) (adj. sys (reactor. vessel pressurizer (pressurizer ((pressure (not. known 2250)) 
(temperature (not. known 6501) 
&level (not. known 50)) 
&adj. sys (drain. tank hot. legl)))) (hpis ((pressure (not. known 2250}& 
(mass. flow (not. known 0&) (adj. sys (hot. legl) ) ) ) (steam. genl ((level (not. known 85)) 
(pressure (not. known 1185)) (adj. sys (hot. legl cold. leg1. 2 hot. l 
amer. fw. sll) ) ) ) (cold. leg1. 2 ((pressure (not. known 3)) (pressure. gradient (not. known 0) ) (pressure. rate (not. known 0)) 
(temperature. gradient (not. known 0)) 
(temperature (not. known 550)) 
(mass. flow (not. known 20)) (adj. sys (cool. pump steam. genl)))) (cold. legl . 1 ((pressure (not. known 2000)) (pressure. gradient (not. known 0)) 
(pressure. rate (not. known 0) } 
(temperature (not. known 550)) 
(temperature. gradient (not. known 0)) 
(mass . flow (not. known 20) ) (adj. sys (cool. pump reactor. vessel)) (rcp ((pressure (not. known 2000)) 
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(mass. flow (not. known 250))) ((adj. sys &cold. legl. l cold. leg1. 2)))) 
(emer. fw. sll ((pressure (not. known 2000)) (adj. sys (steam. genl emer. fw. pump)))) 
(emez. fw. pump ((adj. sys &emer. fw. sll emer. fw. s12)))) 
(emez. fw. s12 ((pressure (not. known 1)) (adj. sys (con. tank emer. fw. pump)))) (con. tank 
(&water. level (not. known 85)) (water. level. gradient (not. known 0)) (adj. sys (emez. fw. s12)))) (hot. leg2 ((pressure &not. known 1800)) (pressure. gradient (not. known 0)) 
(pressure. rate (not. known 0)) 
(temperature (not. known 610)) 
(temperature. gradient (not. known 0)) 
(mass. flow (not. known 20)) (adj. sys (steam. genl turbine) ) ) ) (turbine 
((pzessuze (not. known 1800)) 
&temperature (not. known 610)) (status (not. known 1)) (adj. sys (generator hot. leg2 condenser)))) (generator 
((power (not. known 90)) (adj. sys (turbine)))) (condensez 
((pressure (not. known 1)) 
(temperature (not. known 115)) (radiation (not. known 1)) (adj. sys (turbine cond. pump)))) 
(cond. pump (&status (not. known 1)) (adj. sys (heaterl condenser)))) (heaterl 
((pressure (not. known 2)) 
(temperature (not. known 150)) 
&adj. sys (feed. pump cond. pump)))) (feed. pump ((mass. flow (not. known 2) ) ((adj. sys (heaterl heater2))))) 
(em. feed. pump ((status (not. known 0)) ((adj. sys (heaterl))))& (heater2 
((pressure (not. known 1800&) 
(temperature (not. known 170)) (adj. sys (feed. pump cold. leg2)))) (cold. leg2 ((pressure (not. known 1800)) (pressure. gradient (not. known 0)) 
(pressure. rate (not. known 0)) 
(temperature (not. known 170) 
&temperature. gradient (not. known 0)) 
(mass. flow (not. known 20)) (adj. sys (steam. genl heater2))))) (containment. vessel ((pressure (not. known 1)) (radiation (not. known 1)) (adj. sys (nil)))) 
(sump 
(&water. level &not. known 10)) (adj. sys (nil)))) 
(sump. pump ((status (not. known 0)) (adj. sys (nil)))) (diesel 
((power (not. known 0)) (adj. sys (nil)))) (reactor. trip. ann ((status (not. known 0)) (adj. sys (nil)))) (end))) 
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APPENDIX D 
CATALISP PROGRAM 
COMMENT: BEGIN is the initiation command for CATALISP 
(defun begin () 
&cond ( (y-or-n-p "Would you like to perform a new analysis ?") (setq system nil) 
&setq condl nil) (setq time nil) (setq attr nil) (kbl))) (setq cn3 nil) 
(prim) 
(send *windows :deactivate) 
(send "window2* :deactivate) 
(send *windowl* :deactivate) 
(send *window3a ;deactivate) 
(send *result* :deactivate) 
(send *mouse* :deactivate) 
(send *standard-output* :select)) 
(defun prim &) 
&send large-win :expose) 
(send primary ':expose) 
(send primary ':choose) 
(send primary ':bury)) 
COMMENT: VSNORN, GRADIENT, AND RATEET convert numerical data to 
symbolic representation 
(defun vsnorm &t2 nm) 
(prog nil (if (eql t2 nil) (return ' (not. known) ) ) (if (& t2 nm) (return '(high))) (if (& t2 2355) (return '(very. high)) ) (if (& t2 (a 0 . 05 nm) ) (return ' (very. low) ) ) (if (& t2 nm) (return '(low))) (if (- t2 nm) (return ' (normal) ) ) ) ) 
(defun gradient (tl t2) 
(prog nil (if (eql t2 nil) &return ' (not. known) ) ) (if (& t2 tl) (return '(decreasing))) (if (& t2 tl) &return '(increasing))) (if ( t2 tl) (return '(normal))))) 
&defun ratedet (tl t2) (let ((xxx nil)) 
(pzog nil 
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(if (eql t2 nil) (return '(not. known))) (setq xxx (abs (- t2 tl))) (if ( xxx 0) (return '(zero))) (if (and && xxx 0) (& xxx (* 5 cnn))) (return '(slowly))) (if (and (&= xxx (* 5 cnn)) (& xxx &* cnn 12))) (return 
' (moderately) ) ) (if (& xxx (* 12 cnn) ) (return ' &quickly) ) ) ) ) ) 
(setq kb (make-array 5)) 
COMMENT: READER reads transient datafiles 
(defun reader (st co) (setq st '(string-append "NUKES:&catalisp&" st)) (with-open-file (stream st ':direction ':input) (let ( (n 0) ) 
(prog nil 
label 
&setf (aref time n) (read stream nil)) (setf (aref attr co n) (read stream nil) ) (if (equal (azef time n& nil) (return)) (setq n (+ n 1)) 
(go label))))) 
COMMENT: KBCALL allows I/O access to a knowledge base 
If i 1 kbcall inqueries the database If i 2 Kbcall writes to the database 
(defun kbcall (r v i) (let ((a nil) (b nil) (atl nil) &b3 nil) 
(entry nil) (fentzy nil) (bt nil) (b2 nil) (at nil) &a2 nil& (a3 nil) 
(kbl nil) (b21 nil) ) 
(prog nil 
(cond & (eql (aref kb r) nil) (setf (aref kb r) ' ( (start) (end) ) ) ) ) (setq a (list (cadz v))) (setq b (cadddr v)) (setq c (list (car (reverse v)))) (setq bl &list '(start))) 
&setq al (list b) ) (setq at2 bl) (setq atl nil) (setq b3 nil) (setq kbl (aref kb r) ) (setq entry (append a c)) (setq fentzy (append (list b) (list (list entry)))& 
flagl 
(setq bt (caar kbl)) (setq b3 (cdr kbl) ) (cond ((eql b bt) (setq at (cadar kbl)) (setq atl at) (go flag2))) (cond ((and (eql (caar b3) 'end) (not ( i 1))) 
(list 
&list 
&setf (aref kb r) (append bl (list fentry) b3) ) 
&return))) 
(cond ((and (eql (caar b3) 'end) &= i 1)) (return))) (setq kbl (cdr kbl)) 
&setq bl (append bl (list &car kbl)))) 
(go flagl) 
flag2 
(cond ((and &eql (car at2) nil) (not ( i 1))) (setq b2 (append (list (car al)) (list &append at 
entry))))) (setf (aref kb r) (append (reverse (cdr (reverse bl))) 
b2) b3)) (return))) (setq at. 2 (list (caar atl))) (setq a3 (cdr atl)) (setq al (append al (list (car atl)))) 
(cond ((equal a at2) (go flag3))) (setq atl (cdr atl)) (if (and (eql atl nil) ( i 1) ) (return) ) 
(go flag2) 
flag3 (if ( i 1) (setq c (cdar atl))) 
(cond &(= i 1) (return c))) (setq al (reverse (cdr (reverse al)))) (setq bl (reverse (cdr (reverse bl)))) (setq a2 (append a c)) (setq b2 (append al (list a2) a3) ) (setq b21 (car b2) ) (setq b2 (append (list b21) (list (cdr b2)))) (if (eql i 3) (setq b2 (append al (list a3)))) (cond (&eql (cadr b2) nil) &setf (aref kb r) &append bl b3)) (return))) (setf (aref kb r) (append bl (list b2) b3))))) 
COMMENT: UNKNOWN-RULE, ORGANIZE, AND FINDUNKNOWN derive a list of 
plant conditions that are unknown, yet important for diagnosis 
(defun unknown-rule (ssl) 
(prog &a2 al dum0 duml dum2) (setq a2 ssl) (setq al nil) 
label (if (equal a2 nil) (return ssl) ) (setq dum0 (list (car a2))) (setq a2 &cdr a2)) 
(cond ( &equal (caar dum0) ' rule) 
&setq dum0 (car dum0) ) (setq duml (list (append (list (second dum0) ) (list (third dum0) ) (list (first dum0) ) (list (/ (seventh dum0) 2. 0) ) ) ) ) (setq dum2 (list (append (list (fifth dum0) ) (list (sixth dum0) ) (list (first dum0) ) (list (/ (seventh dum0) 2. 0) ) ) ) ) (setq ssl (append al duml dum2 a2) ) (setq dum0 (append duml dum2) ) ) ) 
&cond ( ( (length (car dum0) ) 2) (eval-rule (car dum0)) 
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(setq ssl (append al col a2)) (setq dum0 col))) 
&setq al &append al dum0)) 
&go label))) 
(defun organize &ssl) (1st ((ssdl nil) (dup2 nil) (ssd nil) 
(dupl nil) (al nil) (a2 nil)) 
(prog nil (setq ssl (unknown-rule ssl) ) (setq ssdl ssl) 
flag2 (setq dupl (car ssdl) ) (setq ssdl (cdr ssdl) ) (setq ssd ssdl) 
(cond ((equal ssdl nil) (go flag4))) 
flag3 
(cond (&equal ssd nil) &go flag2))) 
(cond ((and (equal (car dupl) (caar ssd)) (equal &cadr dupl) 
&cedar ssd))) (setq dup2 (append dup2 (list (car ssd)))))) (setq ssd (cdr ssd)) 
(go flag3) 
flag4 (setq al nil) (setq a2 (cddr ssdl) ) (setq ssdl ssl) 
flag5 (setq ssd (car ssdl)) 
(cond ((equal (car dup2) ssd) (setq ssl (append al a2) ) (go flag4) ) ) (setq al (append al (list ssd) ) ) (setq a2 (cddr ssdl)) (setq ssdl (cdr ssdl)) 
(cond ((equal ssdl nil) &go flag6))) 
(go flag5) 
flag6 (setq dup2 (cdr dup2)) 
(cond ((equal dup2 nil) (setq ss2 ssl) (return))) 
(go flag4)))) 
(defun findunknown (ssl) (let ( (dup2 nil) (countl 0) (ssd nil) (c2 nil) (cl nil) (ss3 nil)) 
(prog nil (setq dup2 nil) (setq uk nil) (setq countl 0) (setq ss2 nil) (setq ssd nil) (setq ssdl ssl) (organize ssl) 
flag7 
&cond ((eql ss2 nil) (return))) 
(ssdl nil) 
(setq ss3 (car ss2)) (setq c2 (append '(the) (list (car ss3)) '(of) (list (cadr 
ss3» '(is not. known))) (setq cl (caar &kbcall 1 c2 1&)) 
(cond ((equal cl 'not. known) (setq uk (append uk (list c2))))) (setq ss2 (cdr ss2)) 
(cond (&equal ss2 nil) (setq uk (list uk)) (return))) 
(go flagy)))) 
COMMENT: SIMULATION puts transient data into the qualitative plant 
model 
(defun simulation () (let ((a 1& (old 0) 
(new 0) 
&nozmal 0) 
&xx nil)) (setq a 0) (setq tstep (+ tstep 1) ) 
(prog nil 
label (if ( a ds) (return)) (setq a (+ a 1&) (setq old (aref attr a (- tstep 11)) 
&setq new (aref attz a tstep)) 
(cond ((eql tstep 1) (kbcall 1 (append '(the) (list (aref condl a)) ' &of) (list (aref system a)) '&is& (append '(not. known) (list old))) 2))) (if (eql new nil) (return)) (setq normal (aref attr a 0)) (setq xx (list (append &vsnorm new normal) &list normal)))) 
(cond ((eql (azef condl a) 'status) (if () new 0. 5) (setq xx '(&on 1, 0)))) (if (& new 0. 5) (setq xx '(&off 0. 0)))))) (kbcall 1 (append '(the) (list (aref condl a)) '(of) (list (aref system a)) '(is) xx) 21 
(setq fl (azef condl a)) (if (eql (aref condl a) 'pressure) (setq fl 
'pressure. gradient) & (if (eql (aref condl a) 'temperature) (setq fl 
'temperature. gradient)) 
(cond ((or (eql (aref condl a) 'pressure) (eql (aref condl 
a) 'temperature) 
(eql (aref condl a) 'neutron. density&) (setq xx (list &append (gradient old new) (list (- old 
new))))) (kbcall 1 (append '(the) (list fl) '(of) (list (aref system a)) '(is) xx) 2) 
(cond ((eql (aref condl a) 'pressure) (setq xx (list (append (ratedet old new) (list (- 
old new))))) (kbcall 1 (append '(the pressure. rate of) 
&list (aref system a)) '(is) xx) 
2))))) 
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(go label)))) 
(defun timint (aaa) (setq aaa (reverse aaa)) 
&setq timl (+ (* (+ (* (digit-char-p (char aaa 4)) 10) (digit-char- 
p (char aaa 3))) 60& (+ (w (digit-char-p (char aaa 1)) 10) &digit- 
char-p (char aaa 0)))))) 
COMMENT: INITVAL initializes variables 
(defun initval &) (setq end nil) (let ((c nil) & (setq rays nil) 
&send *window2* :expose) (setq co 0) (setq cnn 0) (setq cnl nil) (setq cn2 nil) (setq cn3 nil) (setq cno 0) (setq op 15. 5) (setq orp 3500) (setq ot 650) (setq tlo 0) (setq tstep 0& (setq reit nil) (setq graph 0) (setq tzansient (make-array 7)) 
(send *window2* : line-out (setq item-list nil) 
(prog nil (setq c 1) 
label (if (eql (aref system c) nil) (return)) (setq item-list 
&append item-list (list 
(append (list (string-append (prinl-to-string (aref system c)) "'s 
(prinl-to-string (aref condl c)))) 
(append '(:eval) (list (append '(grapher) (list 
c)))))))) (setq c (t c 1)) 
(go label) ) (send plotter-ops :set-item-list item-list))) 
COMMENT: PLOTTER-OPS is a basic pop up menu 
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(setq plotter-ops (tv:make-window 
'tv:pop-up-menu 
':label "Plot Selection" 
':borders 3 
':item-list '((one :eval &grapher 1)) 
(two :eval &grapher 2)) (three :eval (grapher 3)) 
(four :eval (grapher 4)) (five :eval (grapher 5)) (six :eval &grapher 6))))) 
(setq p (make-array 8)) 
COMMENT: RUN is the main body of the program. Zt handles 
communication between the infezence engine and the ATMS knowledge 
base 
(car 
(defun run () (let ( (tl nil) (t2 nil) (r 0) (cl 0) (len nil) 
(count nil) (countl nil) (level 1) (checkl nil) (check ' ((cool . sys) (reactor. trip) (steam. gen . sys) (secondary. sys) (loss. of. offsite. power))) (case nil) 
(out nil) (tran (make-array 9) ) 
(prob (make-array 7))& 
(prog nil (if (equal time nil) (return) ) (initval) 
flagl (setq checkl check) (setq len 1) 
flag2 (if ( len (+ (length checkl) 1)) (go flag3)) (setf (azef transient len) 
(append (car check) (car (kbcall 2 &append '(the pattern of) 
check) '(is ?A)) 1)))) (setq len (+ len 1&) (setq check (cdr check)) 
(go flag2) 
flag3 (setq ssl nil) (setq cl 0) 
flag3, 1 (setq cl (+ cl 1)) (setq ssl &append ssl (cdr &aref transient cl)))) 
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(cond ((= cl (length checkl) ) &findunknown ssl) (go begin) ) ) 
(go flag3. 1 ) 
begin 
(prog nil (setq r 0) 
start (setq r (+ r 1&) 
(cond (( r (+ (length checkl) 1)) (return))) (setf (aref prob r) 100) (setq tl (cdr (aref transient r))) (setq case (car (aref transient r))) 
test (setq t2 (car tl)) (setq tl (cdr tl)) 
(cond ((equal t2 nil) (go start))) (setf (aref prob r) (- (aref prob r) (car (unknown-search 
t2)&)) 
(cond ((and (neq cn2 'sen) (eql (aref prob r) 0)) (setf 
&aref prob r) 1))) 
(go test)) 
(prog nil 
label 
(setq cn (aref time tstep)) 
(cond ((eql cn nil) (go flag6) ) ) 
(cond ((neq cn cno) (send *window2*:set-label (string- 
append Transient Report at " (princ-to-string cn) "s ") ) (setq cnn (- cn cno&) ) ) (setq cno cn) 
( s et q count 0 ) (prog nil 
loop 
(cond (( count (length checkl)) (return))) (setq count (+ count 1)) (setq test (cdr (aref transient count))) (setq case (car (aref transient count))) (setf (aref p count) 1) (prog nil 
1 abc 1 1 
(cond ((equal test nil) (if (& (aref prob count& 0& (setf (aref p count& (float (* (/ (aref p count) (aref prob count)) 100)))) (kbcall 3 (append '(the probability 
of& (list case) '&is) (list (list &aref p count&))) 2) (setq out (append (list case) 
'(probability is) (aref p count))) (return))) (setf (aref p count) (+ (aref p count) (eval-rule (car test)))) (setq test (cdr test)) 
(go labell)) 
&go loop)) (setq count1 1) 
flag5 
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(setq case (car checkl) ) 
(cond ((& (aref p countl) 69) (setf (aref tran level) (append (aref tran level) (list case))) 
(send *window2* :string-out (prinl-to-string case)) 
(send *window2* :y-scroll-to 1 :relative-jump) (setq rays (append rsys (cdr (aref transient 
countl) ) ) ) ) ) (kbcall 3 (append ' (the probability of) case ' (is (0. 0))) 2))) (setq rslt (append reit (list &append &list case) (list 
&aref p countl)) (list level) (list &aref prob countl)))))) (setq countl (+ countl 1)) 
&setq checkl (cdr checkl)) 
(cond ((& countl count) (go flag51))) 
(go flag5) 
flag51 
(cond ((equal (aref tran level) nil) (go flag59))) (setq case (car (aref tran level) ) ) (setf (aref tran level) (cdr &aref tran level& ) ) (setq check (car (kbcall 2 (append ' (the daughter of& 
case ' (is ?A) ) 1) ) ) 
(cond ((equal check ' (&nil) ) ) (go flag59) ) ) (setq level &+ level 1) ) 
(go flagl) 
flag59 
(cond ((and ( level 0) (neq (aref tran 1) nil)) (setq 
level 1& (go flag51) ) ) 
(cond & ( level 0) (setq level 1) &go flag6& ) ) (setq level (- level 1)1 
(go flag51) 
flag6 (setq cnl (test)) (setq end nil) (if (eql cnl 'end) (return)) 
(cond ((& graph 0) (grapher2 graph))) 
(cond ((not (eql cn nil)) (simulation) (send *window2* 
:line-out " "))) 
(setq check ' &(cool. sys& (reactor. trip) (steam. gen. sys) (secondary. sys) (loss. of. offsite. power))) (if &equal cnl 'ok) (display-result rslt&) (setq reit nil) (setq rays nil) 
(go flagl))) (prim))) 
COMMENT: OPTIONS is the main menu used during a simulation run 
(setq options (tv:make-window 
'tv:pop-up-menu 
':label "Option Selection" 
':borders 3 
':item-list '((" Gauge Report" :eval (gauge-report)) 
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(deactivate-window)) 
information)) 
(" Deactivate Report Window(s)" :eval 
("Add Information" :eval &add- 
(" Condition Plots" :eval (cond-plot)) (" Diagnostic Result" :eval (setq end 'ok)) (" Print Valued Results" :eval (print 
reit)) ("&)ncertainty Screen" :eval (cond (&equal 
cn2 ' sen) (setq cn2 nil) ) ( (setq cn2 ' sen) ) ) ) 
&" Exit" :eval (setq end 'end))))) 
(defun test () (tv:window-call (*mouse* :activate) 
(send *mousea ':any-tyi-no-hang)) 
(cond (( co 0) (send *mouse* ':item ':new-type "Options Menu" ) (setq co 1)&) 
(prog nil 
&cond ((and (( tv:mouse-x 488) () tv:mouse-x 127) (( tv:mouse-y 
160& (& tv:mouse-y 50)& 
(go label) ) & 
(return& 
label 
(send options ':expose) 
(send options ':choose) 
(send options ':bury) (return end))) 
COMMENT: The following functions perform some of the options offered 
during a simulation run 
(defun deactivate-window () 
(send *result* :deactivate) (setq cn2 nil) 
(send *window3* :deactivate)) 
(defun add-information () 
(send *standard-output* :select) 
(prog nil 
(cond ((eql rays nil) (return))) 
(send *window2*:deselect) 
(findunknown rays) (print uk)) (setq end 'new) (input-info ds)) 
(defun gauge-report () (1st ((count2 0) (rsysl nil) (testl nil) 
&app nil)) 
(prog nil 
(cond ((eql rays nil) (return))) (setq count2 0) 
(send "window3" :expose t) 
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(send *window3* :clear-history) 
(send wwindow3* :select) 
(organise rays) (setq rsys ss2) (setq rsysl rays) 
flag 
(cond (( count2 (length rays)) (return))) (setq testl (car royal) ) (setq app (append ' (the) (list (car testl) & ' (of & (list (cadr 
testl) ) ' (is ) ) ) (send *window3a :line-out (princ-to-string (append app (kbcall 1 (append app 
'(?a)) 1)), )) (setq rsysl (cdr rsysl) ) (setq count2 (+ count2 1) ) 
(go flag) ) ) ) 
(defun cond-plot () 
(send plotter-ops ':expose-near '(:mouse)) 
(send plotter-ops ':choose) 
(send plotter-ops ':deactivate)) 
(defun make-item () (1st ((cnt 0) (blah nil& (strg nil) ) 
(prog nil (setq cnt 1) (setq blah ' ( (fghj) ) ) 
label (if ( cnt 30) (return) ) (setq strg (princ-to-string (list cnt) ) ) (setq blah (append blah (list &tv:scroll-parse-item 
"line number: 
' (: string (princ-to-string &list cnt) ) ) ) ) ) ) (setq cnt (+ cnt 1) ) 
(go label) ) ) ) 
(defun aaa () 
(send *test* :set-display-item blah)) 
(defun comp () (with-open-file (stream "kbsl: &bob&comp. dat" ':direction ': output) 
(send stream ':string-out (pzinl-to-string &aref kb 1))&)) 
&defun quick-sort &x) (sort x ()'(lambda (x y) (& (second x) (second y)))) (sort x ()'(lambda (x y) (& (third x) (third y&)))) 
93 
(defun quick-sort-1 (list) (let (&rxcv (copy-list list))) (sort sxcv ¹'(lambda (x y) (and (not (or (symbolp (first x)) 
(symbolp (first y)))) « &first x) (first y))))) (sort rxcv ¹' (lambda &x y) (and &not (or (symbolp (first x) ) 
(symbolp &first y) ) ) ) (« first x) (first y) ) ) ) ) ) ) 
(defun get-level (x 1) (let ((new nil) (y (copy-list x)) (s (copy-list x))) (sort y ¹'(lambda (x y) (if (and (- (third x) 1) (not (member+ x 
new))) (setq new (append new (list x)))) 
( (third x) 1))) (sort x ¹' &lambda (x y) (if (and ( (third y) 1) (not (member+ y 
new))) (setq new {append new (list y)))) 
( (third y) 1))) (setq x s) 
new) ) 
(defun best-result (x) (let ((new nil) (y (copy-list x) ) (s (copy-list x) ) ) (sort y ¹' (lambda (x y) (if (and (&= &second x) 70. 0) (not 
(member+ x new) ) ) (setq new (append new &list x) ) ) ) 
(& (second x) 70. 0))) (sort x ¹'(lambda (x y) (if (and && (second y) 70. 0) (not 
(membert y new))) (setq new (append new (list y)))) 
(& (second y) 70. 0))) (setq x r) 
new)) 
(defun display-result (reit) 
(prog (dy level unc dtz) (setq dy (make-array 5)) (setq res (make-array 5)) (setq dtr (make-array 5)) (setf (aref dy 1) "The most probable area(s) of failure is ") (setf (aref dy 2) "Evidence indicates there is a(n) ") (setf (aref dy 3) "Specifically, "1 
(send *result* :expose) 
(send *result* :select) 
(send *result* :clear-history) 
(send *result* :set-cuzsorpos 0 0) (setq rsltl reit) (setq level 1) (setf (aref res 1) (best-result (get-level rslt 1))) (setf (aref res 2) (best-result (get-level reit 2))) (setf (aref res 3) &best-result (get-level reit 3))) 
(prog (res2 real res3) 
labell (setf (aref dtr 1) nil) 
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(if (and ( level 1) (equal (aref res 1) nil) ) (return) ) 
(cond ( (equal (aref res level) nil) (setq level (- level 
1) ) (go labell) ) ) (setq res3 (aref res level)& 
1abe12 
(setq resl (first res3)) 
(cond ((equal real nil) (setq level (- level 1)) (go 
labell))) (setq res3 (cdr res3)) 
(cond ((and (not (member+ (first real) (aref dtr level&)) 
(neq (aref dtr level) nil)) 
(go labe12))) (setq res2 (string-trim "()" (princ-to-string (first 
real)))) 
res2)) 
unc) ) 
(send «result*: line-out (string-append (aref dy level) 
(setq unc (uncertainty (fourth real) ) ) 
(send *result»: line-out (string-append "Uncertainty is 
(setf (aref dtr (+ 1 level) ) (car (kbcall 2 (append ' (the 
daughter of) (first real) '(is ?a)) 1))) (setf (aref zes level) &remove+ real &aref zes level))) 
(cond ( (and (equal (aref dtr (+ 1 level) ) ' ( (nil) ) ) (equal &aref res level) nil) ) (setq level (- level 2) ) (if (& level 0) &setq level 0)))) 
(cond ((and (equal (aref dtr (+ 1 level)) '((nil))) (neq (azef res level) nil)) (setq level (- level 1)))) (setq level &+ level 1)) 
(go labell) ) ) (setq cnl nil) ) 
(defun remove+ (il i2) (let ((i3 i21 (i4 nil)) 
(prog nil 
label 
(cond ((equal il (car i3)) (return (append i4 (cdr i3))))) (setq i4 (append i4 (list (car i3)))) (setq i3 (cdr i3)) (if (equal i3 nil) (return nil)) 
&go label) ) ) ) 
(defun member+ (il i2) (let ( (i3 i2) ) 
(pzog nil 
label 
&if (equal il (car i3) ) (return t) ) (setq i3 (cdr i3) ) (if (equal i3 nil) (return nil)) 
(go label)))) 
COMMENT: UNCERTAINTY defines uncertainty of an event 
(defun uncertainty (x) 
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(prog nil (if (not (numberp x) ) (return nil) ) (if (& x 90) (return "very. low") ) 
&if (& x 70) (return "low")) (if (& x 30) (return "moderate")) (if (& x 10) (return "high")) (return "very. high"))) 
COMMENT: UNKNOWN-SEARCH, EVAL-RULE, EVAL-CD, AND RULE perform the 
actual processing of rules (inference engine) 
(defun unknown-search (rule) 
(prog nil (eval-rule rule) (if (equal nk 'yes) (return (last rule))) (return '(0)))) 
(defun eval-rule (rule) 
(prog (len inq cd) (setq col nil) (setq nk nil) (setq len (length rule)) 
(cond ((& len 2) (setq inq (first (car (kbcall 1 (append '(the) (list (first rule)) '(of) &list (second rule)) '(is ?a)) 1)))) (if &equal inq (third rule)) (return (fourth rule))) (if (and (neq inq 'not. known) (neq inq 'normal) &neq inq 
'nil) (equal (third rule) 'not. normal)) (return &fourth rule))) (if (equal inq 'not. known) (setq nk 'yes)) 
(return '0))) (setq cd (first rule)) (if (eval-cd cd) (return (second rule))) (return '0))) 
&defun eval-cd (cd) 
(prog (cj cdl el inq exp res) (setq cj (first cd)) (setq cdl (cdr cd)) (setq el (list cj)) 
label 
(cond ((equal cdl nil) (return &eval el)))) (setq exp (car cdl) ) 
(cond ((conjunct? exp) (setq zes (eval-cd exp) ) (go labell) ) ) 
(cond ( (equal c j ' rule) (setq el ' (and) ) (setq res (rule exp) ) 
(go labell) ) ) (setq inq (first (car (kbcall 1 (append ' (the) (list (first 
exp) ) ' (of) (list &second exp) ) ' (is ?a) ) 1) ) ) ) (setq col (append col (list exp))) 
(cond ((or (equal inq (third exp)) 
(and (neq inq 'not. known) 
(neq inq 'normal) 
(neq inq 'nil) 
(equal (third exp) 'not. normal))) (setq res 't)) 
(&setq res 'nil))) 
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(cond ( (equal inq 'not. known) (setq nk 'yes) ) ) labell (if (eq nk 'yes) (return nil&) (setq el (append el (list res&)) (setq cdl (cdr cdl)) 
(go label))) 
(defun conjunct? 
(prog nil (if (equal (if (equal (if (equal (if (equal 
(exp) 
(first exp) 'and) (return 't)) (first exp) 'or) (return 't)) (first exp) 'rule) (return 't)) (fizst exp) 'not) (return 't)))) 
(defun rule (exp) 
&prog (c3 c4 kbn) (setq kbn 1) (if (equal (first exp) 'probability) (setq kbn 3)) (setq c3 (car (kbcall kbn 
(append ' (the& (list (first exp) ) ' (of & (list 
(second exp) 1 '(is ?A)) 1))) (ii' (eql c3 nil) (return) ) 
(cond ((equal kbn 3) &setq c3 (append '(probability) c3)))) 
(cond ((equal (fourth exp) 'number) (setq c4 (append '(number) (list (fifth exp)))) (go label&)) (setq c4 (caz (kbcall kbn 
(append ' &the) (list (fourth exp) ) ' &of) (list (fifth exp)) '(is ?A)) 1))& 
label 
(cond ((or (eql (first c3) 'not. known) (eql (first c4) 
'not. known)) (setq nk 'yes) (return 'nil))) (setq c3 (second c3)1 (setq c4 (second c4)) 
&cond ((equal (third exp) '&) (go flagl))) 
(cond ((equal (third exp) '&) (go flag2&)) 
(cond ((equal (third exp) ' ) (go flag3&)) 
(cond ((equal (third exp) '& ) (go flag4))) 
(cond ((equal (third exp) '& ) (go flag5))) (return 'nil) 
flagl 
(cond ((& c3 c4) (return 't&)) 
(go flag6) 
flag2 
&cond ((& c3 c4) (return 't))) 
(go flag6) 
flag3 
(cond ((- c3 c4) &return 't))) 
(go flag6) 
flag4 
(cond ((&= c3 c4) (return 't&)) 
(go flag6) 
flag5 
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(cond ((&= c3 c4) (return 't))) 
flag6 (return 'nil))) 
COMMENT: INPUT-INFO is the user interface that allows a user to tell 
the computer what simulation data files to read 
for initialization of a system 
(defun input-info (ii) (let ((c 0) (a 0) (kbl nil) (kb2 nil) (kb3 nil) 
(fname nil) (sys nil) (blip nil) (item-list nil) 
(ans nil) (ques nil) (anal nil) (quesl nil) (it 
nil)) (setq c 0) (setq a 0& (setq ds ii) 
(cond (( ii 0& (setq time (make-array 800)) (setq attr (make-array '(10 800))) (setq system (make-array 10)) (setq condl (make-array 10)))) (setq kbl (aref kb 1)) 
(send *windowl* :expose) 
(send vwindowl* :clear-history) 
(prog nil 
label 
(setq kbl (cdr kbl) & (setq kb2 (caar kbl) ) (if (eql kb2 nil) (return&) 
(send *windowl* :set-cursorpos c a) 
(send *windowl* ':item ':new-type (prinl-to-string kb2)) (setq c (+ c 160)) 
(cond ((& c 330) (setq c 0) (setq a (+ a 30)))) 
(go label)) (tv:window-call (*windowl* :activate) 
(send *windowl* :select) 
(prog nil 
label 
(setq kbl (aref kb 1)) (clean-blip) (setq blip (send *windowl* :any-tyi)) (setq sys (third blip)) (if (not (listp blip)) (go label)) 
(cond ((equal sys "END"1 (send *windowl* :deactivate) (return))) (select-info kbl sys) (if (equal cond nil) (go label)) 
(send *standard-output* :select) 
(cond ((y-or-n-p "Is the information from a datafile") (setq fname (string-append "sim&" (prompt-and-read :string "Enter 
filename &"))) 
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(setq it (check-others (string-symbol sys) (string- 
symbol cond))) (print it) 
(cond ((numberp it) (reader fname it) (go label))) (setq ds (+ ds 1)) (setf (aref system ds) (string-symbol sys)) (setf (aref condl ds) (string-symbol cond)) 
(reader fname ds) (print 'Done) 
(go label))) (setq ques (string-append "The " cond " of " sys " is ?")) (setq quesl (string-append "Its value is ?")) (setq sys (string-symbol sys)) (setq cond (string-symbol cond)) (setq ans (prompt-and-read :symbol ques)) (setq anal (string-symbol (prompt-and-read :string 
quesl) ) ) 
(kbcall 1 1)))))) 
( o d ( (not &numberp anal) ) (setq anal (seco 
(append ' (the) (list cond) ' (of) (list sys) ' (is ?a) ) 
(setq ans (append (list ans) (list ansi) ) ) (kbcall 1 (append ' (the) (list cond) ' (of) &list sys) 
'(is) (list ans)) 2) 
(go label) ) (cond (( ii 0) (prim) ) ) ) ) ) 
(defun check-others (sys cond) 
(prog (c) 
&setq c 0) 
label (if ( c ds) (return nil) ) (setq c (+ c 1) ) 
(cond ( (and (equal (aref system c) sys) (equal &aref condl c) 
cond)) (return c))) 
&go label))) 
(defun select-info (kbl sys) 
(prog nil 
label 
(setq kbl (cdr kbl)) (setq kb2 (prinl-to-string (caar kbl))) (if (equal kb2 "NIL") (return)1 
(cond ((equal kb2 sys) (setq c 0) (setq kb3 (cadar kbl)) (setq item-list nil) 
(prog nil 
&setq c 1) 
label (if (equal (caar kb3) 'ad). sys) (return)) 
&if (equal (caar kb3) nil) (return)) (setq item-list 
(append item-list (list (append (list (prinl-to-string (caar 
kb3))) 
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(append ' (:eval) (list (append ' (setq 
(list (prinl-to-string (caar cond) 
kb3)&)&)))))& (setq c (+ c 1)) (setq kb3 (cdr kb3)) 
(go label)) (setq cond nil) 
(send II-pop-up :set-item-list item-list) 
(send II-pop-up ':expose-near '(:mouse)) 
(send II-pop-up ';choose) 
(send II-pop-up ':deactivate))) 
(go label)&) 
(defun clean-blip () (let ((blip nil) 
&blipl nil) ) (tv: window-call ( vwindowl *: activate) (prog nil 
label 
(setq blipl (send vwindowlv: any-tyi-no-hang) ) (if (and (eql blipl nil) (eql blip nil) & (return) ) (print blip) 
(go label) & ) ) ) 
(defun string-symbol (str) 
&prog (strl stz2 str3 expl exp2 exp) (if (equal str "") (return)) 
(cond &(not (equal (stri. ng-search " " str) nil)) (return))) (setq str (string-upcase str)) (setq strl (intern stz)) (setq str2 (prinl-to-string strl) ) 
(cond & (equal (substring str2 0 1) ") ") (setq expl (string-search ". " stz) ) 
(prog nil 
(cond ((equal expl nil) (setq expl 0) &return))) (setq str (string-append (string-trim ". " (substzing 
str 0 (t expl 1))) (substzing str (t expl 1) &length str)))) 
label 
(setq expl (- (length str) expl))) (setq exp2 (string-search "E" str)) 
(prog nil 
(cond ((equal exp2 nil) (setq exp (- 0 expl)) 
(cond (( exp 0) (setq strl (parse-integer 
stz)) (return))) 
(go label))) (setq expl (- expl (- (length str& exp2))) (setq str3 &substring str 0 exp2)) (setq exp2 (parse-integer (substring str &+ exp2 1) (length str)))) (setq str str3) (setq exp &- exp2 expl)) 
label 
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(setq strl &float &* &parse-integer str) (expt 10 
exp))))))) (return strl))) 
(defun end &) (send large-win :bury)) 
COMMENT: GRAPHER, GRAPHER2, MAXMIN, and FIX are used to develoP 
graphs of paired datasets 
(defun grapher (i) 
&let ((tl 1& (max nil) (min nil) (cdnl nil) (t2 nil) (inc nil) (incl nil) (c 0) (spac 0)) 
find maximum and minimums (setq tl 1) (setq max (aref attr i 0) ) 
&setq min max) 
(prog nil 
label 
(cond (( tl tstep) (return))) 
(cond (() (aref attr i tl) max) (setq max (aref attr tl)))) 
tl)))& (cond ((( (aref attr i tl) min) (setq min (aref attr i (setq tl (+ tl 1) ) 
(go label) & (setq ymax (w (zound (+ max 1) ) ) ) (setq ymin (* (round (- min 1) ) ) ) (cond (() (- ymax ymin) 100) (setq ymin 0) ) ) 
(prog nil (setq tl 0) 
label (if &eql &aref time tl) nil) (return)) 
&setq xmax (aref time tl) ) (setq tl (+ tl 1) ) 
(go label) ) 
set-up 
(send *window* :set-label 
(string-append (prinl-to-string (aref system i)) "'s " (pzinl-to-string (aref condl i)) 
vs. time (s)")) 
(setq graph i) (setq t2 0) (setq ymax (- ymax ymin) ) 
&prog nil 
flag (setq inc (float (* (/ (round (- (/ ymax 120) 0. 5)) 2) 60))) 
(cond (( inc 0) (setq ymax (* ymax 10)) (setq t2 (+ t2 1)) (go 
flag))) 
(cond (() t2 0) (setq inc &/ inc (expt 10 t2))) (setq ymax &/ ymax (expt 10 t2))) ))) (setq incl (* (round (* 240 (/ inc ymax)))&) 
(send *window" :expose) 
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(send *window* :clear-history) 
(send *window* :set-cursorpos 40 600) 
(send *window* :string-out "Graph" ) 
(send *window* :draw-line 60 20 60 260) 
(send *window* :set-cursorpos 20 255) 
(send *window* :string-out (prinl-to-string ymin)) 
(send *window* :set-cursorpos 20 (- 255 incl)) 
(send *window* :string-out (prinl-to-string (fix (t inc ynu n) 2))) 
(send *window* :set-cursorpos 20 (- 255 &s incl 2))) 
(send *window* :string-out (prinl-to-string (fix (+ (* inc 2) ymin) 
2))) 
(send *window* :set-cursorpos 20 (- 255 (* incl 3))) (send *window* :string-out &prinl-to-string (fix (+ &a inc 3) ymin) 
2))& 
(send *window* :set-cursorpos 20 (- 255 (* incl 4))) 
(send *windowt :string-out (prinl-to-string (fix (+ (s inc 4) ymin) 
2))) 
(send *window* :draw-line 60 260 580 260) 
(cond ((& &- 255 (s incl 5)) 20) 
(send *window* :set-cursorpos 20 (- 250 (* incl 5))) 
(send *window* :string-out (prinl-to-string (fix &+ (* inc 5) 
ymin) 2&)&)) 
(cond ((& (- 255 (* incl 6)) 20) 
(send swindow* :set-cursorpos 20 (- 250 (" incl 6))) (send *window* :string-out (prinl-to-string (fix (+ (" inc 6) 
ymin) 2))))) 
(send *window* :set-cursorpos 55 265) 
(prog nil 
&setq c 0) (setq spec &truncate (/ (t 10 xmax) 10) ) ) 
label (if && (* c spac) xmax) (return)) 
(send *window* :set-cursorpos (t 55 (* c 52)) 265) 
(send *windows :string-out (prinl-to-string &* c spac))) (setq c (+ c 1)) 
(go label)) 
&setq tlo 0& 
graph 
(grapher2 i))) 
(defun grapher2 (i) (let ((x 0) 
(y 0) (tl 0) ) (setq tl tlo) 
(prog nil 
label 
(cond ( ( tl tstep) (return) ) ) (setq y (* &round (- 260 (/ (* 240 &- (aref attr i tl) ymin) ) 
ymax) ) ) ) ) (setq x (* (round (+ 60 (* (aref time tl) &/ 520 xmax) ) ) ) ) ) 
(cond (&= tl 0) (go labell))) 
(send *window* :draw-line xold yold x y) 
labell (setq xold x) 
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(setq yold y) (setq tl (+ tl 1) ) 
&go label)) (setq tlo tstep))) 
(defun maxmin (i) (setq tl 1) (setq max (aref attr i 0) ) (setq min max) 
(pzog nil 
label 
(cond (( tl tstep) (return))) 
(cond ((& (aref attz i tl) max) (setq max (aref attr i tl)))) 
(cond ((( (aref attr i tl) min) (setq min (aref attr i 
tl) ) ) ) (setq tl (+ tl 1) ) 
(go label)) (setq ymax (* (round (+ max 1)))) (setq ymin (* &round (- min 11))) 
(cond (() &- ymax ymin) 100) &setq ysd. n 0))) 
(prog nil (setq tl 0) 
label (if (eql (aref time tl) nil) &return)) (setq xmax (aref time tl)) 
&setq tl (+ tl 1)) 
&go label&)& 
(defun fix (num dp) (setq num (float (/ (* (round (* num (expt 10 dp)))& (expt 10 
dp))))) 
CO&&MENT: TREE, TREE-INFO, and DIS-TREE-INFO aze used to create the 
mouse sensitive tree display of the ATNS network nodes 
(defun tree (par) (let (&y 01 (ymax 0) (n 0) (k (make-array 7)) (kl (make- 
azray 7)) (1 (make-array 7)) (tpl 0) (tp2 0) (i nil) (h 0) (pos (make- 
array '(10 10 10))) 
&pre 0) (past 0) ) 
(prog nil 
(send large-win :refresh) 
(send large-win :expose) 
&send large-win :set-cursorpos 0 0) 
(send large-win ':item ':exam "Examine" ) (setq y 100) (setq ymax 100) (setq n 1) (setf (aref k 1) 4) (setf (aref kl 1) 0) (setf &aref 1 1) par) 
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(setq tpl 0) (setq pos (make-array '(10 10 10))) 
loop 
(prog nil 
loopl 
(cond ((eql (aref 1 n) nil) (setq y (- y (I (* (aref k n) h) 3))) (setq h (t 20 (- ymax y))) (setq y (- y h)) (setq n (- n 1)) (return))) (setq i (car (aref 1 n))) (setq n (+ n 1)) (setf (aref 1 n) (car (kbcall 2 (append '(the daughter 
gf) i '(is ?A)) 1))) 
(cond ((equal (aref 1 n) '((ni. l))) &setq h 15) (setq n (- 
n 1)) (return))) (setf (aref kl n& 0& (setf (aref k n& (length (aref 1 n) ) ) 
(go loopl&) 
(cond (( n 0) (send large-win :set-cursorpos 0 0) (return))) (setf (aref kl n) (+ (aref kl n) 1)) (setq pre (aref kl n)) 
&setq past (aref kl (- n 11)) (if (eql past nil) (setq past 0)) (setq y (+ y h)) (setq i (car (aref 1 n))) (setposition n y i) (setf (aref pos n past pre) (round (+ Y 5))) (setq tpl (- (aref kl n) 1)) (setq tp2 1) 
loop2 
(cond ((not (eql &aref pos (+ n 1) tpl tp2) nil)) 
(send large-win :draw-line (* 150 &+ n 1)) (aref pos (+ n 1) tpl tp2) (- (* 150 (t n 1)) 
30) (aref pos n past pre)) (setf (aref pos (+ n 1) tpl tp2) nil) 
(setq tp2 (+ tp2 1)) 
(go loop2))) (if (& y ymax) (setq ymax y)) (setq y ymax) (setf (aref 1 n) (cdr (aref 1 n))) 
(go loop))) (send large-win :set-cursorpos 0 800) 
(prim)) 
(defun setposition (n y i) (setq y (round y)) (send large-win :set-cursorpos (* 150 n) y) 
(send large-win ':item ':new-type (prinl-to-string (car i)))) 
(send large-win :string-out (princ-to-string &car i)))) 
&defun tree-info () 
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(send large-win :expose) 
(send large-win :select) (tv:window-call (large-win :activate) 
(send large-win :select) 
&prog (blip sys ilist) 
label (clean-blip2) (setq blip (send large-win :any-tyi)) (if (not (listp blip)) (go label)) (setq sys (third blip)) 
(cond &(equal sys "END") (return))) (if (not (stzingp sys)) &go label)) (setq sys (list &string-symbol sys))) (setq ilist (car (kbcall 2 (append '(the pattern of) sys '(is 
?a)) 1))) 
(prog (c cl get) (setq c ilist) (setq ilist nil) 
label (if (equal c nil) (return)) (setq cl (princ-to-string (car c))) 
(cond ((& (length cl) 501 (setq c2 (string-search " 
c] ) ) (if &neq c2 nil) (setq cl (string-append 
(substring cl 0 (- c2 1) ) (substring cl (+ c2 1) (length cl) ) ) ) ) (setq cl (string-append (substring cl 0 49) 
" 
~ . . ")))) (setq get (append (list cl) 
(append '(:eval) (list (append '(dis-tree- 
info) (list (append '(quote) (list (car c))))))))) (setq ilist (append ilist (list get))) (setq c (cdr c)) 
(go label)) 
(send ZZ-pop-up :set-item-list ilist) 
(send ZI-pop-up ':expose-near '(:mouse)) 
(send II-pop-up ':choose) 
(send large-win :any-tyi) 
(send ZI-pop-up ':deactivate) 
(cond ((equal cn3 'off) (setq cn3 'on) (return))) 
(go label) ) ) ) 
(defun dis-tree-info (c) 
(pzog (r) (if (equal c ' (nil) ) (retuzn) ) 
(send large-win :set-cursorpos 0 30) 
(send large-win :clear-zest-of-line) 
(cond ((& (eval-rule c) 0) (setq r "True" )) ((setq r "False" ))) (if (equal nk 'yes) (setq r "Not. known")) 
(send large-win :string-out r))) 
(setq 1 (make-array 7)) (setq k &make-array 7)) (setq kl (make-array 7)) 
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(defun clean-blip2 () 
&let ((blip nil) (blipl nil)) 
(prog nil 
label 
(setq blipl (send large-win :any-tyi-no-hang)) (if (and (eql blipl nil) (eql blip nil) ) (return) ) 
(go label)))) 
COMMENT: DEVELOP-SIMULATION is used to reproduce graphs from journals reporting output from thermal-hydraulic codes. 
(defun develop-simulation () 
&prog nil 
redo 
(send *standard-output» :select) (let* ((stop 0) (dataset (make-array 800)) 
(x-mouse (make-array 80)) 
(y-mouse (make-array 80)) 
(mouse-x nil) 
(mouse-y nil) (cdnl (prompt-and-read :symbol "Enter the name of the 
condition you are defining &")) 
(fname (string-append "Nukes:&catalisp&sim&» (prompt-and-read 
:string "Enter fi. lename (Nukes:&catalisp&sim&) &"))) (step (prompt-and-read :number "Enter interval spacing 
(seconds) &") ) 
(ymin (prompt-and-read :number "Entez lower boundary &")) 
(ymax (- (prompt-and-read :number "Enter higher boundary &») 
ymin)) 
(xmax (prompt-and-read :number "Enter length of time &»)) 
(mouse-y-old (- (prompt-and-read :number (string-append "Enter (prinl-to-string cdnl) " at time zero &")) ymin)) 
&t2 0) (inc 0) (incl 0) (mouse-x-old 60) 
(spac 0) (c 0) (tlo 0) 
(mouse-x 0) 
(mouse-y 0) 
(mouse-char nil) (blip nil) 
(aa nil) 
(new-y 0) 
(slope 0) (cl 0) (c2 0) (c3 0) 
&c4 0)) 
(i. f (not &y-or-n-p "Zs this OK?")) (go redo)) 
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(send *window4»: set-label (string-append &prinl-to-string cdnl) 
vs. time &s) ")) 
(prog nil 
flag (setq inc (float (» (/ &round (- (/ ymax 120& 0. 5)) 2) 60))) 
&cond &(= inc 0& &setq ymax &* ymax 10)) &setq t2 (+ t2 1)) (go 
flag))) 
(cond (() t2 0) (setq inc (/ inc (expt 10 t2))) (setq ymax (/ ymax 
(expt 10 t2))) ))) (setq incl (* (round (* 240 (/ inc ymax))))) (setq mouse-y-old (truncate (- 275 (* incl (/ mouse-y-old inc&)))) (setq mouse-x-old 60) 
(send *window4» :expose) 
(send *window4* :clear-histozy) 
(send *window4» :set-cursorpos 40 620) 
(send *window4* :string-out "Graph" ) 
(send *window4» :draw-line 60 40 60 280) 
(send »window4» :set-cursorpos 20 270) 
(send *window4* :string-out &prinl-to-string ymin)) 
(send *window4* :set-cursorpos 20 (- 270 incl)) 
(send *window4* :string-out (prinl-to-string (fix (+ inc ymin) 2))) 
(send *window4* :set-cursozpos 20 (- 270 (* incl 2&)) 
(send *window4* :string-out (prinl-to-string (fix (+ (* inc 2) 
ymin) 2))) (send *window4» :set-cursorpos 20 (- 270 (* incl 3))) 
(send *window4* :string-out (prinl-to-string (fix (+ &* inc 3) 
ymin) 2))) (send »window4» :set-cursorpos 20 (- 270 (» incl 4))) 
(send *window4* :string-out (prinl-to-string (fix (+ (» inc 4) 
ymin) 2))) (send »window4» :draw-line 60 280 580 280) 
(cond ((& (- 275 (» incl 5)) 20) 
(send *window4* :set-cursorpos 20 (- 270 &» incl 5))) 
(send *window4* :string-out &prinl-to-string (fix (+ (* inc 5) 
ymin& 2) ) ) ) ) 
(cond (() (- 275 (* incl 6)) 20) 
(send *window4* :set-cursorpos 20 (- 270 &» incl 6))) 
(send *window4* :string-out (prinl-to-string (fix (+ (* inc 6) 
ymin) 2))))) (send *window4» :set-cursorpos 55 285) 
&prog nil (setq c 0& (setq spac (truncate (/ xmax 10) ) ) 
label (if (& (* c spac& xmax) (retuzn) ) (send»window4»:set-cursorpos (+ 55 (» c 52) ) 285) (send»window4»:string-out (prinl-to-string (* c spac) ) ) 
(setq c (+ c 1) ) 
(go label)) (send *window4* :draw-filled-in-circle mouse-x-old mouse-y-old 2) (setf (aref x-mouse 0& mouse-x-old) (setf (aref y-mouse 0) mouse-y-old) (setq tlo 0) 
(send *window4* :set-mouse-position 170 170) (setq c 1) 
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(send »window4* :draw-filled-in-circle (azef x- 
mouse c) (aref y-mouse c) 2 tv:alu-andca) (setq mouse-x-old (aref x-mouse &- c 1))) 
&setq mouse-y-old (aref y-mouse (- c 1))) (setq mouse-x (aref x-mouse (- c 1))) (setq mouse-y (aref. y-mouse (- c 1))) (return))) (setq aa &substring (prinl-to-string (third blip)) 2 11)) (setq mouse-x (fourth blip)) (setq mouse-y (fifth blip)) (if (or (equal mouse-x nil) (equal mouse-y nil)) (go 
label)) 
(cond ((equal aa »SCROLLER2") (go labell))) 
(go label) 
labell (setf (aref x-mouse c) mouse-x) (setf (aref y-mouse c) mouse-y) (setq mouse-char (second blip) ) 
(cond ( (char-mouse-equal mouse-char ()Nmouse-z) 
(send *window4* :set-cursozpos 100 0) 
(send *window4* :clear-rest-of-line) (setq c3 (truncate &/ (- (aref x-mouse c) 60) (/ 
520 xmax)))) (setq c4 (+ ymin (» inc (/ (* -1 &- (azef y-mouse 
c) 275)& incl)))) 
:string-out (string-append (prinl- 
fix c4 3)))) 
:set-cursozpos 450 0) 
:string-out (string-append (prinl- 
fix c4 3)))) 
(send *window4» 
to-string c3) " "(prinl-to-string 
(send *window4* 
(send »window4* 
to-string c3) " "(prinl-to-string ( 
&go label) ) ) ) ) (if (&= mouse-x mouse-x-old) 
(send *wi. ndow4*: draw-filled- 
(send *window4* :draw-line 
mouse-y) 
(go label) ) in-circle mouse-x mouse-y 2) 
mouse-x-old mouse-y-old mouse-x 
(prog nil 
label 
(cond & (eql stop 1) (setq stop nil) (return) ) ) (tv:window-call (*window4» :activate) 
(send *window4* :select) 
(prog nil 
label 
(setq blip (send *window4* :any-tyi)) 
(send *window4* :set-cursorpos 0 0) 
(send *window4* ':item ':new-type "Completed" ) 
(send *window4* :set-cursorpos 0 20) 
(send *window4» ':item ':new-type "Undo" ) (if &not (listp blip)) (go label)) 
(cond ((equal (third blip) "Completed" ) (setq stop 1) (return))) 
(cond ((equal (third blip) "Undo" ) (setq c (- c 1) ) 
(cond ( « c 0) (setq c (+ c 1) ) (return) ) ) 
(send *window4»: draw-line (aref x-mouse c) (are f 
y-mouse c) (are f x-mouse (- c 1) ) (aref y-mouse (- c 1) ) tv: alu- 
andca) 
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(setq mouse-x-old &aref x-mouse c) ) (setq mouse-y-old (aref y-mouse c) ) (setq c (+ c 1) ) 
(go label)) (setq stop 0) (setq c 0) 
&setq cl 0) 
&prog nil (setq c2 0) 
label (if (eql (aref x-mouse c2) nil) (return) ) (setf (azef x-mouse c2) (truncate &/ &- (aref x-mouse c2) 60) 
(/ 520 xmax)))) (setf (aref y-mouse c2) (+ ymin (* inc (/ &w -1 (- (aref y- 
mouse c2) 275) ) incl) ) ) ) (setq c2 (+ c2 1)1 
(go label) ) (setq c3 xmax) (setq c4 0) 
(prog nil 
label 
(cond ((& cl xmax) &setq stop 0) (return))) 
(prog nil (setq c2 0) 
label 1 
(cond ( (eql (aref x-mouse (+ c2 1) ) nil) (setq c3 (aref 
x-mouse c2)) (setq c2 (- c2 1)) (setq c4 c2))) 
(cond, ((or (and (& cl (aref x-mouse c2)) (4 cl (aref 
x-mouse (+ c2 1)))) 
(and (& cl c3) (& cl xmax))) (if (& cl c3) (setq c2 c4)) (setq slope (/ (- (aref y-mouse (+ c2 1)) &aref y- 
mouse c2)) (- &aref x-mouse &4 c2 1)) (aref x-mouse c2)))) (setq new-y (+ (* (- cl (azef x-mouse c2) ) slope) (azef y-mouse c2))) (setf (aref dataset c) (string-append (prinl-to- 
string (float cl)) " " (prinl-to-string new-y))) (return))) (setq c2 (+ c2 1)) 
(go labell) ) (setq cl (+ cl step)) 
&setq c (+ c 1)) 
(go label)) (with-open-file (stream fname 
':byte-size nil 
':characters t 
':direction ':output) 
(setq c 0) 
(prog nil 
label 
&if (eql (aref dataset c) nil) (return) ) 
&send stream ':line-out (aref dataset c) ) (setq c (+ c 1) ) 
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(prim) ) ) 
(go label) ) ) ) 
COMMENT: Below are define the windows used in CATALisp 
(defflavor scroller () 
(dw:dynamic-window 
dw:margin-ragged-borders 
tv:text-scroll-window)) 
(defflavor scrollerl () 
(dw:dynamic-window 
dw:margin-ragged-borders&) 
(defflavor new (& (tv:centered-label-mixin 
tv:borders-mixin tv:top-box-label-mixin 
tv:basic-mouse-sensitive-items 
tv:window 
tv:sheet)) 
(setq default 0& (defvar alist-alpha nil) 
(defvar alist-beta nil) 
(defflavor scroller2 () (tv: basic-mouse-sensitive-J. terna 
dw:dynamic-window)) 
(def flavor scroller3 () (tv:basic-mouse-sensitive-items 
tv:typeout-window 
dw:dynamic-window)) 
(setq alist-alpha '((:new-type nil "Right: End" (" End " :value nil :documentation 
Nil"))&) 
(setq alist-beta '((:new-type nil "Right: End" (" End " :eval (setq cn3 'off) 
:documentation "End Tree InfO" )) 
(:exam nil "Right: Menu of Tree Functions" (" Tree-Info " :eval (tree-info) :documentation 
Tree Info ") (" End 
:documentation " End ")))) :eval (setq cn3 'off) 
(defvar *windowl* (tv:make-window 'scroller2 
':x 630 
30 
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:bold :small) 
':width 500 
':height 370 
'&default-character-style '(&dutch 
':item-type-alist alist-alpha)) 
(defvar dynwin 
:normal) 
:thickness 10) 
:thickness 7) 
:thickness 10) 
'nozalal) ) 
:thickness 10) 
:thickness 13)) )) 
(tv:make-window 'sczollerl 
:x 730 
:y 492 
:width 390 
:height 300 
&default-character-style '(&jess :bold 
:expose-p nil 
lend-of-page-mode :truncate 
:margin-components 
'((dwlmargin-borders :thickness 1) 
(dwlmargin-white-borders :thickness 3) 
(dwlmargin-borders &thickness 10) 
(dwlmargin-white-borders :thickness 8) 
(dwlmargin-borders :thickness 3) 
(dw:margin-whitespace &margin &left 
(dwlmargin-scroll-bar) 
(dwlmargin-whitespace &margin :bottom 
(dwlmargin-scroll-bar &margin &top) 
(dwlmargin-whitespace :margin :left 
(dwlmargin-label :margin :bottom 
&style (&sans-serif &italic 
(dw:margin-whitespace :margin :top 
(dw:margin-whitespace :margin :right 
(defvar *window* 
:small) 
time (sec)")) 
(tv&make-window 'scrollerl 
:x 64 
:y 441 
:Mi&ith 359 
:height 350 
:default-character-style '(&dutch :bold 
lend-of-page-mode :truncate 
:name " RCS pressure (psia) vs 
(defvar *window2* (tv:make-window 'dw:dynamic-window 
lx 530 
ly 44 
:small))) 
:width 600 
:height 120 
:name Transient Report" 
:end-of-page-mode :scroll 
:scroll-factor 100 
:default-character-style '(:swiss :bold 
(defvar *window3* (tv:make-window 'scrollerl 
:x 64 
:y 170 
:height 270 
:width 450 
:end-of-page-mode :scroll 
:scroll-factor 100 
:name "Gauge Report" 
:default-character-style '(:swiss :roman 
: small) 
(defvar *result* (tv:make-window 'scrollerl 
:x 524 
:y 170 
:height 270 
:width 450 
:end-of-page-mode :scroll 
:scroll-factor 100 
:name "Diagnostic Report" 
:default-character-style '(:swiss :roman 
:small& 
(defvar «mouse* 
(tv:make-window 
'new 
':borders 2 
':top 50 
':bottom 160 
':right 488 
': width 316 
':blinker-p nil 
':label '(:string "OPTIONS" :font fonts:bigfnt) 
':default-character-style '(:swiss :roman :normal) 
&) 
(setq II-pop-up (tv:make-window 
' tv: momentary-menu 
':label "Plot Selection" 
':borders 3 
':item-list '("Nothing" ))) 
(setq primary (tv:make-window 
'tv:menu 
x 64 
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':y 43 
':label '(Estring " CATALisp" :font fontsEbigfnt) 
':borders 3 
':item-list '((" Develop a Simulation" :eval 
(develop-simulation)) 
info 0)) 
E((not. normal)))) 
(" Input a New Simulation" :eval (input- 
("Run the Simulation" :eval (run)) (" Display Tree Structure" :eval (tree 
(" Exit" :eval (end))))) 
(setE( large-win (tvEmake-window 'scroller2 
:x 64 
:y 163 
Ewidth 1067 
:height 610 
:default-character-style '(:swiss :bold 
: small) 
':item-type-alist alist-beta)) 
(defvar *window4* (tv:make-window 'scroller2 
':x 700 
':y 50 
':width 359 
':height 350 
':default-character-style '(:dutch 
: bold: small) 
': item-type-alist a list-alpha 
':end-of-page-mode :truncate)) 
CO)4)4ENT: This definition contains emergency response operator 
guidelines for many events 
(setf (aref kb 4) 
'((stazt) (sgtr 
((proceduze ((1 "1. Identify Ruptured Steam Generator" ) 
(2 "2. Isolate Ruptured Steam Generator" ("2. 1 WHEN in the nazrow range, THEN stop all AFW flow 
to ruptured steam generators" (confirm)) ("2. 2 Close ruptured steam generator main steamline 
isolation valve and bypass valve" (confirm) "Close non-ruptured steam 
generator main steamline isolation valves and bypass valves. Use 
non-ruptured steam generator PORVs for steam dump. " (confirm)) ("2. 3 Verify ruptured steam generator PORVs closed" (zule (PORV. status steam. gen. l closed 1)) 
"Manually close ruptured steam generator PORV" (confirm)) ("2. 4 Close ruptured steam generator steam supply valve 
to turbine-driven AFW pump" (confirm))) 
(3 "3. Check Pressurizer PORV Elock Valves:" 
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("3. 1 Power available to block valves" (confirm) 
"Restore power to block valves" (confirm)) ("3. 2 OPEN block valves" (confizm) "Manually close 
PORVs. If any valve cannot be closed, Then manually close its block 
valve" (confirm))) 
(4 "4. Check Pressurizer PORVszw ("4. 1 Close PORVs" (rule (PORV. status pressurizer closed 
1)) "Manually close PORVs. IF any valve cannot be closed, then 
manually close its block valve. " (confirm))) (cl "CAUTION: IF any pressurizer PORV opens because of 
high RCS pressure, repeat step 4 after pressure drops below PORV 
setpoint. Seal injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs. ") 
(5 "5. Check if RCP Should Be Stopped:" ("5. 1 If SI running — CHECK FOR FLOW OR PUMP BREAKER 
INDICATOR LIGHTS LITw) ("5. 1. 1 Charging/SI" (confirm) "DO NOT STOP RCPs. " (6)) ("5. 1. 2 High-head/SI" (confirm) "DO NOT STOP RCPs. " (6)) ("5. 2 RCS pressure - EQUAL TO OR LESS THAN 222 PSIG" 
(confirm) "DO NOT STOP RCPs. " (6)) ("5. 3 Stop all RCPs" (confirm))) 
(6 "6 Check If Low-head SI Pumps Should Be Stopped:" ("6. 1 Check RCS pressure") ("6. 1. 1 Pressure — GREATER THAN 1000 PSIG" (rule ((rule 
(pressure reactor. vessel & number 1000)) 1)) 
"LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT" (LOCA 1) ) ("6. 1. 2 Preaaure - STABLE OR INCREASING" (rule ( (Or (pressure. gradient reactor. vessel normal) (pressure. gradient 
reactor. vessel increasing))) 1) (7)) ("6. 2 Reset SI" (confirm» ("6. 3 Stop low-head SI pumps amd place in standby" 
(rule 
(confirm))) 
(7 "7. Check Electrical Power and Air Supply Available 
To Essential Equipment" ("7. 1 Establish power supplies as necessary" (confirm))) 
(8 "8. Check Secondary System Integrity:" ("8. 1 RCS hot leg temperature — GREATER THAN 500 F" (rule ((rule (tempezatuze hot. legl & number 500)) 1)) 
"RCS hot leg temperatuze decreasing" 
(temperature. gradient hot. legl decreasing 1)) 
"Close all main steamline isolation valves and bypass 
valves. " (confirm) 
"Steam generator pressure continuing to decrease" 
(COnfirm) "SGTR With SECONDARY DEPRESSURIZATIONw (SGTR-SD 1)) ("8. 2 ALL steam generator pressures — GREATER THAN ??? 
PSIG" (confirm) 
"Close all main steamline isolation valves and bypass 
valves. " (confirm) 
"Steam generator pressure continuing to decrease" 
(confirm) "SGTR with SECONDARY DEPRESSURIZATION" (SGTR-SD 1))) 
(c2 "CAUTION: Alternate water sources for AFW pumps will 
benecessary, if CST level is low") 
(9 "9. Check Steam Generator Levels:" ("9. 1 Narrow range level — GREATER THAN ??2 8" (confirm) 
"Maintain full AFW flow until nazrow range level is greater than ??? 
(confirm)& 
&"9. 2 Throttle AFW flow to maintain narrow range level 
at ??? 4" (confirm))) (c3 "CAUTION: DO NOT PROCEED to step 10 until ruptured 
steam generator has been identified and isolated. ") 
(10 "10. Cooldown Non-ruptured Steam Generators 50 F 
Below Ruptured Steam Generator:" ("10. 1 Determine required non-ruptured steam generator 
pressure" &confirm)) ("10. 2 Rapidly dump steam to condenser from non-ruptured 
steam generators:" (confirm) 
"Rapidly dump steam with non-ruptured steam generator 
pORVs" (confirm)) ("10. 3 Check ruptured steam generator pressure — STABLE 
or INCREASING" (confirm) 
"SGTR with SECONDARY DEPRESSURIZATION" (SGTR-SD 1))) 
(c4 "CAUTION: If containment conditions are abnormal, go 
to E-l LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT, STEP 9. ") (11 "11. Check RCS Pressure:" ("11. 1 RCS pressure — AT LEAST 200 PSI GREATER THAN 
RUPTURED STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE" (confirm) "SGTR CONTINGENCIES" 
(SGTR-C 1))) 
(12 "12. Depressurize RCS Using Normal Spray:" ("12. 1 Verify normal spray — AVAILABLE" (confirm) 
"Failure. . " (14)) ("12. 2 Open normal spray valves" (confirm) "Failure. . " 
(141 ) ("12. 3 Verify RCS pressure - DECREASING" (rule (pressure. gradient reactor. vessel decreasing 1)) 
"Close spray valves" (14) ) ) 
&13 "13. Check If RCS Depressurization Should Be 
Stopped:" ("13. 1 RCS pressure — LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO RUPTURED 
STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE 
-OR- 
Pressurizer level — GREATER THAN ??? 4" (confirm)) ("13. 2 Stop RCS depressurization by closing spray 
valves" (confirm)1 ("13. 3 Check pressurizer level — GREATER THAN ??? (rule &(rule (level pressurizer & number ???)) 1)) 
"SGTR CONTINGENCIES" (SGTRW 1)) ("13. 4 Verify RCS pressure — INCREASING" 
(pressure. gradient reactor. vessel increasing) 
"Stop RCPs in loops with spray line connections" 
(confirm))) 
(14 "14. Depressurize RCS Using One Pressurizer PORV" ("14. 1 Open one pressurizer PORV" (confirm) "If RCS 
cannot be depressurized using any pORV, THEN use auxiliary spray. " (confirm))) (15 "15. Check Of RCS Depressurization Should Be 
Stopped:" ("15. 1 RCS pressure — LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO RUPTURED 
STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE 
-OR- 
Pressurizer level — GREA1'ER THAN ??? 4" (confirm)) ("15. 2 Stop RCS depressurization:") 
("15. 2. 1 Close PORV" (PORV. status pressurizer closed) 
"Close block valve" (confirm)) ("15. 2. 2 Close auxiliary spray valve" (confirm) "Isolate 
auxiliary spray line" (confirm)) ("15. 3 Check Pressurizer level — GREATER THAN ??? 
(rule ((rule (level pressurizer & number ???)) 1)) 
"SGTR CONTINGENCIES" (SGTR-C 1)) ("15. 4 Verify RCS pressure — INCREASING" 
(pressure. gradient reactor. vessel increasing) 
"Check PRT conditions for RCS leak" (confirm) "LOSS OF 
COOLANT" (LOCA 1))) (c5 "CAUTION: If PRT integrity is lost, abnormal 
containment 
conditions may not be reliable indications of a loss of reactor 
coolant. ") 
(16 "16. Check If SI Can Be Terminated:" ("16. 1 RCS pressure — INCREASE BY 200 PSI" (confirm) "DO 
NOT TERMINATE SI. Check if pressurizer level is increasing" (confirm) 
"SGTR CONTINGENCIES" (SGTRM 1)) ("16. 2 pressurizer level — GREATER THAN 30 8" (rule ((rule (level pressurizer & number 30)))) 
"DO NOT TERMINATE SI. SGTR CONTINGENCIES" (SGTR-C 1)) ("16. 3 RCS subcooling - GREATER THAN ??? F" (confirm) 
"DO NOT TERMINATE SI. ") (16)) (c6 "CAUTION: Do not proceed to step 17 until all 
conditions in step 16 are met. ") (17 "17. Terminate SIrw ("17. 1 Go to ES-3. 1, SI TERMINATION FOLLOWING STEAM 
GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE" (SI-T-SGTR 1) ) ) 
(18 "18. Check If Condensor Can Be Used" ("18. 1 Condensor - AVAILABLE" (conf irm) "Attempt to 
restore condensor" (confirm) 
"Evaluate adequacy of radiation hazard" (confirm) 
"Alternate Cooldown Procedures required" (SGTR-ACP 1))) 
(19 "19. Shutdown Margin" ("19. 1 Verify Adequate Shutdown Margin" (confirm) 
"Borate as necessary" (confirm))) 
(c7 "CAUTION: Steps 20 through 23 must be performed 
simula- 
taneously to avoid loss of pressurizer level control" ) 
(20 "20. Initiate RCS Cooldown to 350 F" ("20. 1 Maintain cooldown rate — LESS THAN 50 F/HR" 
(confirm)) ("20. 2 Dump steam from non-ruptured steam generators 
to condenser" (confirm) 
"Dump steam with non-ruptured steam-generator PORVs" 
(confizm))) (c8 "CAUTION: Charging and letdown flows should be 
compared 
to determine if leakage between the RCS and ruptured steam generator is stopped. ") 
(21 "21. Maintain Pressurizer Level in Normal Operating 
Range:" 
(confirm))) 
("21. 1 Operate chargine and letdown, as necessary" 
(22 "22. Depressurize Ruptured Steam Generator" ("22. 1 Slowly release steam to condenser from ruptured 
steam generator" (confirm) 
"Slowly release steam to atmosphere with ruptured 
steam generators PORV" (confirm))) (c9 "CAUTION: Maintain RCS pressure and temperature 
within normal cooldown lisu. ts 
IF RCS pressure or pressurizer level drop in an uncontrolled 
manner, THEN reinitiate SI and return to step 10. ") 
(23 "23. Depressurize RCSrw ("23. 1 Reduce RCS pressure to maintain RCS/ruptured 
steam generator pressures equal" ) ("23. 1. 1 Use normal pressurizer spray" (confirm) "If 
Letdown in service, then use auxiliary spray, if not, then use one 
pressurizer PORV. " (confirm))) 
(24 "24. Determine Zf SI Accumulators Should Be 
Isolated:" ("24. 1 RCS preSSure - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO ??'? PSIG" (rule ((rule (pressure reactor. vessel & number 400)) 
1)) (201) ("24. 2 Close all SI accumulator isolation valves" 
(confirm) "Vent any unisolated accumulator" (confirm))) 
(25 "25. Check If RHR System Can Be Placed In Service:" ("25. 1 RCS hot leg temperatures - LESS THAN 350 F IN 
NON-RUPTURED LOOPS" (confirm) (20)) ("25. 2 RCS Pressure — APPROEIMATELY 400 pSIG" 
(confirm& (21& ) ) (c10 "CAUTION: Do not collapse the pressurizer bubble" ) 
(26 "26. Place RHR System In Servi. ce" ((confirm))) 
(27 "27. Continue Cooldown To Cold Shutdown:" ("27. 1 Cooldown using RHR" (confirm)) ("27. 2 At least on RCP — RUNNING" (confirm) "Continue 
dumping steam from non-ruptured steam generators until they have 
stopped steaming. " (confirm))) 
(28 "28. Check RCS Temperature:" ("28. 1 Temperature - LESS THAN ??? F" (rule ((rule 
(temperature reactor. vessel & number 5001) 1)) (27)& ("28. 2 Stop all RCPs" (confirm)) ("28. 3 Cooldown pressurize") ("28. 3. 1 Spray pressurizer with auxiliary Spray" (confirm))) 
(29 "29. Maintain Cold Shutdown Conditions" ))))) (si-t-sgtr 
((procedure ((1 "1. Reset SI") 
(2 "2. Stop SI Pumps And Place In Standby:" ("2. 1 Stop Low-head SI pumps" (confirm)) ("2. 2 Stop High-head SZ pumps" (confirm)) ("2. 3 All but one charging/SZ pump" (confirm))) 
(3 "3. Establish Charging/SI Pump Miniflow&w ("3. 1 Verify CCW flow to seal water heat exchanger" 
(confirm)& ("3. 2 Open miniflow isolation valves" (confirm))) 
(4 "4. Isolate BIT:" 
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("4. 1 Close inlet isolation valves" (confirm)) ("4. 2 Close outlet isolation valves" (confizm))) 
(5 "5. Verify SI Reinitiation NOT Required:" ("5. 1 RCS subcooling GREATER THAN ??? F" (confirm) 
"Manually operate SI pumps, as required for maintaining subcooling" 
(confirm) "STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE" (sgtr 10)) ("5. 2 Pressurizer level GREATER THAN 20%" &rule (&rule 
&level pressurizer & number 20)) 1)) 
"Manually operate SI pumps, as required for maintaining 
pressurizer level" (confirm) 
"Manually reinitiate SI. " "STEAM GENERATOR TUBE 
RUPTURE" (sgtr 10) ) ) 
&6 "6. Verify Offsite Power Available" ("6. 1 Offsite power available" (rule ((rule &power 
generator & number 5)) 1)) "Try to restor offsite power" 
(confirm) "Manually load following equipment on the 
diesel generators:")) 
(7 "7. Reset Containment Isolation Phase A") 
(8 "8. Establish Charging:" 
&"8. 1 Close charging flow control valve" (confirm)1 ("8. 2 Open charging line isolation valves" (confirm)) ("8. 3 Open charging flow control valve to establish 
desired flow" (confirm))) 
(9 "9. EStablish Letdown:" ("9. 1 Open letdown line containment isolation valves" 
(confirm)) ("9. 2 Open letdown line isolation valves" (confirm)) ("9. 3 Open letdown orifice isolation valves, as 
appropriate")) 
(10 "10. Align Charging/SI Pump Suction to VCT:" ("10. 1 Open VCT outlet isolation valves" (confirm)) ("10. 2 Close RWST outlet isolation valves" (confirm))) 
(11 "11. Check VCT Makeup Control System:" ("11. 1 Makeup set for automatic control" (confirm) 
"Adjust controls, as appropraite. " (confirm)) ("11. 2 Makeup for GREATER THAN RCS boron concentration" 
(confirm) "Adjust controls, as appropriate")) 
(12 "12. Check RCP Cooling:" ("12. 1 RCP seal injection flow — NORMAL" (confirm) 
"Adjust charging line hand control valve, as necessary. " 
(confirm)) ("12. 2 RCP CCW system flow — NORMAL" (confirm) 
"Establish CCW flow to RCPs: 
1) Reset containment isolation Phase B, if necessary. 
2) Open approriate CCW system isolation valves" )) (13 "13. Check Non-Faulted Steam Generator Levels:" ("13. 1 Narrow range level — GREATER THAN ???" (confirm) 
"Maintain full AFW flow until narrow range level is greater than ???" 
(confirm)) ("13. 2 Throttle AFW flow to maintain narrow range at ???" (confirm))) 
(14 "14. Check CST Level" ("14. 1 CST level GREATER THAN ??? 4" (confirm) "Switch 
to alternate AFW water supply. ")) (15 "15. Establish Pressurizer Pressure Control:" 
("15. 1 Energize pressurizer heaters, as necessary to 
maintain pressure" (confirm))) 
(16 w16. Check RCP Status:" ("16. 1 At least on RCP — Running" (confizm) "Attempt to 
restore on RCP" (confirm) "Verify natural circulation: 
a) RCS subcooling GREATER THAN ??? F 
b) Steam pressure stable 
c) RCS hot leg temperature STABLE or SLOWLY DECREASING 
d) Core exit TCs — STABLE or SLOWLY DECREASING 
e) RCS cold leg temperatuze — NEAR SATURATION TEMPERATURE FOR STEAM 
PRESSURE" (confirm) 
"Increase dumping steam" (confirm))) (17 "17. Check Intermediate Range Flux:" ("17. 1 Flux BELOW ???" (confirm) "Shutdown unnecessary 
plant equipment" (confizm)) ("17. 2 verify source range detectors re-energized" 
(confirm) "Manually reenergize source range detectors. " 
(confirm)) ("17. 3 Transfer nuclear recorders to source range 
scale" (confirm))) 
(18 "18. Shutdown Unnecessary Plant Equipment" ) (19 "19. Verify SI Reinitiation NOT Required:" ("19. 1 RCS subcooling GREATER THAN ??? F" (confirm) 
"Manually operate SI pumps, as required to 
maintain subcooling" (confirm) "STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE" (sgtr 
10)) ("19. 2 Pressurizer level GREATER THAN 20%" (rule ((rule (level pressurizer & number 20)) 1)) 
"Manually operate SI pumps, as required for 
maintaining pressurizez level" (confirm) 
"Manually reinitiate SI. " "STEAM GENERATOR TUBE 
RUPTURE" (sgtr 10))) 
(20 "20. Continue with Procedure In Effect" ((return)1))))) (sgtr-sd 
((procedure ((1 "1. Verify Main Steamline Isolation" ("1. 1 Main steamline isolation valves CLOSED" (confirm) 
"Manually close valves" ) ("1. 2 Main steamline bypass valves CLOSED" (confirm) 
"Manually close valves" )) 
(2 "2. Identify Faulted Steam Generator" ("2. 1 a) Steam generator pressure LESS THAN ??? 
b) Steam generator pressure DECREASING 
c) Inspect steam genezators and main steamline" (confirm) "STEAM 
GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE" (sgtr 9))) 
(3 "3. Try to Stop Steam Release From Faulted Steam 
Generator" ("3. 1 Steam generator PORVs CLOSED" (confi rm) "Manually 
close steam generator PORVs" (confirm) 
"Try isolating that PORV while continuing au. tigation 
procedures" (confizm))) 
(4 "4. Check Faulted Steam Generator Pressurezw ("4. 1 Any faulted steam generator pressure STABLE or 
DECREASING" (confirm) "STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE" 
(sgtz 10))) 
(5 "5. Stop AFW Flow To Faulted Steam Generators:" ("5. 1 Follow plant specific steps" (confirm) ) ) (cl "Alternate water sources for AFW will be necessary if 
CST level is low") 
(6 "6. Check Non-Faulted Steam Generator Level" ("6. 1 Narrow range level GREATER THAN '??? 8" (confirm) 
"Maintain full AFW flow until narrow range level is greater than ??? 
(confirm)) ("6. 2 Throttle AFW to maintain narrow range level at ?? (confirm))) 
(7 "7. Identify Ruptured Steam Generator" ("7. 1 a) Unexpected rise in steam generator narrow range 
level 
b) High radiation from any steam generator blowdown lines 
c) High radiation from any steam generator sample 
d) High radiation from any steam generator steamline" &confirm))) 
(8 "8. Isolate Ruptured Steam Generator" 
&"8. 1 When in narrow range, stop all AFW flow to 
ruptured generatoz" (confirm)) ("8. 2 Verify ruptured steam generator PORV CLOSED" 
(confirm) "Manually close ruptured steam generator PORV" 
(confirm)) ("8. 3 Close ruptured steam generator steam supply valve 
to 
turbine steam supply valve to turbine-drive AFW pump" (confirm))) 
(9 "9. Check Intact Steam Generator Levels:" ("9. 1 NarrOw range level GREATER THAN '??? ()" (confirm) 
"Maintain full AFW flow until narrow range level is greater than ?'?? 
(confirm)) ("9. 2 Throttle AFW to maintain narrow range level at ?? 
(confirm))) 
(10 "10. Verify Ruptured Steam Generaor is Faulted" ((confirm) "STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE" (sgtr 10))) 
(11 "11. Check RCS Pressure:" ("11. 1 RCS pressure — GREATER THAN SI ACCUMULATOR 
PRESSURE" (confirm) "SGTR with CONTINGENCIES" (sgtr-c 1))) 
(c2 "CAUTION: If main steamline isolation valve or bypass 
~el~a for any ruptured steam generator fails open, the main steamline 
isolation valves and bypass valves for non-ruptured steam generators 
must remain closed. ") 
(12 "12. Depressurised Non-Ruptured Steam Generators to 
250 psig:" ("12. 1 Rapidly dump steam to condenser form non- 
ruptured steam generators" (confirm) 
"Rapidly dump steam with non-ruptured steam generator 
PORVs" (confirm))) (c3 "CAUTION: If containment conditions are abnormal, 
LOCA" (" Verify normal containment conditions" (confirm) 
"LOCA" (loca 1) ) ) (13 "13. Depzessurire RCS Using Normal Spray:" ("13. 1 Verify normal spray AVAILABLE" (confirm) (15)) ("13. 2 Open normal spray valves" (confirm) (15)) 
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(»13. 3 Verify RCS pressure DECREASING" 
(pressuze. gradient reactor. vessel decreasing) "Close spray valves" 
&15)&) (14 "14. Check if RCS Depressurization Should Be 
Stopped: » (»14. 1 RCS subcooling LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 50 F 
-OR- 
Pressurizer level GREATER THAN ??? 0» (confirm) "Continue 
depressuzization until condition is met») ("14. 2 Stop RCS depressurization by closing spray 
valves" (confirm)) ("14. 3 Check pressurizer level GREATER THAN ??? 
(confirm) "SGTR with CONTINGENCIES" (sgtr-c 1)) ("14. 4 Verify RCS pressure INCREASING» 
(pressuze. gradient reactor. vessel increasing) 
"Stop RCps in loops with spzay line connections" 
(confirm)) ((17))) (15 "15. Depressurize RCS Using One Pressurizer PORV:" ("15. 1 Open one pressurizer PORV" (confirm) »Manually 
open PORV" (confirm)) ("15. 2 Verify RCS depressurization" (confirm) »Use 
auxiliary spray" (confirm))) 
(16 "16. Check If RCS Depressurization Should Be 
Stopped:" (»16. 1 RCS subcooling LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 50 F 
-OR- 
Pressurizer level GREATER THAN ??? 0» (confirm& "Continue 
depressurization until either condition met. " (confirm)) ("16. 2 Stop RCS depressurization:") ("16. 2. 1 Close PORV" (confirm) "Close PORV block valve" 
&confizm&) ("16. 2. 2 Close auxiliary spray valve" (confirm) 
"Isolate auxiliary spray line" (confirm)) ("16. 3 Check pressurizer level GREATER THAN ??? 
(confirm) "SGTR with CONTINGENCIES" (sgtr-c 1)) ("16. 4 Verify RCS pressure INCREASING" (pressure. gradient reactor. vessel increasing) 
"Check PRT condition for RCS integrity" (confirm) 
"LOCA" (loca 9))) (17 "17. Check If SI Can Be Terminated:" (»17. 1 RCS p~essure INCREASES by 200 PSI" (confirm) "DO 
NOT TER&41NATE SI. Confirm pressurizer level INCRESING" (confirm) 
"SGTR with CONTINGENCIES" (sgtr-c 1)) ("17. 2 Pressurizer level GREATER THAN ?? 4» (confirm) 
»DO NOT TERMINATE SI" 
"SGTR with CONTINGENCIES" (sgrt-c 1) ) ("17. 3 RCS subcooling GREATER THAN ?? 0» (confizm))) 
(c4 "CAUTION: 
1) Do not proceed until all conditions in step 17 are met. 
2) Following SI reset, automatic zeinition of Sl will not occur until 
reactor 
trip breakers are reset. 
3) If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action may be 
required to restart safeguards equipment. " &confirm)) 
(confirm)) 
(18 "18. Reset SI" ((confirm))) (19 "19. Reset Containment Isolation Phase A. " 
((confirm))& 
(20 "20. Stop SI Pumps and Place In Standby:" ("20. 1 Stop low-head SI pumps" (confirm)) ("20. 2 Stop high-head SI pumps" (confirm)) ("20. 3 Stop all but one charging/SI pump" (confirm))& 
(21 "21. Establish Charging/SI Pump Miniflow:" ("21. 1 Verify CCN flow to seal water heat exchanger" 
("21. 2 Open miniflow isolation valves" (confirm))) 
&22 "22. Isolate BIT:" 
&"22. 1 Close inlet isolation valves" (confirm)) ("22. 2 Close outlet isolation valves" (confirm))) 
(23 "23. Realign Charging Flow Path:" ("23. 1 Close charging line hand" (confirm&) ("23. 2 Open charging line isolation valves" (confirm))) 
(24 "24. Check If Charging Flow Should Be Established:" ("24. 1 RCS subcooling LESS THAN or EQUAI to 50 F 
-OR- 
Pressurizer Level LESS THAN or EQUAL TO 30 4" (confirm)) ("24. 2 Control charging flow to maintain pressurizer 
level approximately constant" (confirm) 
"Manually operate SI pumps, as necessary" (confirm))) 
(25 "25. Verify SI Reinitiation Not Required:" ("25. 1 RCS subcooling GREATER THAN ??? F" (confirm) 
"Manually operate SI pumps, as required. Confirm that subcooling can 
be maintained" (confirm) "Manually reinitiate Sl" (12)) ("25. 2 Pressurizer level GREATER THAN 20%" (confirm) 
"Manually operate SI pumps, as required. Confirm maintainability of 
pressurizer level" (confirm) "Manually reinitiate SI" (12))) 
(26 "26. Verify Offsite Power Available:" ("26. 1 Follow plant specific procedures" (confirm& 
"Start Diesel Generators:" &confirm& 
"Bend over and kiss your ass goodbye")) 
(27 "27. Try to Establish Pressurizer Pressure Control:" ("27. 1 Energize heaters as necessary to maintain 
pressure" (confirm))) 
(nl "NOTE: RCPs should be operated in order of priority 
to provide pressurizer spray. " (confirm)) 
(28 "28. Check RCP Status:" ("28. 1 At least one RCP-RUNNING" &confirm) "Manually 
start one RCP" (confirm)) ("28. 2 If more than one RCP is running, then stop all 
but one" (confirm))) 
(29 "29. Try to Initiate Blowdown From Ruptured Steam 
Generator(s):" ("29. 1 Follow plant specific steps" (confirm))) 
(30 "30. verify Adequate Shutdown Margin" ("30. 1 If necessary, Borate" (confirm&)& 
&31 "31. Rapidly Cooldown RCS to 350 F:" ("31. 1 Maintain cooldown rate to LESS THAN 100 F/HR" (confirm)) 
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("31. 2 Dump steam from non-ruptured steam generators to 
condenser" (confirm) "Dump steam with non-ruptured steam generator 
PORVs" (confirm))) 
(32 "32. Control Charging Flow to Maintain Pressurizer 
Level Nearly Constant:" ("32. 1 Manually operate SI pumps as necessary. Confirm 
maintainability of pressurizer level" (confirm) 
"Reinitiate SI" (17))) 
(33 "33. Check Ruptured Steam Generator&a) Pressure:" ("33. 1 Any Ruptured steam generator pressure LESS THAN 
RCS PRESSURE OR DECREASING" (confirm) 
"If all ruptured steam generator pressures greater 
than or equal to RCS pressure and stable" (confirm-) "SGTR with CONTINGENCIES" (sgtr 17))) 
(34 "34. Depressurize Ruptured Steam Generator(s) If 
Necessary:" 
&"34. 1 Slowly release steam to condenser from ruptured 
steam generator(s)" (confirm) 
"Slowly release steam to atmosphere with ruptured 
steam generator PORV" (confirm))) 
(35 "35. Isolate SI Accumulators:" ("35. 1 Close all SI accumulator isolation valves" 
(confirm) "Vent any unisolated accumulator" (confirm))) 
(36 "36. Depressurize RCS:" ("36. 1 Use normal pressurizer spray" (confirm) "Use one 
pressurizer PORV" (confirm) 
"Use auxiliary spray" (confirm))) 
(37 "37. Check if RCS Depressurization Should be 
Stopped:" ("37. 1 RCS subcooling LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 50 F 
MR- 
RCS PRESSURE LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO ANY RUPTURED STEAM GENERATOR 
PRESSURE" (confirm) "Continue depressurization until either condition 
is met. " &confirm)) ("37. 2 Stop RCS Depressurization" (confirm))) 
(38 "38. Check if RHR System can be Placed in Service:" ("38. 1 RCS hot leg temperatures LESS THAN 350 F IN NON- 
RUPTURED LOOPS" (confirm) (31)) ("3S. 2 RCS pressure nearly 400 psig" (confirm) "RCS 
pressure less than 400 psig" (confirm) (32))) 
(39 "39. Place RHR System in Service:" 
"39. 1 Follow plant specific steps" &confirm)) 
(40 "40. continue Rapid Cooldown to Cold Shutdown:" ("40. 1 Maintain cooldown rate LESS THAN 100 F/HR" 
(confirm)) ("40. 2 Cooldown using RHR system" (confirm)) ("40. 3 Continue dumping steam from non-ruptured steam 
generators" (confirm))) 
(41 "41. Check RCP Status:" ("41. 1 At lease one RCP-RUNNING" (confirm) &42)) ("41. 2 RCS pressure GREATER THAN ??? PSIG" (confi. rm) 
"Stop depressurization. Maintain RCS pressure at ??? 
psig" (45))) 
(42 "42. Depressurize Ruptured Steam Generator(s) 
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(»42. 1 Slowly release steam to condenser from ruptured 
steam generator(s)» (confirm) 
"Slowly release steam to atmosphere with ruptured 
steam generator(s) PORV" &confirm))) 
(43 "43. Depressurize RCS&» (»43. 1 Use normal pressurizer spray" (confirm) »Use one 
pressurizer PORV" (confirm) 
"Use auxiliary spray" (confirm)) (»43. 2 Turn off pressurizer heaters, as necessary" 
(confirm)) ("43. 3 Control charging flow to maintain pressurizer 
level approximately constant" (confirm) 
"Manually operate SI pumps, as necessary. " (confirm))) 
(44 »44. Check if RCS Depressurization Should be 
Stopped:" ("44. 1 RCS subcooling LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 50 F 
-OR- 
RCS PRESSURE LESS THAN OR E(}UAL TO ANY RUPTURED STEAM GENERATOR 
PRESSURE» (confirm) 
"Continue depressurization until either condition is 
met. » (confirm)) ("44. 2 Stop RCS depressurization" &confirm))) 
(45 "45. Check RCS Hot Leg Temperatures: » ("45. 1 Temperature -LESS THAN 200 F" &rule ((rule 
(temperature hot. legl 4 number 200)))) (40&) ("45. 2 Stop all RCPs" (confirm))) 
(46 "46. Depressurize RCS to Stop Break Flow:" ("46. 1 Depressurize ruptured steam generator(s), as 
necessary, by dumping steam to condenser from ruptured steam 
generator(s)" (confirm) "Dump steam with ruptured steam generator&a) 
PORV" (confirm)) ("46. 2 Cooldown pressurizer with auxiliary spray" 
(confirm)) ("46. 3 When pressurizer temperature reaches 200 F, stop 
chargine pumps" (confirm))) 
(47 »Maintain Cold Shutdown Conditions" &)))) 
&sgtr-c 
((procedure ((1 "1. Check Secondary System:" ("1. 1 All Steam Generator Pressures GREATER THAN ??? 
PSIG» (confirm) "Close all main steamline isolation valves and bypass 
valves. " (confirm) "Confirm stabilization of steam generator 
pressures" (confirm) (20))) 
&nl "NOTE: Steps 2-19 provide contingencies for recovery 
from a SGTR without an uncontrolled secondary steam release. ") 
(2 "2. EStablish Pressurizer Level Using Normal Spray" ("2. 1 Verify normal spray — Available" (confirm) (4&) ("2. 2 Open normal spray valves" (confirm) (4)) (»2. 3 Verify pressurizer level — INCREASING" (confirm) 
"Close spray valves" &confirm-) (4))) 
&3 "3. Check if RCS Depressurization Should be Stopped:" ("3. 1 Pressurizer level - GREATER THAN 40 W" (confirm) 
"Continue depressurization" &confirm&) (»3. 2 Stop RCS depressurization by closing spray valves" (confirm)) 
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("3. 3 Pressurizer level — STABLE OR DECREASING" 
(confirm) "Stop RCps in loops with spray line connections. " 
(confirm)) ((6))) 
(4 "Establish Pressurizer Level Using One Presssurizer 
PORV ("4. 1 Open one pressurizer pORV" (confirm) "Use 
auxiliary spray" (confirm))) 
(5 "5. Check if RCS Depressurization Should be Stopped:" ("5. 1 Pressurizer level — GREATER THAN 40 4" (confirm) 
"Continue depressurization" (confirm)) ("5. 2 Stop RCS depressurization by closing PORV and the 
auxiliary spray valve" (conf irm) 
"Close PORV block valve and/or Isolate auxiliary spray 
line" (confirm)& ("5. 3 Pressurizer level - STABLE OR DECREASING" 
(confirm) 
"Check PRT conditions for indication of RCS integrity" 
(confirm) (loca 1))) (cl "CAUTION: If PRT integrity is lost, abnormal 
containment conditions may not be reliable indications of loss of 
reactor coolant" ) 
(6 "6. Check if SI can be Terminated&v ("6. 1 Pressurizer level - GREATER THAN 20% AND STABLE" 
(confirm) "Do not terzu. nate SI" (confirm)) ("6. 2 RCS subcooling — GREATER THAN ??? F" (confirm) "Do 
not terminate SI" (confirm))& 
(c2 "CAUTION: Do not proceed to step 7 until all 
conditions in step 6 are met" ((confirm) (6))) 
(7 "7. Terminate SI:" ("SI TERMINATION" (si-t-sgtr 1))) 
(8 "8. Turn off Pressurizer Heaters" ((confirm))) 
(9 "9. Check if Condenser can be Used:" ("9. 1 Confirm condenser availability" (confirm) "Try to 
restore condenser" (confirm) 
"Confirm 10 CFR 20 limits are not exceeded for releases 
from ruptured steam generator" 
(confirm) "SGTR ALTER)4ATE COOLDOWN" (sgtr-acp 1)&) 
(10 "10. Verify Adequate Shutdown Margin" 
&"10. 1 Borate as necessary" (confirm)&) 
&c3 "CAUTION: 1) Steps 11, 12 and 13 must be performed 
simultaneously to avoid loss of pressurizer level control. 
2) Maintain RCS pressure and temperature within normal cooldown 
limits. 
3) If RCS pressure or pressurizer level drop in an uncontrolled 
manner, THEN reinitiate SI and return to step 1") (11 "Initiate Rapid RCS Cooldown To 350 F&v ("11. 1 Maintain cooldown rate — LESS THAN 100 F/HR" 
(confirm)) ("11. 2 Dump stem from non-ruptured steam generators to 
condenser" &confirm) 
"Dump steam from non-ruptured steam generator PORVs. " (confirm))) 
(c4 "CAUTION: Charging and let down flows should be 
compared to determine if leakage between 
the RCS and the Ruptured Steam Generator is stopped. ") 
(12 "12. Depressurize RCS to Naintain Pressurizer Level:" ("12. 1 Reduce RCS pressure to maintain pressurizer 
level between 40% and 60% using normal pressurizer spray" 
(confirm) "If letdown is in service use auxiliary 
spray, else use pressurizer PORV" (confirm))) (13 "13. Depressurizer Reptured Steam Generator(s):" ("13. 1 Slowly release steam to condenser from ruptured 
steam generator(s)" (confirm) 
"Slowly release steam to atmospher with ruptured steam 
generator(s) PORV" (confirm))) (14 "14. Determine if SI Accumulators Should be 
Isolated:" ("14. 1 RCS pressure LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO ??? PSIG" 
(confirm) &11)) 
&"14. 2 Close all SI accumulator isolation valves" 
(confirm) "Vent any uniaolated accumulator" (confirm))) 
&15 "15. Check if RHR System can be Placed in Service:" ("15. 1 RCS hot leg temperature - LESS THAN 350 F IN 
NON-RUPTURED LOOPS" (confirm) (11)) ("15. 2 RCS pressure — APPROXINATELY 400 PSIG" (confirm) 
"Confirm that pressure is less than 400 psig" 
(confirm) (12))) 
(c5 "CAUTION: Do not collapse the pressurizer bubble" ((confirm))) 
(16 "16. Place RHR System in Service:" ("16. 1 Follow plant specific guidelines" (confirm))) (17 "17. Continue Cooldown to Cold Shutdown:" ("17. 1 Cooldown using RHR" (COnfirm)) ("17. 2 At least one RCP RUNNING" (confirm) "Continue 
dumping steam from non-ruptured steam generators until they have 
stopped steaming" (confirm))) 
(18 "18. check Rcs Temperatures:" ("18. 1 RCS Temperature — LESS THAN ??? F" (confirm) (17)) ("18. 2 Stop all RCPs" &confirm)) ("18. 3 Cooldown pressurizer by spraying pressurizer 
with auxiliary spray" (confirm) ) ("18. 4 When pressurizer temperture reaches 200 F, stop 
chargine pumps" (confirm))) 
(n2 "19. NOTE: Steps 20-30 provide contingencies for 
recovery from a SGTR with an uncontrolled secondary steam release" 
(&31))) 
&20 "20. Cooldown RCS by Depressurizing ALL Steam 
Generators To 140 PSIG:" ("20, 1 Rapidly dump steam to condenser (follow plant 
specific procedures)" (confirm) 
"Rapidly dump steam with steam generator PORVs" 
&confirm))) (c6 "CAUTION: Steps 21-29 must be performed 
simultaneously to avoid loss of pressurizer level control" (" Confirm adequate containment conditions" (confirm) (loca 9))) 
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Level: " 
(21 "21. Depressurize RCS To Establish Pressurizer 
("21. 1 Open one pressurizer PORV" (confirm) "Use 
auxiliary spray" (confirm)) ("21. 2 When pressurizer level is greater than 40%, stop 
RCS depressurization" (confirm)) ("21. 3 Verify PORV CLOSED" (confirm) "Close PORV block 
valve" (confirm) & ) 
(22 "22. Verify Adequate Shutdown Margin" ("22. 1 Borate as necessary" (confirm) ) ) 
(23 "23. Continue Cooldown to Cold Shutdown" ("23. 1 Maintain cooldown rate — LESS THAN 100 F/HR" 
(confirm)) ("23. 2 Dump steam to condenser (follow plant specific 
procedures)" (confirm) 
"Dump steam with steam generator PORVs" (confirm)) ("23. 3 cooldown using RHR SyStem if in ServiCe" 
1)) (26)) 
(confizm) 
("25. 2 Close all SI accumulator isolation valves" 
"Vent any unisolated accumulators before proceedings" (confirm))) 
(26 "26. Check RCS Hot Leg Temperatures:" ("26. 1 Temperatures — GREATER THAN 200 F" (rule ((rule 
(temperature hot. legl & number 200)) 1)) (30))) 
(27 "27. Check RCS Conditions:" ("27. 1 Pressurizer level GREATER THAN 20%" (rule ((rule (level pressurizer & number 20)) 1)) (21)) ("27. 2 Pressurizer level STABLE OR INCREASING" 
(confirm) (21) ) ("27. 3 RCS subcooling GREATER THAN 50 F" (confirm) 
(21) ) ) 
(28 "28. Isolate all SI accumulators" ("28. 1 Close all SI accumulators" (conf irm) "Vent any 
unisolated accumulators" (confirm) & ) 
(29 "29. Check Pressurizer Level:" ("29. 1 Pressurizer level STABLE OR INCREASING" 
(confirm) (21)& ("29. 2 SGTR With Secondary Depressurization, Step 18" (sgtr-sd 18))) 
(30 "Depressurize RCS To Ruptured Steam Generator 
Pressure:" ("30. 1 Verify all SI accumulators isolated" (confirm) 
"Close all SI accumulator isolation valves" (conrirm) 
(confirm))) 
(24 "24. Check if RHR System can be Placed in Service:" ("24. 1 RCS hot leg temperatures — LESS THAN 350 F" (rule ((rule (temperature hot. legl & number 350)) 1)) (25)) ("24. 2 RCS pressure — LESS THAN 400 PSIG" (rule ((rule 
(pressure reactor. vessel & number 400)) 1)) (25)) ("24. 3 Place RHR system in service per plant specific 
procedure" (confirm))) 
(25 "25. Check if SI Accumulators Should be Isolated:" ("25. 1 RCS pressure - EQUAL TO OR LESS THAN 200 PSIG" 
(rule ((rule (pressure reactor. vessel & number 200)& 
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(confirm)) 
&confirm)) 
"Vent any unisolated accumulator before proceeding" 
("30. 2 Cooldown pressurizer with auxiliary spray" 
("30. 3 When pressurizer temperature reaches 200 F, Stop 
all SI pumps" (confirm))) (31. "31. Maintain Cold Shutdown Conditions" ))))) (sgtr-acp 
((procedure ((cl "CAUTION: If pressurizer is water solid, stable plant 
conditions must be maintained while heating pressurizer" ) 
(nl "NOTE: Have foldout page out") 
(1 "1. Check Pressurizer Water Temperature:" ("1. 1 Water Temperature EQUAL TO SATURATION TEMPERATURE 
OF RUPTURED STEAM GENERATOR" (confirm) 
"Establish required pressurizer water temperature 
before continuing" (confirm))) 
(2 "2. Check Pressurizer Level:" ("2. 1 Level — GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 35%" (rule (&rule (level pressurizer & number 35)) 1)) 
"Increase charging flow until 35% level is reached" (confina))) 
(3 "3. Equalize Charging and Letdown Flows:" ("3. 1 Take manual control of charging and letdown" 
(confirm)) ("3. 2 Ad)ust total charging pump flow EQUAL to letdown 
and seal leakoff flows" (confirm))1 
(n2 "NO'fE: Flow balance between chargin and letdown 
should be maintained throughout this guideline" ) 
(4 "4. Initiate RCS Cooldown;" ("4. 1 Maintain cooldown rate - LESS THAN 50 F/HR" 
(confirm)) ("4. 2 Maintain RCS pressure — EQUAL TO RUPTURED STEAM 
GENERATOR PRESSURE" (confirm)) ("4. 3 Dump steam to condenser from non-ruptured steam 
generators (follow plant specific procedures" 
(confirm) "Dump steam with non-ruptured steam generator 
PORV" (confirm))) 
(5 "5. Check Pressurizer Level:" ("5. 1 Level — LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 25%" (rule ((rule (level pressurizer ( number 25)) 1)) 
"Continue cooldown until level reaches 25%" (confirm))) 
(6 "6. Stop RCS Cooldown" ((confirm))) 
(c2 "CAUTION: 50 F subcooling must be maintained at all 
times") 
Follows:" 
(7 "7. Backfill RCS From Ruptured Steam Generator as 
("7. 1 Check ruptured steam generator narrow range level 
— GREATER THAN 25%" (confirm) 
"Refill ruptured steam generator to 65%" &confirm)) ("7. 2 Reduce RCS pressure approximately 50 psi less than 
ruptured steam generator pressure by using normal pressurizar spray" 
(confirm) "Use auxiliary spray" (confirm) "Use one pressurizer PORV" (confizm))) 
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(7) ) ) 
&8 "8. Check Pressurizer Level:" ("8. 1 Level — GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 70%" &confirm) 
(9 "9. Check RCS Pressure" ("9. 1 RCS pressure EQUAL TO RUPTURED STEAM GENERATOR 
PRESSURE" (confirm) 
"Increase RCS pressure to ruptured steam generator 
pressure" (confirm))) 
(10 "10. Determine if SI Accumulators Should be Isolated" ("10. 1 RCS pressure — LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO ??? PEIG" 
&confirm) (11)) ("10. 2 Close all SI accumulator isolation valves" 
&confirm) "Vent any unisolated accumulator" (confirm))) (11 "11. Check Charging and Letdown Plows:" ("11. 1 Total charging pump flow - EQUAL TO LETDOWN AND 
SEAL LEAKOFF FLOWS" (confirm) 
"Adjust flow as necessary" (confirm))) 
&12 "12. Verify Adeguate Shutdown Margin" ("12. 1 Borate as necessary" (confirm))) 
(13 "Check RCS/Ruptured Steam Generator Pressure:" ("13. 1 Pressure LESS THAN OR APPROXIMATELY 400 PSIG" 
(confirm) "RCS Temperature GREATER THAN 350 F" 
(confirm '(4)) "1)Continue cooldown per steps 4 to 13 
until steam generators stop steaming. 
2) Maintain stable plant conditions until ruptured steam generator 
pressure decays to 400 psig")) 
(14 "14. Check RCS Temperature:" ("14. 1 Temperature - LESS THAN 350 F" (confirm) "1) 
Cooldown RCS below 350 F 
2) Maintain pressurizer level with increased charging flow until RCS is cooled below 350 F" (confirm))) (15 "15. Place RHR in Service" ("15. 1 Follow plant specific procedures" (confirm))) 
(16 "16. Continue RCS Cooldown Using RHR System. ") 
(17 "17. Check Pressurizer Level:" ("17. 1 Level — LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 25an (confirm) 
"Continue cooldown until level reaches 25% before 
continuing" (confirm))) 
(18 "18. Stop RCS Cooldown") (c3 "CAUT1'ON: SOF subcooling must be maintained at all 
times") 
Follows:" 
(19 "19. Backfill RCS From Ruptured Steam Generator as 
("19. 1 Check ruptured steam generator narrow range 
level - GREATER THAN 25%" (confirm) 
"Refill ruptured steam generator to 65%" (confirm)) ("19. 2 Reduce RCS pressure approximately 50 psi less 
than ruptured steam generator 
pressure by using normal pressurizer spray" (confirm) "Use auxiliary 
spray" (confirm) "Use one pressurizer PORV" (confirm))) 
(20 "20. Check Pressurizer level:" ("20. 1 Level GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 70%" (confirm) (19))) 
(21 "21. Check RCS Pressure:" 
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("21. 1 RCS pressure — EQUAL TO RUPTURED STEAM GENERATOR 
PRESSURE" (confirm) 
"Increase RCS pressure to ruptured generator pressure" (confirm))) 
(22 "22. Check Charging and Letdown Flows:" ("22. 1 Total charging pump flow — EQUAL TO LETDOWN AND 
SEAL LEAKOFF FLOWS" (confirm) 
"Adjust flows as appropiate" (confi. rm))) 
(23 "23. Verify Adequate Shutdown Margin" ("23. 1 Borate as necessary" (confirm))) 
(24 "24. Check RCS Temperature:" ("24. 1 Temperature — LESS THAN 200 F" (rule ((rule 
(temperature reactor. vessel ( number 200)) 1)) (16))) 
(25 "25. Maintain Cold Shutdown Conditions" ))))) (loca 
((procedure ((1 "1. Check Pressurizer Level" ("1. 1 level — STABLE OR INCREASING" (confirm) "Manually 
i. nitiate HPIS" (confirm))) 
(2 "2. Check Sump Pump Status" ("2. 1 Sump Pump — RUNNING" (confirm) "Nothing ' s 
Wrong" )))))) (reactor. trip ((procedure ((1 "1. Check Neutron Density" ("l. 1 Level - ZERO" (confirm) "Manually scram reactor")) 
(2 "2. Confirm Adequate Cooling" ("2. 1 Available cooling" (confirm) "Run for your life" )))))) (i. n-core-cool 
((procedure ((cl "CAUTION: If REST level decreases to less than 40%, 
the ECCS should be aligned for cold leg recirculation. Use 
Guidelines, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION" ) 
(c2 "CAUTION: RHR pumps should not pump water greater 
than 200 F without CCW to the RHR system") 
(1 "1. Verify ECCS Valve Alignment" ("l. 1 STATUS — PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT" (confirm) 
"Manually align valves as necessary" (confirm))) 
(2 "2. Verify ECCS Flow In All Trai. ns:" ("2. 1 CCP injection flow indi. cators — CHECK FOR FLOW 
SI pump flow indicators — CHECK FOR FLOW 
RHR pump flow indicators — CHECK FOR FLOW" (confirm) "Start pumps and 
align valves as necessary. 
Try to establish charging via PD charging pump from the RWST or VCT: 
1) Reset SI, Containment Isolation Phase A and B. 
2) Realign charging system and start PD charging pump. " (confirm))) 
(3 "3. Check RCP Support Conditions" ("3. 1 Status — AVAILABLE" (confirm) "Follow plant 
specific guidelines" (confirm))) 
(4 "4. Check Accumulator Isolation Valve Status:" ("4. 1 Power to isolati. on valves — AVAILABLE" (confirm& 
"Restor power to isolation valve(s)" (confirm&) ("4. 2 Isolation valves — OPEN" (confirm) "Open isolation 
valve(s) unless closed 
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after accumulator discharge" (confirm))) 
(5 "5. Check Core Exit TCsl" ("5. 1 Core exit TCs — LESS THAN 1200 F" (confirm) &6)) ((return))) 
(6 "6. Check Containment Hydrogen Concentration:" 
&"6. 1 Obtain a hydrogen concentration measurement from: 
1) Containment hydrogen monitoring system 
-or- 
2) The PASS system" (confirm)) ("6. 2 Hydrogen concentration — LESS THAN 6. 0% IN DRY 
AIR" (confirm) 
"Consult TSC staff for additional recovery actions" 
(7) ) ("6. 3 Hydrogen concentration — LESS THAN 0. 5 IN DRAY 
AIR" (confilaz) 
"Place containment hydzogen recombiner inservice" 
(confizm))) 
(c3 "CAUTION: Alternate water source for AFW 
pumps will be necessary if CST level decreases to less than 10%") 
(c4 "CAUTION: A faulted or ruptured SG should 
not be used in subsequent steps unless no intact SG is available" ) 
(7 "Check Intact SG Levels:" ("7. 1 Narrow range level — GREATER THAN 10% (25% F0R 
ADVERSE CONTAINNENT" &confirm) 
"Increase total AFW flow to restore narrow range level 
greater than 10% (25% for adverse containment). Confirm total AFW 
flow greater than 470 gpm" (confirm) (n2)) ("7. 2 Control AFN flow to maintain narrow range level 
between 10% (25% for adverse containment) and 50%" (confirm))) 
(8 "Check RCS Vent Paths:" ("8. 1 Power to PRZR PORV block valves — AVAILABLE" 
&confirm) "Restor power to block valves" (confirm)) ("8. 2 PRZR PORVs — CLOSED" (confirm) "Hanually close 
PRZR PORVs. If any PORV cannot be closed, close i. ts block valves" (confirm)) ("8. 3 Block valves — AT LEAST ONE OPEN" (confirm) 
"Open block valve unless it was closed to isolate an 
open PRZR PORV" (confirm)) ("8. 4 Reactor vessel head vents — CLOSED" (confirm) 
"Closed reactor vessel head vent(s)" (confirm)) ("8. 5 PRZR vents — CLOSED" (confirm) "Close PRZR 
vent(s) " (confirm))) 
(nl "NOTE: Partial uncovering of SG tubes is acceptable 
in the following steps") 
(9 "9. Depressurize All Intact SGs to 170 PSIG" ("9. 1 Dump steam to condenser at maximum rate" (confirm) 
"Dump Steam at maximum rate uaing intact SGs 
atmospheric" (confirm)) ("9. 2 Check SG pressures — LESS THAN 170 PSIG" (confirm) 
"SG pressure stable or increasing" (confirm) (7)) ("9. 3 Check RCS hot leg temperatures — AT LEAST TNO LESS 
THAN 400 F" (confirm) (rule (temperature hot. legl decreasing 1)) (7)) ("9. 4 Stop SG depressurization" (confirm))) 
(10 "10. Check If Accumulators Should Be Isolated:" ("10. 1 At least two RCS hot leg temperatures — LESS 
THAN 400 F" (confirm& (16)) ("10. 2 Close all accumulator isolation valves" 
&confirm) "vent any unisolated accumulator" (confirm))) (11 "11. Stop All RCPs" ((confirm))) 
(12 "12. Depressurize All Intact SGs To Atmospheric 
Pressure:" ("12. 1 Dump steam to condenser at maximum rate" 
(confirm) "Dump steam at maximum rate using SG atmospherics" (confirm))) 
(13 "13. Verify ECCS Flow:" ("13. 1 CCP injection flow indicators — CHECK FOR FLOW 
SI pump flow indicators — CHECK FOR FLOW 
RHR pump flow indicators — cHEcK FoR FLow" (confirm) "core exit Tcs 
greater than 1200 F" (confirm) (12))) 
(14 "14. Check Core Cooling:" ("14. 1 Core exit TCs — LESS THAN 1200 F" (confirm) 
(16) ) ("14. 2 At least two RCS hot leg temperatures — LESS 
THAN 350 F" (confizm) (12))) 
(15 "LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT" ((loca 12))) 
(n2 "NOTE: Normal support conditions aze desired but not 
required for starting the RCPs") 
(16 "16. Check Coze Exit TCs" ("16. 1 Status - LESS THAN 1200 F" (confirm) "Start RCPs 
as necessary until coze exit TCs less than 1200 F" 
(confirm) "Core exit TCs greater than 1200 F and all 
available RCPs running" (confirm-& 
"Open all pRZR PORVs and block valves" (confirm) 
"Still bad" (confirm) 
"Open reactor vessel head vents and PRZR vents to 
containment" (confirm))) 
(17 "17. Try to Locally Depressurize All Intact SGs To 
AtmOSpheriC PreaauZe&v ("17. 1 Use SG atmosphere" (confirm))) 
(1S "18. Check If Accumulators Should Be Isolated:" ("18. 1 RHR flow indicators — AT LEAST INTERMITTENT 
FLOW" (confirm& (16&) 
&"18. 2 Close all accumulator isolation valves" 
(confirm) "Vent any unisolated accumulator" &confirm))) (19 "19. Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:" ("19. 1 At least two RCS hot leg temperatures — LESS 
THAN 350 F" (confirm) (20) ) ("19. 2 Stop all RCPs" (confirm))) 
(20 "20. Verify ECCS Flow" ("20. 1 CCP injection flow indicators — CHECK FOR FLOW 
SI pump flow indicators — CHECK FOR FLOW 
RHR pumP flow indicators - CHECK FOR FLOW" (confirm) "1) Continue 
efforts to establish ECCS flow 
2) Try to establish charging" (16))) 
(21 "21. Check Coze Cooling:" 
("21. 1 At least two RCS hot leg temperatures — LESS 
THAN 35&) F" (confirm))) 
(22 "22. LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT" 
(&loca 12))))))) 
(atws 
((procedure ((nl "NOTE: Step 1-3 should be performed immediately If reactor trip occurs, immediately go to E-&), REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY 
INJECTION, STEP 2") 
(1 "1. Perform FOllowing Actions From Control Room:" ("l. 1 Try to trip zeactor manually" (confirm) "Try to 
manually insert control rods" &confirm)) ("1. 2 Tzy to trip turbine manually" &confirm) "Try to 
runback turbine" (confirm))) 
(2 "2. Check AFW Pumps Running" ("2. 1 Motor driven pump breaker indicator lights — LIT" 
(confirm) "Manually start pumps" (confirm)) ("2. 2 Turbine driven pump steam supply valves - OPEN" (confirm) "Manually open valves" )) 
(3 "3. Check AFW Valve Alignment:" ("3. 1 AFW valves — PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT" (confirm) 
"Manually open or close valves as appropiate" (confirm))) 
(4 "4. Check If the Following Trips Have Occured:" ("4. 1 Reactor Trip" (confirm) "Try to trip locally" 
(confirm)) ("4. 2 Turbine Trip" (confirm) "Try to trip locally 
(confirm))) 
(5 "5. Verify AFW Flow:" ("5. 1 AFW flow indicators - CHECK FOR FLOW" (confirm) 
"pezform actions 2 and 3 locally" (confirm))) (cl "CAUTION: Charging pump miniflow valves must remain 
open when RCS pressure is greater than pump shutoff head") 
(6 "6. Initiate Rapid Boration Of RCS To Obtain Adequate 
Shutdown Margin:" ("6. 1 Start charging pumps" (confirm)) ("6. 2 Align boration flow path" (confirm)) ("6. 3 Check RCS Pressure — LESS THAN ??? PSIG" (confirm) 
"Open PRZR PORVs, as necessary, until RCS pressure drop 
to ??? PSIG" (confirm))) 
(7 "7. Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation" ((confirm) "Manually isolate containment ventilation" 
(confirm))) 
(8 "8. Maintain Adequate Shutdown Marin" ((confirm))) 
(9 "9. REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION" ((reactor. trip 2))1)))) (losp 
(&procedure ((nl "NOTE: Steps 1 and 2 are to 
immediately" ) (1 "1. Verify Reactor Trip:" ("1. 1 All rod bottom lights — LIT 
All rod position indicators — ZERO 
Neutron flux — DECREASING" (confirm-) (2)) 
be performed 
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("Manually trip zeactor" (confirm) (atws 1) ) (" If no instrumentation available, dispatch personnel to 
restore power to vital instrument busses" (confirm))) 
(2 "2. Verify Turbine Trip:" ("2. 1 All turbine stop valves — CLOSED" (confirm) 
"Nanually trip turbine" (confirm))) (cl "CAUTION: When power is restored to one ac emergency 
bus immediately go to step 19 and evaluate plant recovery options. If an SI signal exists or if SI is actuated during this guideline, it 
should be reset. ") 
(3 "3. Try to Restore Power to Any AC Emergency Bus:" ("3. 1 Load ac emergency bus on diesel" ) ("3. 1. 1 Start diesel" (confirm) "Follow plant specific 
guidelines for emergency start of diesel" ) ("3. 1. 2 Verify automatic loading on diesel" (confirm) 
"Manually load diesel" (confirm) "Trip diesel" (confirm)) ("3. 2 AC bus loaded" (confirm) "Load bus on any other 
power supply" (confirm)) ("3. 3 AC emergency power restored" (confirm-) (19)) ("3. 3. 1 DiSPatch personnel to locally restore ac power" 
(confirm)) ("3. 3. 2 Place following safeguards component switches in 
PULL-TO-LOCK position: 
a) Charging/SI pumps 
b) High head SI pumps 
c) Low-head SI pumps 
d) Containment spray pumps 
e) CCW pumps 
f) Motor-driven AFW pumps 
g) Containment fan coolers" (confirm))) (c2 "CAUTION; Essential service water pump will 
automatically load on energized ac emergency bus to provide diesel 
generator cooling" ) 
(4 "4. Verify RCS Isolation:" ("4. 1 Pressurizer PORVs — CLOSED" (confirm) "RCS 
pressure greater than 2335" (confizm) 
"Manually close PORVs" (confirm)) ("4. 2 Letdown isolation valves — CLOSED" (confirm) 
"Nanually close valves" (confirm)) ("4. 3 Excess letdown isolation valves — CLOSED" 
(confirm) "Manually close valves" (confirm))) 
(5 "5. Place Following Valve Switches In CLOSED 
Position and Dispatch Personnel to Locally Close Valves To Isolate 
RPC Seals:" ("5. 1 Close RCP seal return outside containment 
isolation valve" (confirm)) ("5. 2 Close RCP seal injection outside containment 
isolation valves" (confizm)) ("5. 3 Close RCP thermal barrier CCW return outside 
containment isolation valve" (confirm))) 
(6 "6. Verify AFW Flow:" ("6. 1 AFW flow indicators — CHECK FOR FLOW" (confirm) 
"1) Verify turbine-driven AFW pump steam supply valves 
open 
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2) Verify proper emergency alignment of AFW valves" (confirm) 
"Manually open valves" &confirm))) 
(7 "7. Check CST To Hotwell Isolation&v ("7. 1 Condenser hotwell isolation valves — CLOSED" 
(confirm) "Manually close valves" (confirm))) 
(8 "8. Check Steam Generator Isolation" ("8. 1 Main steamline isolation valves — CLOSED" 
(confirm) "Manually close valves" (confirm)) ("8. 2 Main steamline isolation bypass valves — CLOSED" 
&confirm) "Manually close valves" (confirm)) ("8. 3 Blowdown isolation valves — CLOSED" (confirm) 
"Manually close valves" (confizm))) 
(9 "9. Check For Secondary Integrity:" ("9. 1 All steam generator pressures — APPRoxIMATELY 
EQUAL" (confirm) 
"1) Zsolate AFW flow of faulted steam genertor 
2) Isolate faulted steam generator steam supply to turbine-driven AFW 
pump" (confirm))) 
(10 10. Check For Primary To Secondary Integrity:" ("10. 1 Condensez air ejector radiation - NORMAL" 
(confirm) 
"If HIGH, continue with this guideline while trying to 
identify and isolate faulted steam generator" (confirm)) ("10. 2 Steam generator blowdown radiation — NORMAL" 
(confirm) 
"If HIGH, continue with this guideline while trying to 
identify and isolate faulted steam generator" (confirm))) 
(c3 "CAUTION: A faulted steam generator 
that is isolated should remain isolated throughout further recovery 
actions. ") (11 "11. Check Non-Faulted Steam Generator Levels:" ("11. 1 Narrow range level - GREATER THAN ???" (confirm) 
"Maintain full AFW flow until narrow range level is 
greater than ???" (confirm)) ("11. 2 Manually control AFW flow to maintain narrow 
range level at ???" (confirm) 
"Zf narrow range level in one steam generator 
continues to increase with AFN flow stopped, 
1) Isolate AFN flow to faulted steam generator 
2) Isolate faulted steam generator steam supply to turbine-driven AFW 
pump" (confizm))) 
(12 "12. Check CST Level:" ("12. 1 CST level - GREATER THAN '??? 0" &confirm) 
"Switch to alternate AFN water supply" (confirm))) 
(13 "13. Check DC Bus Loads:" ("13. 1 Shed all large non-vital dc loads as soon as 
practical" (confirm)) ("13. 2 Dispatch personnel to monitor DC power supply" (confirm))) 
(c4 "CAUTION: Zn order to prevent injection of 
accumulator nitrogen into the RCS and to prevent the reactor core 
returning to criticality due to moderator temperature effects, DO NOT 
reduce RCS pzessure below ??? psig OR coze exit TC temperature below 
'?? F ) 
(n2 "NOTE: 1) The non-faulted steam generators should be 
depressurized as quickly as possible BUT in a controlled manner so 
that RCS pressure and temperature limits are not violated. 2) 
Continue with step 15 of this guideline on after depressurization of 
non-faulted steam generators in step 14 has been started") 
(14 "14. Depressurize Non-Faulted Steam Generators to 
Minimize RCS Inventory Loss:" ("14. 1 Manually open and throttle steam generator poRvs 
to reduce RCS pressure to ??? psig" (confirm) 
"Locally open and throttle PORVs" (confirm)) ("14. 2 Manually control AFW flow to maintain steam 
generator narrow range level at 77? 4" (confirm) 
"If less than ??? 
1) Maintain full AFW flow until narrow range level is greater than 
???4 
2) Maintain steam generator levels above top of U-tubes, then stop 
steam generator depressurization" (confirm)) ("14. 3 Manually throttle steam generator PORVs to 
maintain RCS pressure at ??? psig" (confirm) 
"Locally throttle PORVs" (confirm))) (15 "15. Check RCS Conditions During Secondary 
Depressurization:" ("15. 1 RCS Pressure — GREATER THAN ?? PSIG" (confirm) 
"Stop steam generator depressurization AND restore RCS 
pressure to ?? psig" (confirm)) ("15. 2 Core exit TC — GREATER THAN ?? F" (confirm) 
"Stop steam generator depressurization AND restore RCS 
pressure to ?7 psigw (confirm})) (16 "16. Verify and Reset SI Signal:" ("16. 1 Verify SI signal actuated" (confirm) "Manually 
initiate SI" (confirm)) ("16. 2 Reset SI signal" (confirm))) 
(17 "17, Verify Containment Isolation Phase A:" ("17. 1 Isolation phase A valves - CLOSED" (confirm) 
"Manually close valves" (confirm))) 
(18 "18. Check If Recovezy Can Be Initiated:" ("18. 1 One AC emergency bus — POWER RESTORED" (confirm) 
"Continue to control RCS conditions and monitor plant 
status 
1) Check status of auxiliary boration systems 
2) Check status of spent fuel cooling 
3) Control RCS pressure and temperature" (14))) (19 "19. Maintain Stable RCS Pressure And Temperature 
While Evaluating Recovery Options:") 
(20 "20. Select Recovery Option:" ("20. 1 Check RCS subcooling — GREATER THAN ??? F" 
(confirm) "LOSP with SI REQUIRED" ) ("20. 2 Check pressurizer level — GREATER THAN 10%" 
(confirm) "LOSP with SI REQUIRED" ) ("20. 3 Verify that SI components have not automatically 
actuated upon ac power restoration" (confirm) 
"LOSP with SI REQUIRED") ("20. 4 LOSP WITHOUT SI REQUIRED" )))))) 
(lohs 
((procedure 
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( (cl "CAUTION: DO NOT proceed if there is uncontrolled 
depressuriration of all steam generators and total feed flow is less 
than 470 gpm 2) If wide range level in any 3 SGs is less than 253 or 
PRZR pressure is greater than or equal to 2335 psig due to loss of 
secondary heat sink, RCPs should be tripped and Steps 5-11 should be 
immediately initiated for bleed and feed 3) Feed flow should bot be 
re-established to any faulted SG if a non-faulted SG is available" ) (1 "1. Check If Secondary Heat Sink Is Required" ("1. 1 RCS pressure — GREATER THAN NON-FAULTED SG 
PRESSURE" (confirm) "LOCA" (loca 1) ) ("1. 2 RCS temperature — GREATER THAN 350 F" (confirm) 
"Try to put RHR System in service while continuing with 
guide. " (confirm))) 
(2 "2. Try to establish AFW Flow To at Least One SGs:" ("2. 1 Check control room indications for AFW failure: 
1) CST level 
2) AFW pump power supply 
3) AFW valve alignment" (confirm) ) ("2. 2 Try tO restore AFW flow: 
1) Restore level in CST and start AFW pumps 
2) Align SSW to suction of AFW pumps and start FW pumps 
3) Restore power to MDAFW pumps and start MDAFW pumps 
4) Start TDAFW pump 
5) Align AFW valves as necessary" (confirm)) ("2. 3 Check total flow to SGs — GREATER THAN 470 GPM" 
(confirm) 
DispatCh operator to locally restore AFW flow" (3)) ("2. 4 Return to procedure and step in effect" 
(confirm))) 
(3 "3. Stop All RCPs" ((confirm))) 
(4 "4. Check CCP Status" ("4. 1 Status — AT LEAST ONE AVAILABLE" (confirm) (10))) 
(c2 "CAUTION: If offsite power is lost after 
SI reset, manual action may be required to restart safeguards 
equipment" ) (nl "NOTE: When establishing Main Feedwater to SGs, at 
least two SGs should be used"))))) 
COMMENT: MITIGATE acts a uSer interface with the guideline knowledge 
base 
(defun mitigate (reit) 
(prog (rsltl mp line ans) 
(send *standard-outputw :expose) 
(send wstandard-output* :select) (setq rsltl reit) (setq last nil) (setq line 1) (terpri) 
label (if (equal rsltl nil) (return)) 
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(setq mp (caz (kbcall 4 (append ' (the procedure of ) (car rsltl) 
'(is Ia)) 1))) 
labell 
(prog (current step stepl) (setq step (cdr (get-line line mp))) 
(pzinc (car step&) (terpri) (setq step (cdr step)) 
(go labe13) 
labe12 (setq step (next-line line mp)) (if (equal step nil) (return)) 
&setq line (car step)) (setq step (cdr step)) (princ (car step)) (terpri) (setq step (cdr step)) 
labe13 (setq current (append (car rsltl) (list (caz (next-line 
line mp))))) (setq stepl (car step)) (if (equal stepl nil) (go labe12) ) (setq ans (eval-mit-rou current stepl)) 
(cond ((neq ans nil) 
(cond ((eql (length ans) 2) (setq rsltl (list (list (first ans)))) (setq line (second ans)) (go label))) (setq line (first ans)& 
(go labell))) (setq step (cdr step&) 
(go labe13))&) 
COMMENT: EVAL-MIT-ROU evaluates rules in mitigation kb 
(defun eval-mit-rou (current step) 
(prog (stepl ans) 
label (setq stepl (car step)) 
(cond ((equal stepl nil) (return))) 
(cond ((stringp stepl) (princ stepl) (terpri) (setq step (cdr 
step) ) (go label) ) ) 
(cond ( (equal stepl ' (return) ) (return last))) 
(cond ((equal (first stepl) 'rule) (setq ans &eval-rule (second stepl))) 
(cond ((equal ans I) (return))) 
(cond ((equal nk nil) (princ "Not Confirmed" ) (terpri) (setq step (cdz step) ) (go label) ) ) 
(cond ((equal nk 'yes) (setq stepl '(confirm)))))) 
(cond ((equal stepl '(confirm)) 
(setq ans (y-n-other-p "Is this True ?")) 
&if (not (or (eql ans 't) (eql ans 'nil))) (return ans&) 
(cond (ans (terpri) (return)) ((terpri&)) 
(setq step (cdr step)& 
(go label))) (cond ((equal stepl '(confirm-)) 
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(setq ans (y-n-other-p "Is this True 2") & (if (not (or (eql ans 't) (eql ans 'nil) ) ) (return ans) ) 
(cond ((not ans) (terpri) (return)) ((terpri))) 
&setq step (cdr step&) 
(go label))) (if (= (length stepl) 2) (setq last current)& (return stepl))) 
(defun y-n-other-p (&optional str) 
(prog (ans) 
label 
(setq ans (prompt-and-read :character str)) (if (eql ans 4$y) (return 't)) (if (eql ans I'&n) (return 'nil)) 
(cond ((eql ans 4%() 
&setq ans (b-make-list (string-trim "() " (prompt-and- 
read :string "Special &(")))) 
(return ans))) 
(go label))) 
(defun b-make-list (str) 
(prog (list i j sstr istr bstr) (setq bstr " ") (setq list nil) (setq i 0) (setq 5 1& (setq sstr (substring str i j)) 
label 
(cond (( j (length str)) (cond ((not &equal (substring str (- j 1) j) " ")) (setq list (append list &list (string-symbol 
sstr)))))) (return list))) (setq 5 (+ j 1) ) 
&setq bstr istr) (setq istr (substring str (- j 1) j)) (cond (&equal istr " ") (setq i j) 
(cond ((not (equal bstz " ")) (setq list (append list 
sstr)))))) 
(go label) ) ) (setq sstr (substring str i 5) ) 
(go label) ) ) 
(list (string-symbol 
(defun get-line (line listl) 
(prog (list2) 
label (setq list2 &car listl)) 
(cond ((equal (first list2) line) (return list2))) (setq listl (cdr listl)) 
(go label))) 
next-line retzeives the line immediately after 'line 
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(defun next-line (line listl) 
(prog (list2) 
label 
(setq list2 (car listl)) 
(cond ((equal (first list2) line) (setq list2 (cadr listl)) (return list2))) 
(setq listl {cdr listl&) 
(go label))) 
COMMENT: Below defines windows and commands used for presenting 
Mitigation procedures 
(DW:DEFINE-PROGRAM-FRAMEWORK Mitigation 
:x 730 
:y 43 
:width 390 
:height 300 
:SELECT-KEY 
(&No 
: COMMAND-DEFINER 
T 
: COMMAND-TABLE 
(:INHERIT-FROM ' (" colon full command" "standard arguments" "input 
editor compatibility" ) 
:KBD-ACCELERATOR-P 'nil) 
:STATE-VARIABZES ((task-list nil&) 
:PANES ((TITLE-1 :TITLE :HEIGHT-IN-LINES 1:REDISPLAY-AFTER-COMMANDS NIL) 
(COMMAND-MENU-1:COMMAND-MENU :MENU-LEVEL :TOP-LEVEL) 
(PANE-1 :DISPLAY :INCREMENTAL-REDISPLAY T :REDISPLAY-FUNCTION 
'nil) 
(INTERACTOR-1 :INTERACTOR :HEIGHT-IN-LINES 4)) 
:CONFIGURATIONS 
'((DW::MAIN (: LAYOUT (DW::MAIN :COLUMN TITLE-1 COMMAND-MENU-1 PANE- 
1 ZNTERACTOR-1)) 
(:SIZES 
(DW::MAIN (TITLE-1 1 :LINES) 
(COMMAND-MENU-1 :ASK-WINDOW SELF :SIZE-FOR-PANE COMMAND-MENU- 
1) (INTERACTOR-1 4 :LINES) 
:THEN (PANE-1:EVEN))))) 
:top-level 
(dw:default-command-top-level :dispatch-mode :form-preferred)) 
(define-mitigation-command (corn-sgtr :menu-accelerator "SGTR") 
() (mitigate '((sgtr)&)) 
(define-mitigation-command (corn-sgtr-contingencies :menu-accelerator 
"SGTR Contingencies" ) 
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() 
&mitigate ' ( (sgtr-c& ) ) ) 
&define-mitigation-command (corn-si-terad. nation :menu-accelerator "SI 
Termination" ) 
() (mitigate '((si-t-sgtr)))) 
(define-mitigation-command (corn-loca :menu-accelerator "LOCA" ) 
(1 (mitigate '((loca)))) 
(define-mitigation-command (corn-reactor-trip :menu-accelerator 
"Reactor Trip" ) 
&) (mitigate '((reactor. trip)))) 
(define-mitigation-command (corn-inadequate-core-cooling :menu- 
accelerator "Znadequate Core Cooling" ) 
() (mitigate '((in-core-cool)))) 
(define-mitigation-command &corn-atws :menu-accelerator "ATWS") 
() (mitigate '&(atws)))) 
(define-mitigation-command (corn-losp :menu-accelerator "LOSP") 
() 
&su. tigate '(&losp»)& 
(define-mitigation-command (corn-lohs :menu-accelerator "LOHS") 
() (mitigate ' ( &lohs) ) 1) 
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